Is Mormonism Morally Relative?

[_A Light in the Darkness]

Notice Guy has now just admitted to being rationally inconsistent. That was the entire substance of my post that started this tangent. He just now feels the right to own that inconsistency by pointing out that people often are unreasonable or, more charitably, that it is sometimes hard not to be inconsistent since we don't know everything.

That said, one need not conclude that people use both formal theories of normative ethics in their decision making. Most people aren't sophisticated enough to have such views anyway. That screws up the order of things. What happens is that people go about behaving and thinking the way they do, and those theories step in and try to account for the nature of moral obligations. To the extent that they conflict with how humans go about justifying themselves or deriving moral beliefs, either those humans are wrong or the theories are off. Both can't be correct. That is logically inconsistent, as Guy now finally acknowledges. It literally can't be both. If the empirical reality is that people often employ both, then the empirical reality is that people aren't reasonable. The solution there isn't to embrace this, but to progress in our understanding. And as a trivial matter, the inconsistencies Guy has attempted to bring up are easily shown to not be inconsistent as he would make them out to be. He tries to pidgeonhole moral statements as "formalistic" or "utilitarian" based on how it sounds rather than thinking about how they are understood in light of those theories. Yet he accuses others of having not given the subject much thought. For those who know better, it is insulting.

[_Runtu]

Notice Guy has now just admitted to being rationally inconsistent. That was the entire substance of my post that started this tangent. He just now feels the right to own that inconsistency by pointing out that people often are unreasonable.

I believe his point was that we're all morally inconsistent: sometimes we principles Trump consequences, and sometimes the reverse is true. There's nothing rationally inconsistent or unreasonable about this aspect of human behavior.

That said, one need not conclude that people use both formal theories of normative ethics in their decision making. Most people aren't sophisticated enough to have such views anyway. That screws up the order of things.

I think you misunderstood Guy here. No one has said that anyone uses theories in their decision making. In fact Guy specifically said the opposite: that the theories exist to explain human decision making processes.

What happens is that people go about behaving and thinking the way they do, and those theories step in and try to account for the nature of moral obligations. To the extent that they conflict with how humans go about justifying themselves or deriving moral beliefs, either those humans are wrong or the theories are off. Both can't be correct. That is logically inconsistent, as Guy now finally acknowledges. It literally can't be both.

Again, I think you're misreading Guy. It's quite consistent for humans to weigh principle against consequence.

If the empirical reality is that people often employ both, then the empirical reality is that people aren't reasonable.

This is a nonsequitur.

The solution there isn't to embrace this, but to progress in our understanding. And as a trivial matter, the inconsistencies Guy has attempted to bring up are easily shown to not be inconsistent as he would make them out to be. He tries to pidgeonhole moral statements as "formalistic" or "utilitarian" based on how it sounds rather than thinking about how they are understood in light of those theories. Yet he accuses others of having not given the subject much thought. For those who know better, it is insulting.

I've pretty much left you guys to your topic, as admittedly it's not something I've spent time on, nor am I interested in spending time on it. I'd comment on the insults from both sides, but what would be the point?

[_A Light in the Darkness]

I believe his point was that we're all morally inconsistent: sometimes we principles Trump consequences, and sometimes the reverse is true. There's nothing rationally inconsistent or unreasonable about this aspect of human behavior.

His point is that he is inconsistent as I have been saying, sure, but so is everybody. He says, or at least implies, there is nothing wrong with this.

I don't think you have the background to follow the more technical issue here. I don't mean this in an insulting way. There's two ways of looking at moral obligations being discussed here. One tells you what to do in series of duties one must follow that are derived a priori and then applied to situations people find themselves in. The other looks to the consequences of behavior to determine what you ought to do. Now, you can have principles that are based in consequences. You can say, "Don't kill Mormons" as a matter of principle and think this is correct because of the consequences it will cause. And there is plenty of room for exceptions, as the way we use language does allow for general rules of thumb. It's not a simple matter of "trumping." Rather, he is pointing out (or trying to) that the former sometimes seems to better explain the type of moral statements people use and sometimes it is the latter. Principles are easy to understand in terms of those a priori duties, for instance. So people use both. My response above is an extended way of showing why this is a misguided thing to say.

[_A Light in the Darkness]

If the empirical reality is that people often employ both, then the empirical reality is that people aren't reasonable.

This is a nonsequitur.

If the empirical reality is that people believe that dinosaurs lived with man, then the empirical reality is that people aren't being reasonable. Is this a statement you understand?

[_Runtu]

I believe his point was that we're all morally inconsistent: sometimes we principles Trump consequences, and sometimes the reverse is true. There's nothing rationally inconsistent or unreasonable about this aspect of human behavior.

His point is that he is inconsistent as I have been saying, sure, but so is everybody. He says, or at least implies, there is nothing wrong with this.

I don't think you have the background to follow the more technical issue here. I don't mean this in an insulting way.

Of course I don't have the technical background, as I said, but it's nice to finally have you say that in a noninsulting way.

