The Roles of Logic and Science in Questions of Theology

[_marg]

by the way..I did reread the entire thread yesterday, though by the time I got to the last couple of posts I was tired and tended to skip through. And I also relistened to the section on Ontological arguments in the Teaching Co course Philosophy of Religion and one lecture is devoted to why they fail.

I plan to eventually post something which synthesizes it all.

I woke up thinking about this stuff and decided to post.

"Marg and JAK, perhaps you think all words just have God given definitions and when someone states the definition that are claiming that this is the true definition. That would be quite odd."

What it is Tarski is that God is a value laden word. It means different things to different people, bur rarely do people assume God to be a concept representative of something vacuous. I mentioned to you previously I have no idea myself what a God is, I rely upon other people's idea, if I discuss the concept.

So a sentence including a def'n can not contain the word god-like (whatever that concept is) and have any meaning without the concept of god existing first. It is the concept that exists, not any actual God. The concept of a God has to be assumed because you can not have such a conceptual thing as "no God" or even "no God-like" without first the concept of God in the first place. So by using a word God-like there is a link to an assumed conceptual God. I'm not referring to a God that exists as an actuality but rather the (positive) concept of a God. Now I suppose one could argue that the concept of God could be vacuous (all that doesn't exist) but then there would be no properties to discuss with that concept, so how could one create an argument for a vacuous - all that doesn't exist?

So you can not have the concept "god-like" without first the concept God existing. You can not have the concept of "no God/all that is vacuous" without first the concept of "a God". It doesn't matter what that concept is/consists of. The very fact that the word is used(even in a definition in which it is being defined) means that that thing has to exist as a concept to discuss it. And I don't mean existing as an actual thing, I mean existing as a concept.

Post note: Since the word God can be anything I'm told and it does not assume any entity first, then how about replacing in the definition given, the word "God" with "vacuous". It becomes "x is vacuous -like". What kind of sense does that make for an argument to argue over the vacuousness of a thing.

[_Tarski]

So a sentence including a def'n can not contain the word god-like (whatever that concept is) and have any meaning without the concept of god existing first.

That is most certainly and quite obviously not true.

In the deductive argument, X is god-like means "X has as essential properties those and only those properties which are positive". Nothing more!

Why is this triviality so hard for some people? I am amazed.

More evidence:
Consider the definition:

Definition: A postive integer is prime if it is divisible only by itself and the number 1.

Now, the word prime already had a meaning and some connotations before this definition was originally given. Does anyone seriously think that the meaning of prime number depends in anyway on those prior meanings and connotations? Or does the definition stand on its own?
Hint: It is the latter.

We could have used the word irreducible or even a nonsense word and the meaning would be the same if we used the same definition. The supposed prior meaning ladeness is not an issue at all.

Similarly, we could have call the property in Godel definition "totally postive" instead of "god-like". It matters not for the argument.

Post note: Since the word God can be anything I'm told and it does not assume any entity first, then how about replacing in the definition given, the word "God" with "vacuous". It becomes "x is vacuous -like". What kind of sense does that make for an argument to argue over the vacuousness of a thing.

It could make plenty of sense if the word vacuous-like is used to mean what it is defined to mean in the DEFINITION. Becuase then it would have nothing to do with the oridnary use of the word!!!!!!!

[_marg]

As I mentioned tarski, why not use the word "vacuous" for God. You didn't address that.

[_Tarski]

As I mentioned tarski, why not use the word "vacuous" for God. You didn't address that.

Quote:
Post note: Since the word God can be anything I'm told and it does not assume any entity first, then how about replacing in the definition given, the word "God" with "vacuous". It becomes "x is vacuous -like". What kind of sense does that make for an argument to argue over the vacuousness of a thing.

It could make plenty of sense if the word vacuous-like is used to mean what it is defined to mean in the DEFINITION. Becuase then it would have nothing to do with the ordinary use of the word!!!!!!!

Sheeesh.

If I define vacuous to mean apple then I can eat a vacuous. LOL

And my example about the word prime makes the point definitively. It's obvious Marg. Proved. Done.

[_Tarski]

Quote:

A definition may either give the meaning that a term bears in general use (a descriptive definition), or that which the speaker intends to impose upon it for the purpose of his or her discourse (a stipulative definition). Stipulative definitions differ from descriptive definitions in that they prescribe a new meaning either to a term already in use or to a new term. A descriptive definition can be shown to be right or wrong by comparison to usage, while a stipulative definition cannot. A stipulative definition, however, may be more or less useful. A persuasive definition, named by C.L. Stevenson, is a form of stipulative definition which purports to describe the 'true' or 'commonly accepted' meaning of a term, while in reality stipulating an altered use, perhaps as an argument for some view, for example that some system of government is democratic. Stevenson also notes that some definitions are 'legal' or 'coercive', whose object is to create or alter rights, duties or crimes.[

Common implicit rule followed by logicians such a Godel:
If a definition is given as part of the body of a deductive argument and labelled as a definition. Then it is a stipulative definition.

