Atheists who believe in moral truth must be nihilists.

[_JAK]

You misrepresent the website which you posted -- academic dishonesty:

http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/moral-relativism/

You quote only the first 3 lines which you thought served your purpose. Here’s what it really said in the first two parts of eight parts:

(Due to space, anyone reading can access the complete website as I’ll not copy all of the reference -- your reference -- on the board.)

Suffice it to say, it’s disingenuous to cherry-pick one sentence of a lengthy website on a
topic and deliberately misrepresent that website by omission of its major discussion. What you chose and choose is dishonesty.

I'll document:

The website:

http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/moral-relativism/

Moral Relativism

First published Thu Feb 19, 2004; substantive revision Wed Mar 10, 2004

Moral relativism has the unusual distinction — both within philosophy and outside it — of being attributed to others, almost always as a criticism, far more often than it is explicitly professed by anyone. Nonetheless, moral relativism is a standard topic in metaethics, and there are contemporary philosophers who defend forms of it: The most prominent are Gilbert Harman and David B. Wong. The term ‘moral relativism’ is understood in a variety of ways. Most often it is associated with an empirical thesis that there are deep and widespread moral disagreements and a metaethical thesis that the truth or justification of moral judgments is not absolute, but relative to some group of persons.

Sometimes ‘moral relativism’ is connected with a normative position about how we ought to think about or act towards those with whom we morally disagree, most commonly that we should tolerate them.

· 1. Historical Background

· 2. Forms and Arguments

· 3. Descriptive Moral Relativism

· 4. Are Moral Disagreements Rationally Resolvable?

· 5. Metaethical Moral Relativism

· 6. Mixed Positions: A Rapprochement between Relativists and Objectivists?

· 7. Relativism and Tolerance

· Bibliography

· Other Internet Resources

· Related Entries

1. Historical Background

Though moral relativism did not become a prominent topic in philosophy or elsewhere until the twentieth century, it has ancient origins. In the classical Greek world, both the historian Herodotus and the sophist Protagoras appeared to endorse some form of relativism (the latter attracted the attention of Plato in the Theaetetus). It should also be noted that the ancient Chinese Daoist philosopher Zhuangzi (formerly spelled Chuang-Tzu) put forward a nonobjectivist view that is sometimes interpreted as a kind of relativism.

Among the ancient Greek philosophers, moral diversity was widely acknowledged, but the more common nonobjectivist reaction was moral skepticism, the view that there is no moral knowledge (the position of the Pyrrhonian skeptic Sextus Empiricus), rather than moral relativism, the view that moral truth or justification is relative to a culture or society. This pattern continued through most of the history of Western philosophy. There were certainly occasional discussions of moral disagreement — for example in Michel de Montaigne's Essays or in the dialogue David Hume attached to An Enquiry Concerning the Principles of Morals. These discussions pertained to moral objectivity, but moral relativism as a thesis explicitly distinguished from moral skepticism ordinarily was not in focus. Prior to the twentieth century, moral philosophers did not generally feel obliged to defend a position on moral relativism.

Nonetheless, the increasing awareness moral diversity (especially between Western and non-Western cultures) on the part of Europeans in the modern era is an important antecedent to the contemporary concern with moral relativism. During this time, the predominant view among Europeans and their colonial progeny was that their moral values were superior to the moral values of other cultures. Few thought all moral values had equal or relative validity, or anything of that sort. The main impetus for such a position came from cultural anthropology.

Anthropologists were fascinated with the diversity of cultures, and they produced detailed empirical studies of them — especially “primitive,” non-Western ones. Early on anthropologists accepted the assumption of European or Western superiority. But this was challenged by Franz Boas, and his students — in particular, Ruth Benedict, Melville J. Herskovits, and Margaret Mead — explicitly articulated influential forms of moral relativism in the twentieth century. In 1947, on the occasion of the United Nations debate about universal human rights, the American Anthropological Association issued a statement declaring that moral values are relative to cultures and that there is no way of showing that the values of one culture are better than those of another.

Anthropologists have never been unanimous in asserting this, and in recent years human rights advocacy on the part of some anthropologists has mitigated the relativist orientation of the discipline. Nonetheless, prominent contemporary anthropologists such as Clifford Geertz and Richard A. Shweder continue to defend relativist positions.

