Res Ipsa wrote: ↑Sat Jan 01, 2022 8:46 pm
Please dig away. I learned Critical Theory in law school, but not in a course called Critical Theory. I learned it through the utterly charming case method of study (a la the Paper Chase), but with the method turned on its head. And I was left to figure out what it all meant mostly on my own. So, it's hard sometimes for me to articulate as a general concept something that I learned through repeated examples.
Your initial understanding is what I intended, but I can see why you found my wording problematic. It's easiest for me to illustrate in law. Classical legal theory postulated that judges decided cases by the application of discernible and neutral rules. Langdell proposed that we could discover those rules by studying cases. From the cases, we could infer the rules. And, once we knew the rules, we could deduce the correct result in any given case.
Between classical legal theory and Critical Legal Studies came a school of thought called Legal Realists. I believe they were the first recognized school fo thought to apply Critical Theory to law. One of the notions that they challenged was that general rules could ever dictate the results in a specific case. When I referred to the ideals of western liberal democracy, I'm analogizing to the general legal rules. And when I referred to equality of opportunity vs. oppression, I'm analogizing to the results in a specific case. If a general rule cannot dictate the results in a specific case, then we cannot simply rely on what appears to be a fair and neutral set of general principles to give us a fair and just society on the ground. We have to look at outcomes and not just be satisfied with theory.
I hope that is a better explanation.
Thanks, Res. It reminded me of something I had read quite a few years ago (damn that made me feel old, too) out of Reason magazine in 2004. It had to do with the debate around same-sex marriage a decade before
Obergefell v. Hodges that took on the issue from the position of marriage tradition. The writer is a gay, libertarian male who first framed the problem from an argument with which he agreed, then deconstructed to show the premise behind the conservative view of proven societal norms having intrinsic value that one tampers with at risk to society was digressive in the face of recognized harm. Here's the link:
https://reason.com/2004/06/01/objection ... -unions-2/
His set-up invokes Friedrich August von Hayek, who he describes as, "one of the 20th century's great economists and philosophers." The Hayekian argument, as he calls it, is built on the same foundation you describe being proposed regarding law by Langdell. That being as follows:
"Every man growing up in a given culture will find in himself rules, or may discover that he acts in accordance with rules -- and will similarly recognize the actions of others as conforming or not conforming to various rules," Hayek wrote in Law, Legislation, and Liberty. The rules, he added, are not necessarily innate or unchangeable, but "they are part of a cultural heritage which is likely to be fairly constant, especially so long as they are not articulated in words and therefore also are not discussed or consciously examined."
...
"It may indeed prove to be far the most difficult and not the least important task for human reason rationally to comprehend its own limitations. It is essential for the growth of reason that as individuals we should bow to forces and obey principles which we cannot hope fully to understand, yet on which the advance and even the preservation of civilization depends. Historically this has been achieved by the influence of the various religious creeds and by traditions and superstitions which made man submit to those forces by an appeal to his emotions rather than to his reason. The most dangerous stage in the growth of civilization may well be that in which man has come to regard all these beliefs as superstitions and refuses to accept or to submit to anything which he does not rationally understand. The rationalist whose reason is not sufficient to teach him those limitations of the powers of conscious reason, and who despises all the institutions and customs which have not been consciously designed, would thus become the destroyer of the civilization built upon them. This may well prove a hurdle which man will repeatedly reach, only to be thrown back into barbarism."
This Hayekian argument essentially being that the rules, the structure that culture and tradition has erected are dangerous to tamper with as one cannot be so smart as to be able to predict a positive outcome from doing so. And the potential risk is so great that it should scare away the attempt.
As the author continues,
"Here the advocates of same-sex marriage face peril coming from two directions. On the one side, the Hayekian argument warns of unintended and perhaps grave social consequences if, thinking we're smarter than our customs, we decide to rearrange the core elements of marriage. The current rules for marriage may not be the best ones, and they may even be unfair. But they are all we have, and you cannot re-engineer the formula without causing unforeseen results, possibly including the implosion of the institution itself. On the other side, political realism warns that we could do serious damage to the legitimacy of marital law if we rewrote it with disregard for what a large share of Americans recognize as marriage.
"If some state passed a law allowing you to marry a Volkswagen, the result would be to make a joke of the law. Certainly legal gay marriage would not seem so silly, but people who found it offensive or illegitimate might just ignore it or, in effect, boycott it. Civil and social marriage would fall out of step. That might not be the end of the world -- the vast majority of marriages would be just as they were before -- but it could not do marriage or the law any good either. In such an environment, same-sex marriage would offer little beyond legal arrangements that could be provided just as well through civil unions, and it would come at a price in diminished respect for the law.
"Call those, then, the problem of unintended consequences and the problem of legitimacy. They are the toughest problems same-sex marriage has to contend with. But they are not intractable."
The author acknowledges his own favoritism for Hayek as an economist, including the same principles being foundation to his economic views on free markets vs. central control, but then proceeds to make what I think is a case for same-sex marriage that aligns with what you describe above in general regarding critical theory as an approach to established orders where outcomes do not, as claimed, reveal truly desirable and predictable guiding principles in play.
So the extreme Hayekian position -- never reform anything -- is untenable. And that point was made resoundingly by no less an authority than F.A. Hayek himself. In a 1960 essay called "Why I Am Not a Conservative," he took pains to argue that his position was as far from that of reactionary traditionalists as from that of utopian rationalists. "Though there is a need for a 'brake on the vehicle of progress,'" he said, "I personally cannot be content with simply helping to apply the brake." Classical liberalism, he writes, "has never been a backward-looking doctrine." To the contrary, it recognizes, as reactionary conservatism often fails to, that change is a constant and the world cannot be stopped in its tracks.
His own liberalism, Hayek wrote, "shares with conservatism a distrust of reason to the extent that the liberal is very much aware that we do not know all the answers," but the liberal, unlike the reactionary conservative, does not imagine that simply clinging to the past or "claiming the authority of supernatural sources of knowledge" is any kind of answer. We must move ahead, but humbly and with respect for our own fallibility.
And there are times, Hayek said (in Law, Legislation, and Liberty), when what he called "grown law" requires correction by legislation. "It may be due simply to the recognition that some past development was based on error or that it produced consequences later recognized as unjust," he wrote. "But the most frequent cause is probably that the development of the law has lain in the hands of members of a particular class whose traditional views made them regard as just what could not meet the more general requirements of justice….Such occasions when it is recognized that some hereto accepted rules are unjust in the light of more general principles of justice may well require the revision not only of single rules but of whole sections of the established system of case law."
That passage, I think, could have been written with gay marriage in mind. The old view that homosexuals were heterosexuals who needed punishment or prayer or treatment has been exposed as an error. What homosexuals need is the love of another homosexual. The ban on same-sex marriage, hallowed though it is, no longer accords with liberal justice or the meaning of marriage as it is practiced today. Something has to give. Standing still is not an option.
Hayek himself, then, was a partisan of the milder version of Hayekianism. This version is not so much a prescription as an attitude. Respect tradition. Reject utopianism. Plan for mistakes rather than for perfection. If reform is needed, look for paths that follow the terrain of custom, if possible. If someone promises to remake society on rational or supernatural or theological principles, run in the opposite direction. In sum: Move ahead, but be careful.