[_marg]

As I mentioned tarski, why not use the word "vacuous" for God. You didn't address that.

Quote:
Post note: Since the word God can be anything I'm told and it does not assume any entity first, then how about replacing in the definition given, the word "God" with "vacuous". It becomes "x is vacuous -like". What kind of sense does that make for an argument to argue over the vacuousness of a thing.

It could make plenty of sense if the word vacuous-like is used to mean what it is defined to mean in the DEFINITION. Becuase then it would have nothing to do with the ordinary use of the word!!!!!!!

Sheeesh.

If I [you]define[/you] vacuous to [you]mean[/you] apple then I can eat a vacuous. LOL

I still see a problem. The assumption in the defintion is that there is a concept to be defined. The very act of defining assumes that a concept representing an entity exists. The defining creates an existence of that concept. The existence is assumed. But vacuous/non existence is a concept, however that is not assumed as an option.

The act of defining brings into the assumption in the argument that something exists. If it didn't then vacuous/nothing/empty/ would be an option.

[_Tarski]

As I mentioned tarski, why not use the word "vacuous" for God. You didn't address that.

Quote:
Post note: Since the word God can be anything I'm told and it does not assume any entity first, then how about replacing in the definition given, the word "God" with "vacuous". It becomes "x is vacuous -like". What kind of sense does that make for an argument to argue over the vacuousness of a thing.

It could make plenty of sense if the word vacuous-like is used to mean what it is defined to mean in the DEFINITION. Becuase then it would have nothing to do with the ordinary use of the word!!!!!!!

Sheeesh.

If I [you]define[/you] vacuous to [you]mean[/you] apple then I can eat a vacuous. LOL

The defining creates an existence of that concept. .

It makes the concept exist in a sense but does not guarantee or assume that an entity exists which fits the definition. That must be demonstrated, which is the point of the rest of the argument.

Also, see my last post about stipulative definition.

[_Tarski]

Marg,
I have taught logic before as part of some math courses.
Just wondering? Suppose you were in my class and we were going over these issues and I was trying to explain the whole thing about the role of stipulative definitions in deductive arguments. What do you think I should do at this point if you were in one of my classes where I teach logic and you kept not getting this point?

I have never quite had that situation but I am trying to picture exactly how patient I should be.

Once in a while someone might think it is me that doesn't get it but then I can just drag another professor into my office and it becomes clear that what I am saying is just standard stuff--the student is convinced.

[_marg]

The defining creates an existence of that concept. .

It makes the concept exist in a sense but does not guarantee or assume that an entity exists which fits the definition. That must be demonstrated, which is the point of the rest of the argument.

Also, see my last post about stipulative definition.[/quote]

Ok so we are in agreement with this part "It makes the concept exist in a sense"

and in agreement here "but does not guarantee or assume that an entity exists which fits the definition."..except the option of nonentity/vacuous as a concept is not allowed hence..the concept must be about a thing existing. So the option includes only existing things, conceptually.

[_Tarski]

The defining creates an existence of that concept. .

It makes the concept exist in a sense but does not guarantee or assume that an entity exists which fits the definition. That must be demonstrated, which is the point of the rest of the argument.

Also, see my last post about stipulative definition.

Ok so we are in agreement with this part "It makes the concept exist in a sense"

and in agreement here "but does not guarantee or assume that an entity exists which fits the definition."..except the option of nonentity/vacuous as a concept is not allowed hence..the concept must be about a thing existing. So the option includes only existing things, conceptually.

[/quote]

If you give a stipulative definition of a word like vacuous then this choice may make the thing hard to read but the reader should then forget about the usual definition. There is a very big reason that Godel used the hyphenation god-like. This was to help make it more clear that this is a coinage. A new precise definition. He does this exactly so that people will not accuse him of using a vague definition or a common notion. It is a stipulative definition and a look a the definition makes it clear why he chose such a word.

What do you think is a good name for what he is defining?

I like "totally positive". Then we can say that Godel is trying to prove the existence of a "totally positive" being where "totally positive" means nothing more than what is stipulated in his definition.
What would you call a totally positive being if such a being existed in real life? Well, it depends on what positive means--and there is the real problem with this whole argument (besides the existence is not a property thing).