An important early bridge from anthropology to philosophy was established by Edward Westermarck (1906-8 and 1932), a social scientist who wrote anthropological and philosophical works defending forms of empirical as well as metaethical moral relativism. In the post-war period, moral philosophers began devoting considerable attention to moral relativism and some — most notably Richard B. Brandt (1954) and John Ladd (1957) — took quite seriously the empirical effort of anthropology to understand the moralities of different cultures. Since then, the explicit focus on anthropological inquiries has mostly (though not entirely) subsided among philosophers. However, the preoccupation with moral relativism has not, and there is now an enormous literature on the subject (the Bibliography below is very limited). Most of these discussions are situated in the domain of “pure metaethics,” but not all. For example, there is considerable work on moral relativism in connection with human rights (with which some forms of relativism are in obvious conflict) and also with feminist philosophy (where it has been both criticized and defended vis-a-vis feminist concerns). There are also discussions of moral relativism in applied fields such as medical ethics.

2. Forms and Arguments

In general, the term ‘relativism’ refers to many different ideas. For example, in anthropology it sometimes connotes, among other things, the rather uncontroversial notion that anthropologists should strive to be impartial and unprejudiced in their empirical inquires. However, in moral philosophy ‘relativism’ is usually taken to suggest an empirical, a metaethical, or a normative position.

The website:

http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/moral-relativism/

For an honest address of this website, one must read all of it.

You placed it in your post. You dishonestly represented it.

JAK

[_JAK]

JAK,

Don't make me raise my right arm to the square. The Lord is not pleased with your opinions and I must insist that you repent.

Earlier you wrote:

(JAK): A claim requires transparent, objective evidence for support. Otherwise, it’s meaningless. It’s subjective in that there is no objective, skeptical review of the claim. Hence, anyone can claim anything -- subjective and mere assertion.

In other words, subjective claims are meaningless.

JAK:
In the context of my statement, claim absent evidence which supports the claim is unreliable.

Later you write:

(JAK):Discussions of moral notions consistently involve subjective imposition of cultural, societal, and civilizational notions.

Hence, notions of moral truths are inherently linked to the relative merit of such concepts.

Tommy wrote:
Therefore, discussion of moral notions are a banter of meaningless claims. And the relative merit is nonsense, as is cultural relativism. [/quote]

JAK:
You misrepresent. Notions of morality are demonstrably different in different cultures, civilizations, and societies (religions). Such notions are not consistent nor the same from group to group. Historical documentation affirms evolution of religious shifts -- doctrinal shifts.

Your statement is not what I stated nor is it an accurate paraphrase.

Yes JAK, I've read the book of Alma and have learned from my peers in the past how to reveal the contradictions of Christ's opposition.

JAK:
Entirely irrelevant to any comments of mine.

However, religious doctrines/dogmas don’t agree. The greater and lesser schisms in the evolution of religious inventions has been well documented. The most dramatic and recent fracture in Christianity began in 1517. It became what is know as the Protestant Reformation. That schism has led to the emergence of more than 1,000 denominations.

1517 CE: Martin Luther attacked certain practices and beliefs of the Roman Catholic Church, and the authority of the Pope. He was followed by other reformers which produced a mass movement -- the Protestant Reformation.

See the link below:

Families of Christian denominations in North America

You might also be interested in biblical contradictions. See the link below:

Biblical Contradictions

JAK

[_A Light in the Darkness]

Has he/she responded to your post yet?

Compare this to his original position statement: "Atheists who believe in moral truth must be nihilists."

My original position statement was clarified in the next lines in my opening post. The thread title only allows so much space.

All you have to do i read it:

"He shows how this flows from simply believing that things have value independent of personal opinion, that values can be aggregated, and that the future is limitless."

I think this criticism can be explained in terms of faulty reading on your part.

He has, of course, now turned his guns against moral relativism, arguing that it is functionally equivalent to nihilism. But, thankfully, we seem to be making at least a little progress. He does acknowledge that atheists who believe in moral relativism thereby escape being nihilists. And he at least implicitly recognizes that those who disbelieve in aggregative value theory and infinite future time will also escape nihilism. And instead of arguing that said atheists are nihilists, he now merely says that they "reduce down into nihilism." (This last point is only a partial improvement; I'm sure there are some atheists who will not eventually "reduce down" into nihilism, even if that is the logical consequence of their beliefs-- and even that is debatable.)

