Is Mormonism Morally Relative?

[_Blixa]

Whoever is the hand inside Tommy's head deserves a medal for verb-izing "alliteration."

Thanks for sending me off to class with a smile. And my students thank you, too.

[_Tommy]

Dear Sister Blixa,

Thank you very much. You and your students are invited to my office anytime. I will have resources ready some extra blue Books of Mormon and hardbound, illustrated Bibles for those students who don't have their own scriptures.

You may be interested to know that I have received many medals, awards, and honorary degrees over the years. Many of them are on display in my office.

[_guy sajer]

I disagree with your analysis of Guy's position.

He stated it over and over. He accepts deontology and consequentialism are competing and inconsistent accounts of normative ethics. He asserts that people, depending on the situation, believe both. He declares me naïve for criticizing him for declaring to hold both views.

Yes, I accept that deontology and consequentialism are competing and inconsistent THEORETICAL MORAL FRAMEWORKS. But they are only frameworks for understand human morality and behavior. There is no requirement that humans adere to the one or the other with any kind of consistency.

I do not believe that people invoke one or the other depending on the situation; rather this is observable empirical fact. People are morally (and logically) inconsistent. One can (and does), for example, condemn lying on the one hand invoking formalistic principles (e.g., "lying is just wrong"), but in another situation rationalize lying by invoking utilitarian principles (e.g., the lie spares a friends feelings).

God himself (according to Mormon scripture) condemns murder on the one hand in formalist manner, yet justifies it on the other in utilitarian manner (Nephi vs. Laban). God is morally inconsistent, because humans are, and humans give God his personality and characteristics, and put his words in his mouth, so such is to be expected.

People are both good and bad, generous and stingy, naughty and nice, faithful and faithless, all opposite, inconsistent characteristics. If people are so inconsistent in everything else, why should they be any less consistent in how how they apply morality in their lives.

To expect people to utlize consistent moral principles in everything is wholly unrealistic, and, yes, naïve.

I see this position as being self-evident and borne out daily in observable behavior of humans.

Why you have such a difficult time accepting this simple, intuitive, obvious fact is a bit preplexing to me.

[_A Light in the Darkness]

He stated it over and over. He accepts deontology and consequentialism are competing and inconsistent accounts of normative ethics. He asserts that people, depending on the situation, believe both. He declares me naïve for criticizing him for declaring to hold both views.

Yes, I accept that deontology and consequentialism are competing and inconsistent THEORETICAL MORAL FRAMEWORKS. But they are only frameworks for understand human morality and behavior. There is no requirement that humans adere to the one or the other with any kind of consistency.

Well, there's also virtue ethics. It is, however, unreasonable to believe in mutually inconsistent things.

I do not believe that people invoke one or the other depending on the situation; rather this is observable empirical fact. People are morally (and logically) inconsistent. One can (and does), for example, condemn lying on the one hand invoking formalistic principles (e.g., "lying is just wrong"), but in another situation rationalize lying by invoking utilitarian principles (e.g., the lie spares a friends feelings).

What I don't think you understand is that both of those kinds of statements can be understood in terms of deontological and consequentialist ethics. To the extent you want to be reasonable, you need veer in one direction. Rule consequentialism (even act consequentialism technically) and an understanding of human langauge and fallibility can easily incorporate a statement like "lying is just wrong." A consequentialist can say something like this: Lying very often obtains aggregate harm. There are exceptions, but in most instances, when people think they have an exceptional situation, they are wrong. Hence, it is good to have a strong rule in place to declare lying is wrong. With this rule in place, we stand the best chance at thwarting aggregate harm. Granted, if you really think about it, there are times when human judgment is near universally good enough that this rule can be reasonably violated, such as lying to Nazis to protect Jews, but they are extreme.

God himself (according to Mormon scripture) condemns murder on the one hand in formalist manner, yet justifies it on the other in utilitarian manner (Nephi vs. Laban). God is morally inconsistent, because humans are, and humans give God his personality and characteristics, and put his words in his mouth, so such is to be expected.

I answered this. I would appreciate your reply.