Gad wrote:
Marg,
If your questions are regarding the meaning of his axioms, I don't have much interest as I noted above that it is unlikely I could agree with them anyway as I'm not a platonist. If your questions have to do with the structure of his argument, the symbolic manipulation, then ok. I only have two points of interest in this discussion:
1) If CC doesn't have the scholarly credentials to question Armstrong who isn't even a real authority in her field, then JAK most certainly does not have the scholarly credentials to to question Godel, who was probably the most noteworthy authority in history, of his field.
2) Godel's argument is not a tautology. Godel would not make a simple error that undermines the argument right out of the preface of a beginners guide to logic, c'mon.
My questions have to do with the argument put forth by CC, his use of Godel’s argument for that argument as well as what conclusion can be drawn and relied upon by Godel’s argument.
With regards to your interest, # 1, I addressed it already. You didn’t comment on what I said. I’ll attempt again. JAK’s statement/point to CC in which he offered K Armstrong as a source to back him up was basic theological knowledge. CC didn’t argue JAK’s point instead he dismissed it. Remember the phrase “extraordinary claims require extraordinary evidence” ? JAK’s claim was common knowledge not the least bit extraordinary, presumption rested with that claim. CC did not overturn it by his dismissal of K. Armstrong as a source for theological information. On the other hand CC’s claim is an extraordinary one. He claims a particular logic proves an actual God’s existence. The presumption does not rest with that claim, and CC needs extraordinary evidence to warrant it. He attempts to do so using Godel’s ontological argument. When JAK counters Godel’s ontological argument and how CC is using it, CC’s response does not refute JAK’s counter argument. Instead, CC focuses on ad hominem which indicates a disingenuous party when done repeatedly in lieu of proper argumentation. Furthermore his argument is that all theological claims are logically based which he never establishes.
Everyone in this entire world can argue against Godel’s argument, one doesn’t need credentials to do so. Just as everyone can argue against K. Armstrong. JAK has argued a case of the limitation of Godel’s argument and what it does not establish. It is up to CC to counter back. He has not done so, successfuly. JAK did not dismiss Godel out of hand, he presented a case against Godel’s ontological argument.
Godel’s ontological argument is fundamental to CC’s argument. K. Armstrong as a source back up to JAK’s point about many religious groups existing with different doctrines in not fundamental to the main argument.
With regards to your point # 2, don’t you think it is up to you to explain why you think Godel's ontological argument is not a tautology? I thought to some extent all deductive arguments were, but whether or not they are called tautological depends on how close or obvious the connection is between premises and conclusion.
So the following is what I'd also like you to comment on.
CC wrote: "You are correct in that logic is essential to theology."
I asked him: Explain why logic is
essential to theology. Can theology exist without logic?
CC’s reply: Without formal logic 'anything goes,' which is not acceptable to me.
***My question for you Gad: Do you agree with CC? Is logic
essential to theology/theological claims?
I cont’d to press CC: “You stated that logic is essential to theology. I don't see any justification for the "essential" part. JAK has pointed out to you and you might respond to him later, that value derived from logic is dependent upon reliable assumptions. In science there are scientific natural laws assumed because they hold up under testing and objective evaluation. It's a possibility they might be overturned in the future. But theories rest upon these scientific laws as the basic assumptions and build upon them. So science is logical in that way.
In theology the basic assumptions of the supernatural do not hold up to testing and objective evaluation. So those assumptions have no basis for merit as being actually true. JAK says it well " After many assumptions, theology may argue some causal link. The problem is that the initial assumptions were truth by assertion. Hence, applying “logic” following faulty assumptions really means we have no logic or we have flawed logic."”
***My question to you Gad, do you agree or disagree with JAK’s point? " After many assumptions, theology may argue some causal link. The problem is that the initial assumptions were truth by assertion. Hence, applying “logic” following faulty assumptions really means we have no logic or we have flawed logic."”
CC’s responded to me: Gödel defines a God-like being, sets forth some axioms, then proceeds to prove such a being exists.
***My question to CC but now to you: What definition does Godel give for this "god-like being"?
What axioms are assumed?
Does this "logic" arrive at a conclusive conclusion or a probability?
Does the conclusion conclude that a God exists as an actual entity, by actual I mean a thing which exists in reality.
***I wrote this to CC and would like to know if you agree with me or not?
The weakness or problem with the way you are using this modal logic is that it is a game or system which does not have to connect to the actual world but you are using it as if it does connect. If it is used as if it links to the actual world but there in fact is no link, then it's used incorrectly. And that means the logic has broken down. Your conclusions will not be logically derived. If this God proof Godel logic doesn't link to an actual world, then any conclusion drawn can not be relied upoon as saying anything true about the actual world.
CC, where is the link/connection to the actual world in this Godel logic for God? What definition of a god is it theoretically concluding exists in the actual world?
***I wrote this to you, do you agree or disagree?
"I don't think JAK has been critical of modal logic. I think he has been critical of the argument given by CC that one can use Godel's ontological argument using modal logic to justify there is logical proof of God's existence. Modal logic may be useful, I've got no qualms with that and I doubt JAK does either. The problem is with how someone uses it. If one is going to set up a definition and assume axioms and then use that closed system/game whatever you want to call it, to say something about the actual world, there has to be some link to the actual world to warrant doing that. You say "God in theism reasoned from ontology, similarily, isn't something emperical evidence will ever say much about." Well that's fine but then one should be clear and honest about the limitations of what an ontological argument regarding a God concept can say. It can not say, it has logical proof of the existence of an actual God."
You wrote
3) sorry, but JAK has not, nor will he ever find a simple logical fallacy in Godel's thinking, no matter what Godel was thinking about.
I responded: Yes but Godel's logic is a closed system. I'm sure JAK appreciates that if one wants to restrict one's reasoning to such a closed reasoning system, it is limited to what information can be derived from it with regards to the actual world we live in.
***Do you agree with me or not?