Their views by consequence are nihilist in nature. An atheist may not recognize this, of course, but that's neither here nor there. I clearly was talking about what one's positions logically ential. And, to be clear, moral relativism only escapes the issue insofar as it denies aggregate value theory. Moral relativism is still a form of belief in moral truth. It just makes that truth relative to culture, etc. So some "cultures" would run amok the problem still.

In other words, according to aggregative value theory, "goodness" is an actual, measurable, local phenomenon that can either increase or decrease, and we can add together the local units of goodness over a given area or period of time to determine the total goodness in that area or period. The article Ray quoted in the OP assigns the goodness values to units of time and argues that if future time is infinite, increases in value are meaningless. We might express it this way:

I'm not Ray. Everyone has hilariously just concluded that I'm Ray based upon next to nothing and a little irrational prejudice.

Note also that Ray has accommodated some, but not all, of the objections I raised earlier in the thread:

To make your personal definition of "meaning" (and thus your personal definition of "nihilism") part of the premise of your argument is what we call the fallacy of arbitrary redefinition.

The definition of nihilism in question is standard use in an academic context. In order for it to be an arbitratry personal definition, this would have to not be the case. It would have to be my use, not a term clearly defined in an acadmic paper in a way that accords with how other academic papers will use the term. Further, you are able to understand what is being communicated readily, as it is clearly defined. I think in your reach to the general dictionary you likely missed the contextual use of the term as it applies in moral philosophy. This is to be expected, as dictionaries are just designed to reflect common uses in the general populace. This can miss technical jargon, newer uses, subcultural uses, and so on.

As for your main criticism, you completely misunderstood what you were responding to. Smith doesn't assign value to units of time. He is talking about any kind of system of values that aggregates. I picked a common one, namely classic utilitarianism. In that system, to increase value, you increase the total happiness that exists. Happiness is a mental state of subjects. People, in other words. It just so happens that when compared against spatiotemporal infinity, any action cannot increase or decrease it because that increase is infintesimal. It doesn't matter. That's a valid use of the term nihilism.

[_CaliforniaKid]

Hello ALiD,

I am pleased you have chosen to defend your views. First, let's get a few trivialities out of the way:

My original position statement was clarified in the next lines in my opening post. The thread title only allows so much space.

All you have to do I read it:

"He shows how this flows from simply believing that things have value independent of personal opinion, that values can be aggregated, and that the future is limitless."

Very well, despite some obvious deficiencies in the above-quoted statement, I shall give you the benefit of the doubt.

I'm not Ray. Everyone has hilariously just concluded that I'm Ray based upon next to nothing and a little irrational prejudice.

OK. I shall show you the courtesy of taking your word for it.

Now, on to the philosophy:

The definition of nihilism in question is standard use in an academic context. In order for it to be an arbitratry personal definition, this would have to not be the case. It would have to be my use, not a term clearly defined in an academic paper in a way that accords with how other academic papers will use the term. Further, you are able to understand what is being communicated readily, as it is clearly defined.

Nihilism is frequently used-- even in an academic context-- as a near-synonym for pessimism or defeatism. More often than not, it is used as a derogatory label for someone else's point of view. "Nihilism" in common usage denotes a much more thoroughgoing rejection of value, meaning, truth, and ethics than one can argue for on the basis of Smith's philosophical argument. While Smith apparently thinks he has established nihilism in the full sense of the term, all he has really demonstrated is that-- if one accepts his particular formulation of aggregative value theory (and I do not)-- one cannot, by acting ethically, increase the total value of the universe. This leads to a rejection of moral realism but not necessarily of ethics, rights, and dignity insofar as they are social constructs or utilitarian ideals. Without a thoroughgoing rejection of ethics, a group of people cannot accurately be described as nihilists.

As for your main criticism, you completely misunderstood what you were responding to. Smith doesn't assign value to units of time. He is talking about any kind of system of values that aggregates.

