Confirmation Bias

[_wenglund]

One of the main impediments to a fruitful discussions is divergent understandings and interpreted meanings of basic concepts.

Such appears to be the case on this thread with the meaning of the term "confirmation bias".

Since Michael Shermers article was used to introduce the subject, would anyone here be averse to using his definition:

"[b]whereby we seek and find confirmatory evidence in support of already existing beliefs and ignore or reinterpret disconfirmatory evidence

."

From what little I have been able to read online on the subject, this definition seems to fit how psychologists and epistemologist have defined it--though some draw a distinction between confirmation bias and disconformation bias.

Can we agree on this definition?

Thanks, -Wade Englund-

I don't agree on the definition because you've left out the context. What you've kept here could almost support your example of a hot stove although that's obviously not valid.

What context do you require before you will accept SHERMER'S definition?

Thanks, -Wade Englund-

Just the context that was in the link you took your excerpt from would be fine for me.

So, in other words, to you, the entire article defines the term, rather than just the excerpt?

Aren't you, in one respect, expanding the definition beyond practicle use, while in another sense, restricting the definition to what was covered in the article?

What is the point in doing that?

Thanks, -Wade Englund-

[_maklelan]

That's one major failing point of most amateur scientists (namely, those who post on message boards like this [myself included]). People see something that doesn't fit in science, and assume it cannot be. The real answer is, we haven't found the answer YET. Eventually, with enough testing, we can find out the reasons for anything. Eventually.

I think this extends to professional scientists as well. Why hasn't the Antikythera Mechanism changed our perception of ancient intelligence and the theory of the evolution of science? Why hasn't the fact that the Chinese discovered America almost a hundred years before Columbus shown up in any textbooks? Why do people still say "That's not my forTAY," when it should just be "fort"?!?

[_dartagnan]

Would I be incorrect to conclude that you do not accept SHERMERS definition as I quoted it?

As I demonstrated, your quote was incomplete. Your quote made it seem like any “seeking” for confirmatory evidence was a conscious act. Anything will be assumed to be conscious if not explicitly indicated otherwise. This is a radical departure from your flawed understanding that includes “considering” travel routes and years of political deliberation, as valid examples of CB.

either way, you are mistaken to assume that "motivated reasoning" (which is what Westen's study was about)

How can I be mistaken on a subject I have yet to comment on?

or even "confirmation bias" is about "purely emotional dependence in decision making".

According to Shermer’s citation, in context, confirmation bias is “driven by emotions.” The entire purpose of CB is to self-sooth and to relieve oneself from a state of mental anxiety so to speak.

While emotions are involved, so are automatic thoughts and pre-establish beliefs and motives

Of course thoughts are involved, but what drives them is the unconscious need for positive emotional stimulation. This is like saying hatred and malevolence was not all that was involved in killing his wife. After all, there was that knife he used. You’re desperately fishing for some way to make your initial comments seem less than idiotic and calling me “uninformed” is just the CB ticket to avoid the evidence while rewarding yourself with good feelings.

As for your example, I can't speak to what kind of missionary you may have been, nor can I speak for all missionaries, but I tended to end my discussions as a missionary with "read, study, and pray", rather than just "pray".

Right. “Read” (the Book of Mormon), “study” (the Book of Mormon) and “pray” (about the Book of Mormon). Some “investigation” you got going on there, huh? What is never encouraged during the discussions is to “reason,” “investigate” or “think.” Never. To reason and think is a pathway to the dark side (conveniently excused as avoiding Bible bashing?). It means missionaries who had hoped to pop in and out with a baptism in a week, are now left to answer dozens of concerns that they are ill-equipped to resolve, and they leave future missionaries with a burdensome chore to take over where the former left off. That is too inefficient to be encouraged, so it is avoided.

And, for those who correctly understand the true nature of prayer, it is intended to be a learning and reasoning experience, and not just a purely emotional exercise. The mind should be as much involved in the process as the heart.

Then please demonstrate where “reasoning” is encouraged. Let’s take the Pepsi challenge. I did a search for both terms “reasoning/prayer” in LDS conference talks. No hits. When searching the LDS archive I found the following:

In an article by Richard G. Scott called “Trusting the Lord,” (Ensign Nov 1995) after talking about the benefits of personal prayer, he finalizes his talk with a true whammy:

I know the principles that we have discussed are true. They have been tested in the crucible of personal experience. To recognize the hand of the Lord in your life and to accept His will without complaint is a beginning. That decision does not immediately eliminate the struggles that will come for your growth. But I witness that it is the best way there is for you to find strength and understanding. It will free you from the dead ends of your own reasoning.

