When Debate Doesn't Make Sense

[_A Light in the Darkness]

Also, I think it should be pointed out that what I said might at first be a tad confusing to you. That's natural. I wouldn't expect everyone to be aces at basic differential Calc from the get go. I understand this. What is less forgiveable is the attitude that if you don't get it right away and it comes from a disagreeable source, then it must be bogus quibbling or obscurantism. Whether you recognize it or not, what I am saying is relatively basic if you are conversant with contemporary philosophy and actually matters to the discussion at hand. To those who share similar knowledge, it does not reflect well on you. All that said,

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Logic

[_A Light in the Darkness]

So, just to be sure I understand; your position is that if an argument is internally consistent (e.g., all the conclusions follow from the premises), but the premises themselves are silly and quite easily demonstrated to be false, this is a logically sound argument?

It is an unsound argument. It is not illogical per se, as that refers to logical validity. If the inferences are good, then an argument is logical. Soundness is a property of true conclusions of valid arguments, but only in informal language is it fair to say, "belief in santa claus is illogical." It isn't in the formal sense required by the position under discussion. It's just unsupported by the available evidence and regarded false because of other, extra-evidential considerations.

[_Gorman]

I haven't read through the entire thread yet, so this may have already been addressed.

We live in a universe of laws. That means we live in a universe of constraints. It seems to me that it is only when our beliefs conform to those constraints that they have any real chance of being true.

Off the top of my head, I might say there are two primary constraints which our beliefs must conform to, if they are to have any chance of being true: one constraint is logic, the other is evidence. It seems to me that any belief which requires the disregard of either, or both, is almost certainly wrong (certainly by definition, it would be irrational).

The above quote is correct to a certain extent. It certainly appears that we live in a universe of laws and constraints. The only problem is that we may not really know these laws and constraints. It is definitely apparent that we don't know the ultimate answer. If that ultimate answer gives us the final laws and constraints (which may or may not happen), then the question is, do we know enough that the final answer won't be much different than the current answer? I personally don't think we know enough. I would be surprised if the final answer is remotely close to the answer we have now, but I know other scientists that think otherwise. The point is that we are not certain.

In this light, logic and evidence break down somewhat. Logic is a wonderful tool if the input data and assumptions are correct, otherwise the output is probably false (and possibly drastically so). Evidence is heavily weighted by the assumptions made in science. If any one of these assumptions is incorrect...well, garbage in garbage out. When talking about the fundamental nature of the universe, science cannot be sure that what it is saying is remotely correct, although we hope that we are getting closer.

When discussing science, we are fine with the fact that our theories may be incorrect because we have experiments to fall back on to formulate new theories. When trying to apply these constraints to religion, you have a problem because there is no way to tell if the constraints are valid. When using scientific theories to extrapolate further into the unknown, anything can happen if the theories are even slightly wrong. A metaphysical elephant can hide in the details. A belief may seem illogical in one set of evidence and logic, and entirely logical in another set. It is entirely subjective in that you must choose how much you personally trust the scientific theories and assumptions relating to the belief in question.

[_A Light in the Darkness]

How on earth is it quibbling to point out someone's fundamental assertion is completely and totally wrong?

Unless you are totally clueless, which I doubt, you understood what posters meant when they talk about sound logic. It is quibbling to turn this into a discussion of the academic rules of logic, wherein logic is not violated just because an element is a false premise. I think it is a textbook case of scholastic tortuousness.

If someone says that a statement is capable of being if and only if it is logical and supportable through evidence, then the term "logic" in that sentence isn't referring to soundness of premises, it is referring to making good inferences. How do I know this? Because evidence is how one goes about establishing the truth of most premises. If the term "logic" in that sentence encapsulated the notion of having true premises, then there would be no reason to refer to evidence at all. At the same time, it would be the most trivial thing to say ever. Logic, then, just means "capable of being reasonable." And if that is all that is being said: That propositions are only meaningful if they can be reasonable, then, "Duh!!!!!!!" Holy obvious Batman. But, that's not really what was being said. This can be figured out from the dicussion on evidence that follows. He's trying to explain what it means to be reasonable. According to him, being reasonable entails using good logic and having evidence. This, however, can't quite be right for some reasons I listed above.

[_guy sajer]

It is an unsound argument. It is not illogical per se, as that refers to logical validity. If the inferences are goitsod, then an argument is logical. Soundness is a property of true conclusions of valid arguments, but only in informal language is it fair to say, "belief in santa claus is illogical." It isn't in the formal sense required by the position under discussion. It's just unsupported by the available evidence and regarded false because of other, extra-evidential considerations.

Ok, thanks. I don't have the time or inclination to check up on this as to whether this represents general consensus or your interpretation. Somebody else can take that on if they like.

I'd only comment that going by this definition, Mercury, and 95%+ of everyone else uses the term "logic" incorrectly.

Regardless, it's a very narrow issue and of limited relevance to the arguments at hand, except to the extent to that AlitD wishes to use it to put down Mercury and vice versa (since Mercury tried the put down first).

Carry on gentle persons.

[_JAK]

I haven't read through the entire thread yet, so this may have already been addressed.

