Is Mormonism Morally Relative?

[_guy sajer]

First, I agree with Guy that the notion of moral expertise seems rediculous. I disagree with him in that absolute moral truths are discoverable. I think that we can talk about absolute morality or absolute truth - but neither is discoverable. I wouls suggest that we can approach them - but knowing how close we are is something else entirely.

Ben, I would agree with you here. By saying moral truths are "knowable," I have in mind something like you describe. However, I do think they are "discoverable," meaning that the process of approaching them is akin to a process of discovery. As they are not handed down to us from on high, we must, as society, "discover" them as it were. I think we are using the term "discover" differently. When I use this term, I refer to an iterative and largely incremental and, for the most part, cumulative process of experience, reflection, and learning.

[_A Light in the Darkness]

Ah, but again we come back to the idea of "moral truth." If moral statements are simply societal customs and standards, in what way can there be any "truth" about them?

Technically, then you could talk about the "truth" of whether a moral statement is in accord with social customs and standards. It appears you want to both adopt this position and deny moral truth to. So not only are you rejecting moral truth, but you are also adopting a hilariously untenable view of ethics taken seriously by very few philosophers of ethics, believer or not.

[Guest]

I don't know why "moral expertise" is such a difficult concept for so many to swallow. If you adopt the dominant view that moral truth exists, then it is only natural to expect that some people are better equipped to know moral facts than others. We allow for expertise on every other factual matter; why not moral facts? Even if you thought that morality was a matter of personal "taste" we generally accept that some tastes are more refined, or well studied, than others. In other words, some people have a more expert pallate: a more sophisticated, developed way of understanding their tastes and how things relate to them. You might not think fathers know more about right and wrong than 3 year olds, but to find it absurd betrays a curious attitude akin to finding it absurd that someone would believe that fathers know more about driving than 3 year olds.

[_KimberlyAnn]

What I find funny about this thread is that the title implies that morality could be fixed or that there might be an absolute morality. I think that morality in general is always relative, is always affected by cultural and social conditions, and so on.

That was my point in the earlier thread, which is why I thought it was ironic that the church can be said to be morally relative as well.

I agree that morality is often relative, but I also believe that there are "absolute" moral truths, or perhaps best stated as "first moral principles," that serve as the basis for constructing a moral framework. These, though, are limited, and are discoverable through reason, experience, and, most importatly, empathy.

I can't add much to this. I think Guy Sajer has it right. Though morality is often relative, there are fundamental moral truths.

I do believe Joseph Smith's polyandry was a violation of a fundamental moral truth. I personally believe he had nefarious motives, used deceitful tactics, and went against the prevailing moral standards of his day, rendering his actions amoral, not only in the eyes of most people in the twenty-first century, but also in the eyes of his contemporaries.

KA

[_guy sajer]

What I find funny about this thread is that the title implies that morality could be fixed or that there might be an absolute morality. I think that morality in general is always relative, is always affected by cultural and social conditions, and so on.

That was my point in the earlier thread, which is why I thought it was ironic that the church can be said to be morally relative as well.

I agree that morality is often relative, but I also believe that there are "absolute" moral truths, or perhaps best stated as "first moral principles," that serve as the basis for constructing a moral framework. These, though, are limited, and are discoverable through reason, experience, and, most importatly, empathy.

I can't add much to this. I think Guy Sajer has it right. Though morality is often relative, there are fundamental moral truths.

I do believe Joseph Smith's polyandry was a violation of a fundamental moral truth. I personally believe he had nefarious motives, used deceitful tactics, and went against the prevailing moral standards of his day, rendering his actions amoral, not only in the eyes of most people in the twenty-first century, but also in the eyes of his contemporaries.

KA

And, I would argue, one fundamental moral truth is the inviolable (sic) worth of the individual. (This is stated as a general moral principle. There can, theoretically be exceptions, but they require a compelling case to justify.) Joseph Smith was immoral because he used and manipulated other other people, and worse people who looked up to him as an authority figure (he used his authority status to exploit others, including vulnerable minors) for his own selfish ends. He treated people as means to his ends rather than ends in themselves, as respect for their human dignity required.