But according to you, prayer and reasoning go hand in hand huh? Apparently Richard G. Scott could learn a thing or two from you about prayer and reasoning. What does that say when the village idiot knows more than LDS leaders?

Ezra Taft Benson, once said in “Beware of Pride,” Ensign, May 1989 -

When pride has a hold on our hearts, we lose our independence of the world and deliver our freedoms to the bondage of men’s judgment. The world shouts louder than the whisperings of the Holy Ghost. The reasoning of men overrides the revelations of God, and the proud let go of the iron rod.

In L. Aldin Porter, “The Revelations of Heaven,” Ensign, Nov. 1994, he informs us that the “reasoning of men” cause people to leap to conclusions and declare false doctrines.

Gordon B. Hinckley, “Contend Not with Others,” Tambuli, Nov. 1989 -

While standards of people in general may totter, we of the Church are without excuse if we drift in the same manner. We have standards—sure, tested, and effective. To the extent that we observe them, we shall go forward. To the extent that we neglect them, we shall hinder our own progress and bring embarrassment to the work of the Lord. These standards have come from him. Some of them may appear a little old fashioned in our society, but this does not make them less valid nor diminish the power of their application. The subtle reasoning of men, no matter how clever, no matter how plausible it may sound, cannot take away the declared wisdom of God.

That damn “reasoning” getting in the way of everything good and pure. I cannot find any encouragement from the LDS leadership to reason anything. The term is almost always associated with apostates, hard hearts, the wicked, evil tradition, false doctrine and leading to spiritual dead-ends.

Incidentally, the verb “to reason” appears only once in the Book of Mormon:

Helaman 16:15-20

Nevertheless, the people began to harden their hearts, all save it were the most believing part of them, both of the Nephites and also of the Lamanites, and began to depend upon their own strength and upon their own wisdom, saying:

Some things they may have guessed right, among so many; but behold, we know that all these great and marvelous works cannot come to pass, of which has been spoken.

And they began to reason and to contend among themselves, saying:

That it is not reasonable that such a being as a Christ shall come; if so, and he be the Son of God, the Father of heaven and of earth, as it has been spoken, why will he not show himself unto us as well as unto them who shall be at Jerusalem?

Yea, why will he not show himself in this land as well as in the land of Jerusalem?

But behold, we know that this is a wicked tradition which has been handed down unto us by our fathers, to cause us that we should believe in some great and marvelous thing which should come to pass, but not among us, but in a land which is far distant, a land which we know not; therefore they can keep us in ignorance, for we cannot witness with our own eyes that they are true.

No surprises here. From this we can gather that reasoning is a “wicked tradition” that occurs when people “harden their hearts.” While reasoning is something both Jesus and the apostles engaged in a positive way, it is almost always associated with negative concepts that should be avoided, in an LDS context. So please illustrate for us all how the phrase, “reasoning of men” really doesn’t leave a black mark on the merits of human reasoning.

The fact is wade, you have no idea what you are talking about, and I would venture to guess that we are witnessing a classic example of confirmatory bias in action. For example, when I said reasoning and the LDS prayer method are at odds, you eased the pain of this knowledge by immediately inventing nonsense from thin air, asserting that if only I knew anything about Mormonism, I would understand that prayer and reasoning go hand in hand. This served to emotionally stimulate you. Not only did you avoid the evidence you didn’t want to read – anxiety you didn’t want to experience - but you responded in a way that rewards yourself with good feelings. You feel good now because you think you have somehow shown me to be ignorant of things LDS by merely asserting it. Of course, other people in the audience who are not suffering from CB overload, do not see this, and can reason with the evidence rationally, but you see this because you choose to see it – nay, you need to see it.

[_wenglund]

For example, if I have learned by sad experience, and to a great degree of confidence, that if I put my bear hand in a fire then I will get burn't, is it a problem to cease being skeptical about whether the fire will burn me or not? Is it a problem to view various actions with fire as confirming that bias--including even in relation to instances that seem to defy my bias, such as with fire-walkers?

To me, I think "confirmation bias" is, for the most part, a pragmatic mechanism. It prevents us from having to reinvent the epistemic wheel over and over again. It helps us avoid the unnecessary and arduous task of rethinking things to the nth-degree, particularly in instances where split-second decisions are required.

Interestingly, your argument demonstrates confirmation bias. Your predetermined conclusion is that confirmation bias is pragmatic, not problematic. You offered one example that was designed to support your conclusion. You then seem to draw a hasty generalization from that one example.

While your conclusion may be correct (depending upon how one defines "confirmation bias"), you guessed wrong about several of the premises in your "reasoning" (perhaps, itself, an ironic function of "confirmation bias").