We live in a universe of laws. That means we live in a universe of constraints. It seems to me that it is only when our beliefs conform to those constraints that they have any real chance of being true.

Off the top of my head, I might say there are two primary constraints which our beliefs must conform to, if they are to have any chance of being true: one constraint is logic, the other is evidence. It seems to me that any belief which requires the disregard of either, or both, is almost certainly wrong (certainly by definition, it would be irrational).

The above quote is correct to a certain extent. It certainly appears that we live in a universe of laws and constraints. The only problem is that we may not really know these laws and constraints. It is definitely apparent that we don't know the ultimate answer. If that ultimate answer gives us the final laws and constraints (which may or may not happen), then the question is, do we know enough that the final answer won't be much different than the current answer? I personally don't think we know enough. I would be surprised if the final answer is remotely close to the answer we have now, but I know other scientists that think otherwise. The point is that we are not certain.

In this light, logic and evidence break down somewhat. Logic is a wonderful tool if the input data and assumptions are correct, otherwise the output is probably false (and possibly drastically so). Evidence is heavily weighted by the assumptions made in science. If any one of these assumptions is incorrect...well, garbage in garbage out. When talking about the fundamental nature of the universe, science cannot be sure that what it is saying is remotely correct, although we hope that we are getting closer.

When discussing science, we are fine with the fact that our theories may be incorrect because we have experiments to fall back on to formulate new theories. When trying to apply these constraints to religion, you have a problem because there is no way to tell if the constraints are valid. When using scientific theories to extrapolate further into the unknown, anything can happen if the theories are even slightly wrong. A metaphysical elephant can hide in the details. A belief may seem illogical in one set of evidence and logic, and entirely logical in another set. It is entirely subjective in that you must choose how much you personally trust the scientific theories and assumptions relating to the belief in question.

PhysicsGuy stated in conclusion:
A metaphysical elephant can hide in the details. A belief may seem illogical in one set of evidence and logic, and entirely logical in another set. It is entirely subjective in that you must choose how much you personally trust the scientific theories and assumptions relating to the belief in question.

I mention this because you again appear to give credibility to that which lacks it. You clearly support “a metaphysical.” You give no example to support your contention.

What’s an example of a reliable “metaphysical elephant”? Absent evidence for that metaphysical elephant, it should be disregarded.

Of course the conclusions must be correct. But you say the “assumptions.” Just what “assumptions” absent evidence do you regard as “correct”?

It appears as if you’re playing word games. Assumptions, what are some you make, and how do you determine that they are reliable?

I’m skeptical.

JAK

[_Tarski]

Logic isn't concerned with whether propositions are true or not per se.

This sentence alone points out the fact you have no idea what you are talking about.

Actually, for formal logic he is not far off the mark.

Note the following definitions

If the logical form is a good one, the resulting argument will be valid. A valid argument is one in which the truth of the premises guarantees the truth of its conclusion. However, the issue is one of inference and the truth of the premisses is not at issue per se for validity.

Soundness is a different matter. There the truth of the premises is at issue but often the truth of the premises cannot be determined by purely logical considerations. Sometimes they are taken as axioms (as in Euclidean geometry).

VALIDITY + TRUE PREMISES = SOUNDNESS

Finally, let me add that there is much more to rationality than pure logic and there is much more to choosing warrented beliefs than adherence to some formula. Even the aquisition of evidence faces the problem of subsequent interpretation as well as the issue implicit and explicit theoretical backgrounds.

[_beastie]

Tarski, good to see you here.

You were featured in one of ALITD's threads, you may want to check it out:

Apologists Wasting their Time

[_A Light in the Darkness]

Ok, thanks. I don't have the time or inclination to check up on this as to whether this represents general consensus or your interpretation. Somebody else can take that on if they like.

I'd only comment that going by this definition, Mercury, and 95%+ of everyone else uses the term "logic" incorrectly.

Regardless, it's a very narrow issue and of limited relevance to the arguments at hand, except to the extent to that AlitD wishes to use it to put down Mercury and vice versa (since Mercury tried the put down first).

Carry on gentle persons.

People in their everyday speech use the term "logical" to mean "reasonable." That's all well and good. I have no problem with common parlance. However, the formal argument being made here requires the more technical sense of logic. Tarski isn't really saying anything different than me, though I get a kick out of him saying I"m not "far off the mark" even though I'm not off the mark at all. You're not far off the mark Tarski.

[_Tarski]

People in their everyday speech use the term "logical" to mean "reasonable." That's all well and good. I have no problem with common parlance. However, the formal argument being made here requires the more technical sense of logic. Tarski isn't really saying anything different than me, though I get a kick out of him saying I"m not "far off the mark" even though I'm not off the mark at all. You're not far off the mark Tarski.

Well, your choice of words was "Logic isn't concerned with whether propositions are true or not per se".
But the question of validity of a logical argument isn't concerned with whether propositions are true or not per se. That might have been a better way to put it. It sounds a bit weird to suggest that the issue of truth doesn't play a role since the meaning of soundness does employ the notion of truth. Also consider that my namesake Afred Tarski was a logician quite concerned with the meaning of the notion of "true propositions".