Au contraire, my friend, it seems you are the one who has misunderstood Smith's argument. His aggregative system is very specific. It assigns a value to every unit of space, and the sum total of these units at a given moment comprises the value of that moment. Smith points out that both space and time are infinite, therefore an actual increase in value is impossible. But most aggregative systems do not concern themselves with the values of an infinite number of quantities (and probably would deny that inert space could have any intrinsic value, anyway). They are concerned with the values of a finite number of quantities: specifically, of people. This should be readily apparent to you if you know anything about the utilitarian system ethics.

I picked a common one, namely classic utilitarianism. In that system, to increase value, you increase the total happiness that exists. Happiness is a mental state of subjects. People, in other words. It just so happens that when compared against spatiotemporal infinity, any action cannot increase or decrease it because that increase is infintesimal. It doesn't matter. That's a valid use of the term nihilism.

If our object is to increase the total happiness that exists over a finite population, why in the world would we compare that against spatiotemporal infinity? Utilitarianism simply is not interested in spatiotemporal infinity! It is interested in the well-being of a finite population of human beings (or, in some formulations, a finite population of sentient beings). Smith's argument provides absolutely no leverage against this system.

-CK

[_marg]

I gather than in these quarters, my thread title is likely to be met with rolled eyes and hyperventilating dismissals pouring from flushed faces. So please don't take my word for it. Listen to this argument from Quentin Smith, one of atheism's most accomplished and popular apologists:

http://www.qsmithwmu.com/moral_realism_ ... _smith.htm

I read his argument though I still don't fully understand it. His last paragraph "how to live a nihilistic life" seemed to make sense. Events over a time period or over an area relative to infinity of space and time don't matter. There is no particular goal which can be ultimately reached, unless I suppose that goal is complete nothingness which could go on for infinity.

However what Q. Smith argued isn't representative of your subject title.

Q. Smith does not argue atheism entails moral nihilism. Rather he presents 3 premises which have nothing to do with atheism, and those premises entail moral nihilism. Look at the heading of his article: MORAL REALISM AND INFINITE SPACETIME IMPLY MORAL NIHILISM. If it is assumed or accepted there is moral nihilism relative to spacetime infinity, then it follows from that there are no moral agents. And god which is understood as a moral agent therefore would not exist. So moral nihilism in this argument entails atheism in the sense that atheism follows as the rational position to hold assuming this argument is true.

He has swallowed the full implications of his atheism. He accepts that moral truth, the kind we are used to anyway, isn't real or that, "Our emotional responses to acts or states of affairs we believe have positive or negative value occur when we are narrowly focused on “the here and now”, on the people we interact with or know about, ourselves, and the animals, plants and material things that surround us in our daily lives. In our daily lives, we believe actions are good or bad and that individuals have rights. These beliefs are false...Most of the time, we live in an illusion of meaningfulness and only some times, when we are philosophically reflective, are we aware of reality and the meaninglessness of our lives."

Essentially that's what he argued. But you have this part incorrect, his atheism does not imply his argument. His argument implies atheism. Atheism he derives after assuming an infinite space time universe in which no event relative to the infinite space time universe has any signficant value. From that he reasons no moral agent, no god therefore atheism a rational position to hold.

He is pointing out what Christian scholars have noted for years: that a godless, finite life when compared against the backdrop of an infinitely long universe is meaningless.

That's true, However "godless" follows from the conclusion of a moral nihilism being contingently true. So if one accepts the argument if follows from that argument that no moral god exists.

That nothing you do matters.

That's true according to his argument nothing matter relative to an infinite time/space. It's not true relative to a finite time/space. So his argument is a way of looking at things from a different perspective. What we as individuals perceive relative to a finite time/space is likely much different than if we would be able to look at events from the perspective of infinity. A similar example, our perception of the earth at any particular place on it is much different that if we are able to view the totality of earth from outer space. We can not see it as a sphere from our relative perspectives on earth. So certain areas are flat, others mountainous but we don't see the totality of the spere of earth..that is what the earth truly is a sphere.

He shows how this flows from simply believing that things have value independent of personal opinion, that values can be aggregated, and that the future is limitless. He also tries to use this in an argument against God. I think he is mistaken here, essentially attacking a strawman, needlessly limited version of God, but please keep focus on his main argument.

A theist and/or an atheist can evaluate his argument. God is not a contingent part of his first argument, but if one accepts the conclusion of his first argument the second argument follows that there is no god, as long as one defines god as a moral agent.