I derived the conclusion by first asking myself the deconfirming and skeptical question whether "confirmation bias" is necessarily problematic. I then analysed what function it might serve in the way we think and process information, and reasonably concluded that, from an epistemic standpoint, and given the rationally determined inverse correlation between skepticism and confidence, as well as from my reading on "automatic thoughts" and "core beliefs" in Cognitive Behavioral Therapy, it may serve the pragmatic function of avoiding reinventing the knowledge and belief wheel over-and-over. A host of examples flooded to mind, and from those examples I formulated a hypothesis, which I intended, and continue to intend, to test to see whether it is generalizable or not. My proferring, for pratical purposes, that single and obvious example for the purpose of innitiating a discussion on that specific question, may in no reasonable way be interpreted as the sole basis for my hypothesis, let alone the basis at all or the generalization of my hypothesis.

As it is, at least one cognitive scientist (see my link to Chris's article above) seems to share my point of view, and his view seems to be based on his reading of studies and findings of leading experts on the subject.

Granted, all this may be a function of "confirmation bias" or even "motivated reasoning", but if my hypothesis is correct, then that is not necessarily problematic. Time, of course, will tell. ;-)

Why not this example:

In the ancestral environment, individual A has concluded, based on repeated personal experience, that brightly colored berries hanging on bushes are delicious and safe to eat. Individual A observes individual B eat some brightly colored berries on a bush and becoming violently ill. Individual A disregards the contradictory evidence, eats berries, and also becomes very ill.

Perhaps it is my confirmation bias factoring in again, but I don't see this as disconfirming my hypothesis. I have granted that confirmation bias could, at times and in some ways, be problematic, and I even proferred a way of distinguishing between that which may be pragmatic and that which may be problematic: "whether a given 'confirmation bias' lends itself to valued personal development and epistemic growth, or not.' Clearly, your example above does not lend itself to personal development and epistemic growth.

Any time human beings engage in fallacious reasoning we risk making error.

You are presupposing that confirmation bias is necessarily "fallacious reasoning". I am skeptical of that assumption. Could you describe the fallacy(ies) you see as necessarily involved, and provide examples to support your assumption, and provide reasons for generalizing to most, if not all instances of confirmation bias? ;-)

The error may be positive, as in believing something that is not correct, or negative, which is not believing something that is correct. Some of that same fallacious reasoning may lead us to make decisions that either are helpful or harmful (see fallacy of fallacy – by the way, I wanted your website because I thought surely you would have discussed confirmation bias there and it would help me understand your viewpoint, but I could not see any section that seemed to address it). So just the fact that sometimes confirmation bias leads us to make a decision that is beneficial (as in your fire example) does not necessarily indicate that the decision was not based on fallacious reasoning.

Likewise, just because some of the confirmation biases may be based on fallacious reasoning, doesn't mean that confirmation bias, itself, or all or most instances of confirmation bias, are fallacious. (By the way, in my research of the many websites where the various fallacies were listed, I did not come across a single one that spoke specifically of of "confirmation bias". Since first hearing of the term, though, I have Googled it in relation to logic, and found instances where it is mentioned in connection with "selective evidence" or "hasty generalizaton", but not as its own logical fallacy.)

I am certain that there is an explanation for why human beings are universally prone to confirmation bias that would indicate that it was beneficial to our ancestors for some reason – perhaps to expedite quick action, as you mentioned. But that does not mean that confirmation bias is not a flaw in reasoning.

Certainly there are times when the evidence supporting a conclusion is so overwhelming that it is reasonable to be skeptical of contradictory evidence. That is why I am always suspicious of claims such as horse bones being found in Mesoamerica during the Book of Mormon era, for example. The burden of proof shifts to the individual making the unusual claim. This does not mean that the unusual claim is either necessarily false or true.

Isn't that a form of confirmation bias? Is it flawwed or fallacious reasoning?

Whether or not any given individual wishes to be aware of confirmation bias and the flaw it introduces into reasoning is dependent upon the priorities of the individual, of course.

...and, according to Kunda, it depends upon motives as well. The same is true in reverse (awareness of how confirmation bias may not introduce flaw into reasoning, but may provide a reasonable and practical default mechanism for thinking).

Thanks, -Wade Englund-

[_beastie]

Wade -

If I'm inclined, I'll deal with the rest of your post later, but am not sure there is much of a purpose. I think I made my reasoning very clear in my last post.

Yes, being skeptical of claims of Mesoamerican horses is confirmation bias. However, that bias does not prevent me from doing my best to fairly evaluate the information. I have attempted to verify such claims several times in the past. This is why it is helpful to understand the phenomenon, in order to attempt to correct the instinct in oneself.