[_Runtu]

Ah, but again we come back to the idea of "moral truth." If moral statements are simply societal customs and standards, in what way can there be any "truth" about them?

Technically, then you could talk about the "truth" of whether a moral statement is in accord with social customs and standards. It appears you want to both adopt this position and deny moral truth to. So not only are you rejecting moral truth, but you are also adopting a hilariously untenable view of ethics taken seriously by very few philosophers of ethics, believer or not.

Again with the ridicule. Knock it off.

[_A Light in the Darkness]

And, I would argue, one fundamental moral truth is the inviolable (sic) worth of the individual. (This is stated as a general moral principle. There can, theoretically be exceptions, but they require a compelling case to justify.)

Then I guess it isn't a fundamental moral truth. You went from Kantian ethics to denying them in the span of a sentence.

[_guy sajer]

And, I would argue, one fundamental moral truth is the inviolable (sic) worth of the individual. (This is stated as a general moral principle. There can, theoretically be exceptions, but they require a compelling case to justify.)

Then I guess it isn't a fundamental moral truth. You went from Kantian ethics to denying them in the span of a sentence.

I am asserting a "general" moral truth, not an absolute one.

There's an obvious difference between the two.

I am very careful about asserting absolute, specific moral truths, as one can almost always conceive of circumstances in which an exception to the moral rule is justified, unless one is truly a hard core Kantian (which I am not; more I believe that rigid adherence to formalistic precepts or utilitarian precepts, to be inappropriate and evidence of moral immaturity). That is why I begin with general first principles rather than with iron clad, rigid formalistic ones. Those who wish to assert exceptions must then justify the exception by appealing to another moral principle. Even Kantian, absolute truths can come into conflict with each other, forcing even the most die hard Kantian formalist to choose between them. A more complete moral theory will equip the person with a framework for understanding and choosing when "absolute" truths come into conflict, or for identifying situations in which utilitarian considerations outweigh formalistic ones.

These points are rather pedestrian to someone who's willing to stop and think a bit as opposed to one who rushes in looking only to score debating points, but who in the process only suceeds in displaying his own ignorance.

Kantian formalism can be a useful framework, but it is also a limiting one. One can be Kantian on one hand, but pragmatic (utlitarian) on the other. There's no rule saying one can only be the one or the other, nor is it necessarily logically inconsistent.

[_A Light in the Darkness]

One can be Kantian on one hand, but pragmatic (utlitarian) on the other.

No more than a shape can be a square on one hand and a circle on the other. These are mutually contradictory positions.

There's no rule saying one can only be the one or the other, nor is it necessarily logically inconsistent.

Hahaha. Yes it is. I'm a utilitarian and a deontologist! I try to believe six impossible things before breakfast each day!

[_guy sajer]

One can be Kantian on one hand, but pragmatic (utlitarian) on the other.

No more than a shape can be a square on one hand and a circle on the other. These are mutually contradictory positions.

There's no rule saying one can only be the one or the other, nor is it necessarily logically inconsistent.

Hahaha. Yes it is. I'm a utilitarian and a deontologist! I try to believe six impossible things before breakfast each day!

Show me one person who uses only formalistic decision making rules and never, ever bases decisions on consequences.

Or, show me one person who uses only utilitarian decision making rules and never, ever bases decisions on principle.

People are morally complex, and few people utilize a wholly internally consistent set of moral principles and decision rules. One can, for example, oppose lying on principle (Kantian formalism) and strive to live by this rule, yet, on occasion, justify a little "white lie," (or greater lie--utilitarianism) if he/she perceives that lying in this case produces a better state of affairs.

Case in point, your own beloved Gordon B. Wrinkley, who espouses truth telling on the one hand (formalism) yet denies knowledge of the "man was once God" doctrine (one assumes for utlitarian reasons--to avoid embarrasment, to forestall the necessity to explain himself, to not case the pearls before the swine, etc.), despite this being a common Mormon doctrine introduced by Joseph Smith and taught regularly at Mormon meeting houses across the world.

In similar manner, one can be both nice and mean, brave and cowardly, considerate and inconsiderate, arrogant and meek, even though all of these are opposite characteristics as well.

Is this really the best counter argument you can muster?

I am not impressed.