Gadianton wrote:JAK: And how many books have you (CC) had published? What is your particular qualification for passing judgment on the scholarship of Armstrong? Have you read The Battle for God?
Wouldn't CC then be able to ask you what your particular qualification is for dismissing Godel? (and by the way, Armstrong isn't to religious studies as Godel is to logic)
While the world's most significant logician might have been wrong, he probably wasn't merely begging the question.
(You quote from a much longer and more comprehensive post of mine.)
Why challenge Gödel? Good question
Realize that the reference to “modal logic” refers to multiple individuals each of whom have different constructs. Gödel is one.
See this for
other names which have different views of “modal logic” than does Gödel. It’s a lengthy discussion with multiple links within it. The university is Princeton.
“Abstract The problems we deal with concern
reasoning about incomplete knowledge. Knowledge is understood as ability of an ideal rational agent to make decisions about pieces of information. The formalisms we are particularly interested in are Moore's autoepistemic logic (AEL) and its variant, the logic of acceptance and rejection (AEL2). It is well-known that AEL may be seen as the nonmonotonic KD45 modal logic. The aim is to give an appropriate modal formalization for AEL2.”
Source
In bold (my addition) is a significant problem in “modal logic.” Another author is mentioned here.
Note the title in the following:
An Adaptive Logic for Presumptive Truth
This is a PDF file. In it you will find this statement:
“We relate the modal fragments of the adaptive logics to the corresponding temporal logics and focus on two main features:...”
I’ll not attempt to type all that the website gives.
Again, Gadianton, keep in mind there are various authors who begin with different assumptions in “modal logic” and Gödel is
one.
CC has stated:
“I accept Gödel's Ontological Argument as valid and work from there.”
Since there are numerous participants in “modal logic” and since they do not begin with the same
assumptions, and since
all assumptions absent evidence should be view with skepticism or rejected, the position of CC is an irrational one.
Why does he take it? He takes it because he claimed that Gödel proved
God. Gödel did nothing of the sort. Gödel
assumed God.
If you re-read Gödel, he makes an “if/then” construction in which the “if” part has
God in it. He establishes no such entity with all his sleight of hand and ruse of word.
But you, Gadianton, are quite right to ask why we might dismiss Gödel. The dismissal or skeptical review is of any construction which makes
assumptions for which no evidence is provided.
I’m not sure who you thought said something you stated:
Gadianton stated:
(and by the way, Armstrong isn't to religious studies as Godel is to logic)
Who argued that? I didn’t. Only CC referred to Gödel. I addressed his flawed defense. In previous posts, I addressed CC’s posts quoting him verbatim and responding. This format makes it difficult to see exactly where a post applies since it always places any post last. As a result, a response may be far from the post to which it was a response.
In any case, CC as not addressed my analysis and issues with regard to “modal logic.” I gave several links in earlier posts which address the problematic aspects not only of Gödel but of the general frame of reference in which
assumptions are made either implicitly or explicitly which are not supported by evidence.
That’s an inherent flaw in “modal logic.” There is “bi-modal logic” and “specific modal logic.”
“Presumptive truth” is a flaw in
modal logic as well. When one
accepts a single author among many (as CC stated he does), one is greatly limited. Any one of many “modal logic” constructs might be bette. Thus, one is making an
irrational leap. “Presumptive truth” is the title in a link I gave above.
You might also visit:
An Investigation in Quantified Modal Logic
While you may only get some of this publication on the web, “Quantified Modal Logic” discusses
others than Gödel (whom CC accepts).
So a better question is why does CC accept
one? I have suggested the answer to that.
Another link for you:
A deduction theorem for rejection theses in L ukasiewicz's system of modal logic.
“Modal logic” is frequently obsessed with metaphysics, temporal reasoning, epistemics, the analysis of action and processes, and ethical reasoning.
In fact all those and more is discussed in a publication:
Modal Logics and Philosophy by (I think) Rod Girle.
You can look up as you like.
JAK