Confirmation bias is an example of fallacious reasoning because it entails ignoring evidence that should be considered. It's rather astounding you claim otherwise. Perhaps that evidence can be evaluated and then rejected for valid reasons, but to claim it's sound reasoning to simply ignore it, or pretend it says something other than what it does, is silly.

To repeatedly claim it's 'pragmatic" is besides the point. It may be "pragmatic" in terms of the ancestral environment of our ancestors, but so were many other things that it may not be in our best interest to replicate.

This is a first, I must say - someone arguing that confirmation bias is not flawed reasoning. Only on the internet.

[_Lucretia MacEvil]

I don't agree on the definition because you've left out the context. What you've kept here could almost support your example of a hot stove although that's obviously not valid.

What context do you require before you will accept SHERMER'S definition?

Thanks, -Wade Englund-

Just the context that was in the link you took your excerpt from would be fine for me.

So, in other words, to you, the entire article defines the term, rather than just the excerpt?

Aren't you, in one respect, expanding the definition beyond practicle use, while in another sense, restricting the definition to what was covered in the article?

What is the point in doing that?
Thanks, -Wade Englund-

I realize you are just trying to come up with a succinct definition, and that the article in total is not a succinct definition, but the article conveyed an understanding of "confirmation bias" -- maybe not a complete understanding, I'm not pretending to be an expert here, I'm learning along with the rest of us -- but your definition is lacking and I think I see your agenda (and you always have one). In a later post, you stated:

You are presupposing that confirmation bias is necessarily "fallacious reasoning". I am skeptical of that assumption. Could you describe the fallacy(ies) you see as necessarily involved, and provide examples to support your assumption, and provide reasons for generalizing to most, if not all instances of confirmation bias? ;-)

Of course, it has to be always fallacious reasoning. Just because a correct conclusion may be reached fallaciously doesn't make falacious reasoning correct. If you know that 5 plus 5 is ten because you dropped your Book of Mormon and it opened to page 10, fine, at least you can count your tiny toes with that knowledge, but maybe recognizing the fallacy will help you with the rest of your sums.

[_beastie]

Wade,

I’m having difficulty figuring out how Chris’s essay supports your contention that confirmation bias is not problematic. For example, read this paragraph:

These situations imply that motivated reasoning is in fact our default mode of reasoning; the one that we revert to when we are threatened, when our cognitive resources are limited, or when we aren't highly motivated to make an effortful attempt to come to the objectively "right" answer. Interestingly, under this theory, motivated reasoning is automatic, relatively effortless, and likely occurs below the level of awareness. This allows for what Kunda calls the "illusion of objectivity," which is the belief that the conclusion at which we've arrived is the objectively right one, even though the processes through which we've arrived at it were biased.

The fact that “motivated reasoning is automatic, relatively effortless, and likely occurs below the level of awareness” does not alter the fact that it is only an “illusion of objectivity” – the belief that the conclusion at which we’ve arrived is the objectively right one, even though the processes through which we’ve arrived at it were biased

I suspect that you are conflating two ideas:

A) whether or not a pattern of behavior can be explained in terms of evolutionary utility
B) whether or not a pattern of behavior is based on flawed reasoning

Not only do I agree that A is true for the phenomenon of confirmation bias, I think it is obvious that it is true due to the fact that it is a universal pattern of behavior. Every human being is vulnerable to confirmation bias. That means that our ancestors who displayed confirmation bias tended to survive and reproduce at a more successful rate. However, that fact does not mean that B is also true. I bet you can figure out which logical fallacy it would be to assume that it does.

Look at another example for a demonstration:

The tendency of human beings to view themselves as part of some “group”, and to view their own group as more worthy, more noble, more ‘right’, than the “other” groups is universal. It is seen throughout the world, throughout history. The tendency to form groups and to prioritize the worthiness of one’s own group (which meant worthy of more access to resources than the “other”, even if it had to be forcibly taken) created an environment in which our ancestors were more likely to survive and reproduce. Hence, it is a universal tendency. But it is also a completely fallacious, illogical, and irrational tendency.

[_rcrocket]

The tendency of human beings to view themselves as part of some “group”, and to view their own group as more worthy, more noble, more ‘right’, than the “other” groups is universal. It is seen throughout the world, throughout history. The tendency to form groups and to prioritize the worthiness of one’s own group (which meant worthy of more access to resources than the “other”, even if it had to be forcibly taken) created an environment in which our ancestors were more likely to survive and reproduce. Hence, it is a universal tendency. But it is also a completely fallacious, illogical, and irrational tendency.

