Tal's epistemology (and DCP's)
Posted: Wed Jul 11, 2007 4:12 am
OK this deserves an new thread.
Here is a quote of Tal's to get us started.
Personally, I am not so quick to dismiss all the ideas of Kant, Hume and Kuhn.
I don't think that we have discovered a rock solid foundation for knowledge in the way that classical epistemology sought and seeks to do. The same questions and pitfalls keep recurring.
On the other hand, I agree with folks like Dennett (and Rorty) to the extent that I think science and other projects can get along without such foundationalisms. There is no "formula" for truth but this does not stop the scientific endeaver.
Where I am having trouble is seeing whether Tal thinks that we (or that Mormons) must come up with a foundation for or otherwise believe in the possibility of absolute indubitable knowledge or acquiesce to radical skepticism.
My take on DCP is that he probably
1. Rejects radical skepticism and radical relativism.
2. He rejects the possiblity (and perhaps the coherence) of absolute knowledge (we are human!). He probably realizes that the word knowledge is just a word we use without total consistancy and without appeal to a formula or a final theory of knowledge.
3. He thinks there is something to the idea that all so called facts are theory laden but that this does not lead to radical skepticism or epistemological solipsism. It only means that our facts are situated in an implicit and sometimes explicit theoretical background and cannot even be stated without such.
4. He thinks that he can have an admittedly imperfect knowledge of the truth of the Mormon church.
I agree with 1,2, and 3 and even think that if the Mormon church were true (contra all plausiblity) then indeed one might be able to know it in the same sense that one "knows" other things so 4 could be true (no claim of godlike apodicticity). Unfortunately I think this would involve considerations that should be public and in some sense empirical---not some appeal to a subjective encounter with "The Holy Ghost".
However, such an encounter may just in fact make someone believe. But then an encounter with LSD makes people believe weird things too.
The main place I differ is simply that I think evidence and common sense demand that I recognize that the Mormon church is about as likely to be true as the Church of Scientology (essentially nil).
Why DCP doesn't see this is just a mystery of life that I am used to becuase I see similar thing all around me.
In short I don't think that DCP or anyone else knows the church to be true and I hold this opinion in part simply because I don't think the church is true and by linguistic convention one can't know what isn't true.
In fact I am tempted to say I know it's not true--I think I have good reasons! But that knowledge/conviction isn't locked up in some absolute sense (as if I had a mathematical proof).
So what exactly are Tal's own convictions on "knowledge"?
What exactly are Dr. Peterson's conviction on the matter.
Please, note that I don't think a person should have hold a grand theory of knowledge and its OK to say so.
Also, in regard to Post Modernism, I think there is a great deal of misunderstanding and overgeneralization.
For example, I personally think a lot of that stuff is bunk but guys like R. Rorty are to be given due consideration.
Sidewinder/Gadianton/Greyskull had a few good things to say on this.
Greyskull, care to weigh in?
Here is a quote of Tal's to get us started.
Tal Bachman wrote:[color=darkblue][size=14]Tarski
As a rule, I try to interpret things as charitably as is consistent with remaining rational. After reading some of the nonsense banged out on this issue by Peterson and other (amateur) apologists on the FAIR board - citing "Structure of Scientific Revolutions" to defend Mormonism, citing Kant's adoption of, and spin on, Hume's skepticism (which has pretty much subserved every daft po-mo or radically skeptical claim since) - I don't think I have them mispegged at all (or perhaps I should put it this way: only they themselves have given others every reason to believe they [at opportune times anyway] doubt the possibility of knowledge; and if they don't really doubt it, but simply have said as much while defending Mormonism, that only means they are very happy to spontaneously fly up ad hoc defense arguments which even they themselves don't really believe in, just to...just to what? "Do their jobs"? "Keep people believing"? But why, if it isn't even true? And if they're doing that, what would that say about their integrity?)
Personally, I am not so quick to dismiss all the ideas of Kant, Hume and Kuhn.
I don't think that we have discovered a rock solid foundation for knowledge in the way that classical epistemology sought and seeks to do. The same questions and pitfalls keep recurring.
On the other hand, I agree with folks like Dennett (and Rorty) to the extent that I think science and other projects can get along without such foundationalisms. There is no "formula" for truth but this does not stop the scientific endeaver.
Where I am having trouble is seeing whether Tal thinks that we (or that Mormons) must come up with a foundation for or otherwise believe in the possibility of absolute indubitable knowledge or acquiesce to radical skepticism.
My take on DCP is that he probably
1. Rejects radical skepticism and radical relativism.
2. He rejects the possiblity (and perhaps the coherence) of absolute knowledge (we are human!). He probably realizes that the word knowledge is just a word we use without total consistancy and without appeal to a formula or a final theory of knowledge.
3. He thinks there is something to the idea that all so called facts are theory laden but that this does not lead to radical skepticism or epistemological solipsism. It only means that our facts are situated in an implicit and sometimes explicit theoretical background and cannot even be stated without such.
4. He thinks that he can have an admittedly imperfect knowledge of the truth of the Mormon church.
I agree with 1,2, and 3 and even think that if the Mormon church were true (contra all plausiblity) then indeed one might be able to know it in the same sense that one "knows" other things so 4 could be true (no claim of godlike apodicticity). Unfortunately I think this would involve considerations that should be public and in some sense empirical---not some appeal to a subjective encounter with "The Holy Ghost".
However, such an encounter may just in fact make someone believe. But then an encounter with LSD makes people believe weird things too.
The main place I differ is simply that I think evidence and common sense demand that I recognize that the Mormon church is about as likely to be true as the Church of Scientology (essentially nil).
Why DCP doesn't see this is just a mystery of life that I am used to becuase I see similar thing all around me.
In short I don't think that DCP or anyone else knows the church to be true and I hold this opinion in part simply because I don't think the church is true and by linguistic convention one can't know what isn't true.
In fact I am tempted to say I know it's not true--I think I have good reasons! But that knowledge/conviction isn't locked up in some absolute sense (as if I had a mathematical proof).
So what exactly are Tal's own convictions on "knowledge"?
What exactly are Dr. Peterson's conviction on the matter.
Please, note that I don't think a person should have hold a grand theory of knowledge and its OK to say so.
Also, in regard to Post Modernism, I think there is a great deal of misunderstanding and overgeneralization.
For example, I personally think a lot of that stuff is bunk but guys like R. Rorty are to be given due consideration.
Sidewinder/Gadianton/Greyskull had a few good things to say on this.
Greyskull, care to weigh in?