I'm not ready to accept his argument as I don't fully understand it. Particularly his first premise. However I do think that events relative to space/time infinity are so insignificant as to be meaningless in the grand scheme of things, but of course people are not interested in relating what possesses value to space/time infinity, they want to compare value relative to that which brings meaning to their lives, other's lives or future lives.

[_A Light in the Darkness]

Q. Smith does not argue atheism entails moral nihilism.

Again, I pointed this out in my opening post. I, however, think he misses a crucial property of God that many theists, including those found in your ward, that deflects the problem. Notice the crux of his argument rests on spatiotemporal infinity (Note to Beastie: Not to be equivocated with other notions of infinity). Does atheism have a similar "out?" Hence, the point of my claim. However, we can neglect whether theism falls to the argument and just focus on whether atheism does. These are not mutually exclusive things.

[_marg]

Q. Smith does not argue atheism entails moral nihilism.

Again, I pointed this out in my opening post.

I'm sorry I didn't notice, could you show me where you point this out. I addressed your opening post and didn't leave out any sentences.

I, however, think he misses a crucial property of God that many theists, including those found in your ward, that deflects the problem.

I hold an atheist position and have done so since birth, I have no ward. However I did notice Q. Smith used or assumed a particular God. How would your definition of a God differ to his? Would your God not be a moral agent for mankind? What would the purpose of your God be?

Notice the crux of his argument rests on spatiotemporal infinity (Note to Beastie: Not to be equivocated with other notions of infinity).

Yes.

Does atheism have a similar "out?"

I'm sorry I don't see how this sentence follows or is relevant to the previous sentence. The spatiotemporal infinity is an assumption, not an out.

Hence, the point of my claim.

I think the point of your claim is that you think one needs to believe in a God to have meaning in one's life. You assume Q. Smith argument is what all atheists accept. And that it follows for all atheists that they have no meaning in their lives. But this isn't so. As Q. Smith pointed out it's not how people operate. What they think is of value is relative to their finite lives or perhaps their perception of other's lives and they do not operate their lives as if they are living in an infinite space/time universe. While theists might operate with a love of God which they might assume gives them meaning, likewise atheists would operate with a love of mankind. One doesn't need a god belief to find meaning in life.

Q. Smith's argument supplies a reasoning why everyone (theists as well) should hold an atheist position. If due to infinite space/time our universe is unaffected by anything man does, if each event is so small in the scheme of things that it makes no difference in increassing value eventually to the future universe, then from the perspective of an infinite space time universe nothing is good or bad. And a God which is good the sort mankind typically thinks exists would not exist. But Q. Smith's argument is not how people operate. And his argument is not the reason which has consensus of approval by atheists for why they are atheists.

However, we can neglect whether theism falls to the argument and just focus on whether atheism does. These are not mutually exclusive things.

I'm assuming you mean atheism and his argument are not mutually exclusive. Yes if one accepts his first argument , and if one assumes the sort of God he mentions then one can assume that God based on his argument doesn't exist.

However if one doesn't accept his argument, doesn't accept his premises, doesn't accept the God he uses, then the reasoning for atheism he gives is irrelevant.

I don't understand his first premise, so I'm not in any position to evaluate it. Apparently he's written an entire book which supports it.

People in this thread are critical of his argument, don't accept it, do find flaws in it. Do you disagree with those flaws, if so what's your reasoning. If you support Q. Smith's argument then he's saying you should be an atheist. Most people in this thread, explained that for operational purposes they do not have beliefs which come from a perspective of an infinite space/time universe. They hold beliefs which come from the perspective of their finite lives and an appreciation of other's finite lives.

Even if one were to appreciate that in the long run, with an infinite space/time universe their actions will make no difference as far as adding any value to the universe, it still won't affect how people will operate. They still will be concerned with the betterment of the present life on earth, the betterment of others, and the betterment of future lives ahead of them, if they are attempting to be morally good individuals. And that is the case irrespective of their God beliefs.

Your argument assumes Q. Smith's argument is the reasoning employed by atheists, it's not.

What Q. Smith is doing is offering a different perspective. For operational purposes we typically assume a finite perspective but he's saying if one is completely logical and looks at the issue from the perspective that the universe is infinite in space and time then logically we should all be atheists of a moral agent sort of God.