Not according to evolutionary biology. The tribal instinct is deeply rooted in the instinctual desire to advance one's genes over anybody else's. Since tribal groups are genetically similar, instinct/biology/genetics/evolution teaches them to attempt to triumph uber alles.

P

[_wenglund]

Wade,

I’m having difficulty figuring out how Chris’s essay supports your contention that confirmation bias is not problematic. For example, read this paragraph:

These situations imply that motivated reasoning is in fact our default mode of reasoning; the one that we revert to when we are threatened, when our cognitive resources are limited, or when we aren't highly motivated to make an effortful attempt to come to the objectively "right" answer. Interestingly, under this theory, motivated reasoning is automatic, relatively effortless, and likely occurs below the level of awareness. This allows for what Kunda calls the "illusion of objectivity," which is the belief that the conclusion at which we've arrived is the objectively right one, even though the processes through which we've arrived at it were biased.

The fact that “motivated reasoning is automatic, relatively effortless, and likely occurs below the level of awareness” does not alter the fact that it is only an “illusion of objectivity” – the belief that the conclusion at which we’ve arrived is the objectively right one, even though the processes through which we’ve arrived at it were biased

Are you assuming that since there is an "illusion of objectivity", that means there was, per se, "flawed reasoning"?

I am skeptical of that, and I didn't see Chris' article as suggesting that.

In fact, in the online article, "The Case For Motivated Reasoning", by Dr. Ziva Kunda of Princeton University (the person credited with first positing this notion, and the person Chris was quoting above), said in terms of motivated reasoning (specifically directional motivated reasoning): "People do not seem to be at liberty to conclude whatever they want to conclude merely because they want to. Rather, I propose that people motivated to arrive at a particular conclusion attempt to be rational and to construct a justification of their desired conclusion that would persuade a dispassionate observer. They draw the desired conclusion only if they can muster up the evidence necessary to support it (cf. Darley & Gross, 1983 ). In other words, they maintain an "illusion of objectivity" ( Pyszczynski & Greenberg, 1987 ; cf. Kruglanski, 1980 )."

I suspect that you are conflating two ideas:

A) whether or not a pattern of behavior can be explained in terms of evolutionary utility
B) whether or not a pattern of behavior is based on flawed reasoning

Not only do I agree that A is true for the phenomenon of confirmation bias, I think it is obvious that it is true due to the fact that it is a universal pattern of behavior. Every human being is vulnerable to confirmation bias. That means that our ancestors who displayed confirmation bias tended to survive and reproduce at a more successful rate. However, that fact does not mean that B is also true. I bet you can figure out which logical fallacy it would be to assume that it does.

Actually, no, I haven't conflated those two ideas. First of all, I am not trying to "explain" the notions (be it "confirmation bias" or "motivated reasoning"). Rather, I am attempting to evaluate them. Second, unlike some here, I am not restricting my evaluation to logicality, but I am also factoring in utility. Third, I am not evaluating the notions in terms of evolution, but rather in terms of value to those living in today's world. Fourth, unlike some here, I am open to testing the accuracy of the presumption that these notions are "flawed" or "fallacious" reasoning per se.

Interestingly enough, in Kunda's article linked to above, she looks at the issue of reasoning in terms of goals/motives. She divides the goals/motives into two main categories: Accuracy and Directional. "The work on accuracy-driven reasoning suggests that when people are motivated to be accurate, they expend more cognitive effort on issue-related reasoning, attend to relevant information more carefully, and process it more deeply, often using more complex rules. These ideas go back to Simon's (1957) notion of satisficing, according to which decision makers form aspirations as to how good an alternative they should find and terminate their search for alternatives as soon as they find one that meets that level.
Stigler (1961) extended these ideas by pointing out that search strategies have costs that may be weighted against their utility. The implication is that people may focus not only on how good an outcome they desire but also, and sometimes predominantly, on how much cognitive effort they are willing to expend. In other words, people are aware of the effort-accuracy trade-off and select strategies by considering both their costs and their benefits ( Beach & Mitchell, 1978 ; Payne, Bettman, & Johnson, 1988 )."

Thanks, -Wade Englund-

[_wenglund]

Beastie, Lucretia, and dartagnan,

Shermer's article was about "confirmation bias", whereas the study upon which his article was based was about "motivated reasoning".

To your minds, are these terms synonyms?

If not, what differences do you see between them, and do you see those differences as problematic in terms of Shermer's use of a study on "motivated reasoning" to support his point about "conformation bias"? (In other owrds, did Shermer pull a few threads out of Westen's rug, thereby unraveling Westen's rug?) ;-)

Thanks, -Wade Englund-