There's two ways of looking at moral obligations being discussed here. One tells you what to do in series of duties one must follow that are derived a priori and then applied to situations people find themselves in. The other looks to the consequences of behavior to determine what you ought to do. Now, you can have principles that are based in consequences. You can say, "Don't kill Jews" as a matter of principle and think this is correct because of the consequences it will cause. And there is plenty of room for exceptions, as the way we use language does allow for general rules of thumb. It's not a simple matter of "trumping." Rather, he is pointing out (or trying to) that the former sometimes seems to better explain the type of moral statements people use and sometimes it is the latter. So people use both. My response above is an extended way of showing why this is a misguided thing to say.

I still think you're misreading him (and I'm not being insulting either), technical background or no. But I'll let Guy respond for himself.

[_Runtu]

If the empirical reality is that people often employ both, then the empirical reality is that people aren't reasonable.

This is a nonsequitur.

If the empirical reality is that people believe that dinosaurs lived with man, then the empirical reality is that people aren't being reasonable. Is this a statement you understand?

That's not a very good analogy. Is it reasonable to weigh moral beliefs against consequences or not?

[_A Light in the Darkness]

If the empirical reality is that people often employ both, then the empirical reality is that people aren't reasonable.

This is a nonsequitur.

If the empirical reality is that people believe that dinosaurs lived with man, then the empirical reality is that people aren't being reasonable. Is this a statement you understand?

That's not a very good analogy. Is it reasonable to weigh moral beliefs against consequences or not?

Let me be more explicit. The "empirical reality" that Guy describes is a state of affairs where people believe mutually inconsistent things. I consequently pointed out that means the empirical reality is a place where people believe unreasonable things. It doesn't justify their unreasonable views. My analogy points to something that is rationally dubious. Want another example? Suppose someone asserts that the empirical reality is that the same people believe the LDS faith is a Christian religion and that the LDS faith is not a Christian religion. My counter response would be, "then the empirical reality is that people out there are being unreasonable."

[_Runtu]

Let me be more explicit. The "empirical reality" that Guy describes is a state of affairs where people believe mutually inconsistent things.

I disagree with your analysis of Guy's position.

I consequently pointed out that means the empirical reality is a place where people believe unreasonable things.

And I pointed out that was a nonsequitur based on a misreading of Guy's position.

It doesn't justify their unreasonable views. My analogy points to something that is rationally dubious. Want another example? Suppose someone asserts that the empirical reality is that the same people believe the LDS faith is a Christian religion and that the LDS faith is not a Christian religion. My counter response would be, "then the empirical reality is that people out there are being unreasonable."

Again, it's a poor analogy because it misrepresents Guy's position.

[_A Light in the Darkness]

I disagree with your analysis of Guy's position.

He stated it over and over. He accepts deontology and consequentialism are competing and inconsistent accounts of normative ethics. He asserts that people, depending on the situation, believe both. He declares me naïve for criticizing him for declaring to hold both views.

[_Tommy]

My Dear Brothers and Sisters,

I stand before you today confused. Confused at the grace that so fully HE proffers me. You are all choice spirits of our heavenly father. Guy, you have so much potential, and the Lord is saddened that you won't allow him to use you in priesthood leadership service. I'd say you're a bishop or stake president at minimum. But so it is with free agency. I would say unto you only, do not procrastinate the day of your repentence.

I thought I'd take a moment to add my point of view on the matter. A young couple came into my office a few years ago, heartbroken over moral transgressions. The Lord and I were certainly saddened at the dire news they bore. There had been acts performed in the bedroom, forbidden by God's divine law as revealed by our prophet Spencer W. Kimball.

The couple, desiring further light and knowledge, inquired into the nature of this divine law. It was an opportunity to teach. They wanted to know, was it the letter of the law, or the spirit of the law which mattered most, and could not their sins be lessened by appealing to the spirit? It would seem there is a rough approximation here to the "formalism" and "consequences" being discussed. But "formalism" is a rather vague notion. On the one hand, as I explained, we can certainly think of deontic ethics in terms of formality but this is misleading. Kantian ethics for instance, I explained to our good sister, are what we call autonomic, coming from within the individual. There are not a set of external, codified categorical imperatives resting somewhere outside. The individual must take situations as they come and work out the consistency in their own minds. And then on the other hand, I said, turning my attention to the young man, there is nothing essentially "informal" or more personal in the case of consequentialism. Of course, I had to explain to him that consequentialism isn't necessarily utilitarianism but that utilitarianism would serve as a convenient example.

As we searched the scriptures together, we discovered that codified law such as the Ten Commandments don't require a deontic reading. Rather, they can be understood in the context of Rule Utilitarianism. And that it wasn't necessarily the ungodly acts he had been performing with his wife were wrong irrespective of the ends. I alliterated, "Rule Utilitarianism sandbags Satan's slippery slopes." I explained that we must look at the aggregate good and evil generated by all of God's children everywhere, following the directives of President Kimball's letter, not at what seemed to be the limited consequences of isolated instances. I explained that we can conceive of all this in terms of rules and ends strictly, without a shred of concern for means or deontology.

The young woman bowed her head in shame. The young man said he was confused. I told him that he was not confused and proceeded to open Martin Heidegger's classic Being and Time. After reading a few verses, I looked into his eyes and said, "Now, young man, you are confused." The youth nodded and admitted he understood the lesson on morals. Both promised to live the commandments.

I hope we can all choose to live the commandments. What a glorious day in the office.