Tal's epistemology (and DCP's)

[_Tal Bachman]

ANY theory of knowledge, in order to not be heretical to Mormonism, HAS to begin by conceding the possibility of "sure and certain knowledge".

Tarski, do you agree with this statement?

[_Daniel Peterson]

Yes. You've caught my position pretty well. (Except for the last sentence, where I think there is room for argument -- an argument in which I won't engage here, but regarding which Alvin Plantinga, William Alston, and a few other contemporary philosophers of religion are relevant.)

Incidentally, when you move this thread to the CK, can you do something about making it not spread out beyond the confines of my computer screen?

[_Bond...James Bond]

Mod Note: Alright the thread has been moved to the Celestial Kingdom, and I'll sticky it for a while (the Spaulding Thread needs company)....remember since it's in the Celestial:

1) Please no ad hominems. If you want to disagree with a position that's fine, just please explain yourr reasoning and try to be nice about it.

2) No bad language (I've haven't seen any but just a reminder)....that includes dangs and H-E-double hockey sticks (except when referring to the Hot Place of course).

3) I think that's about it, carry on with the festivities-Bond

[Guest]

By the way, I don't know why ALITD thinks I'm setting out to "solve the problem of induction" here; as I said explicitly, all I'm going to try to do here is show that Popper et al have failed. That is, after all, part of what I need to show to prove that subsequent efforts (like Mormon apologetic ones) influenced by, or based on, these arguments must be flawed. And in fact, I wonder if I will already have shown it with the prima facie argument I started with, as long as I can show that in fact, that the positions of the philosophers in question really do incline them, or force them, to deny (K).

You've argued up to this point and after that accepting the problem of induction entails radical skepticism. Since the problem of induction is legitimate and you don't consider yourself a radical skeptic, I concluded that you must fancy yourself to have some sort of solution for it. Otherwise, you are a radical skeptic as well.

You later write, "Little wonder then, that those who came after, and who began their own reasonings on Hume's arguments against the rationality of induction, should be led to the same place, regardless of how loathe or eager they might have been to fully admit it."

The (Humean) problem of induction is that induction itself isn't justified. So other you are in that place too or you have some sort of solution to the problem. Therefore, it is not unreasonable to think you'd actually explain why the problem of induction isn't a problem. Yes, everyone who has tackled the problem has failed in the sense that they haven't managed to give a rational account of how one can form reasonable beliefs about unobserved instances from observed instances. (Whether this is actually necessary is its own issue.) But you are no different in this regard.

[_A Light in the Darkness]

Or have you been to any General Conferences or testimony meetings lately where most participants get up and say, "I think this might be the one true church, but I can't really rule out that we all might be profoundly mistaken, and it is possible also that Joseph Smith didn't tell the truth about his experiences - in the name of Jesus Christ, Amen"?

Do people usually say, "I think North America won't sink under a tidal wave tommorrow, but I can't really rule out that we all might be profoundly mistaken, and it is possible that today might be North America's last day?" Of course not. That's because this is regarded as so highly implausible as to not be worth mentioning. Fallibilism - thinking knowledge is inherently fallible - doesn't preclude extreme confidence or the myriad ways we choose to express that confidence. You seem to consistently miss the difference between formal certainty required by your arguments and the everyday certainty we all think and express when we talk about things we have confidence in.

Do I think the Sun will rise tomorrow in the east? Do I think molecules exist? Do I think I own a computer?

Certainly.

"Aha!" you say, "That means you are not a fallibilist. Because if you were, you'd have to acknowledge you can't be certain about this."

Um, sure Mr. Pedant, I'm not technically certain in a highly formal sense, but in the common way we use that term to express a certain level of confidence, I'm certain.

[_A Light in the Darkness]

It's also instruction to realize that Tal is arguing that accepting the problem of induction as a problem without fully resolving it makes one a radical skeptic. So it isn't just Hume, Kant, Popper, etc. that are part of his "Group K." It's virtually all modern philosophers and philosophy students. This includes Quine, Wittgenstein, Carnap, Hempel, and virtually any other figure who matters that you can name.

[_Tarski]

ANY theory of knowledge, in order to not be heretical to Mormonism, HAS to begin by conceding the possibility of "sure and certain knowledge".

Tarski, do you agree with this statement?

There are a couple of related obstacles to my conceeding to that.
1. I don't think Mormonism a unified target. There is just this big pile of statements and they don't always seem consistent.
For example "we walk by faith" and "we can have sure and certain knowledge now".

Sure and certain is used in with varying degrees of strictness.
I am sure and certain that 7 is a prime number.
I am sure and certain that my dog has a skeleton.
I am sure and certain that my mommy loves me.
I am sure and certain that Ellen Degeneres is gay.
I am sure and certain that rocks are solid.
I am sure and certain that rocks are mostly empty space.
I am sure and certain that joe is going to screw up again today.

We have to be clear on what we are conceeding. Are all of the above really referring to one equally strict concept?


2. Mormonism seems to have a concept of heretical that is a bit fuzzy around the edges. I don't think one is heretical if one believes the basics (First vision, prieshood authority, divinity of Jesus, etc.). You can go around teaching that sure knowledge is not possible and not expect to be excommunicated. But one cannot teach that Joseph Smith wasn't a prophet or that Jesus didn't rise from the dead.
The there is a functional definition of heresy. Are you going to get away with repeatedly sharing that opinion with other members?

While such a one (walk by faith type) is not a heretic, he/she must at least face up to the realization that they cannot accept some strong statements like the ones you listed.
But, anyway, one has to choose between the doctrines of walking by faith and knowing something for sure by the HG. In other words, one is going to have to be a seemingly inconsistent with various commonly accepted statement in any case.

Recall this one from Alma 21

And now as I said concerning faith—faith is not to have a perfect knowledge of things; therefore if ye have faith ye hope for things which are cnot seen, which are true.

So maybe the heretic is the one who claims certainty!!


One final thought. The statements of Mormon leaders and prophets are not stacked up against each other in a logical chain like dominoes ready to be toppled by knocking over just one.
It is fault tolerant in part because it is already fuzzy and not internally consistent. Mormons already seem willing to accept that the pontifications of the GAs aren't always right in every case. They just usually don't think they have the right to pick and choose for personal convenience.

[_Bond...James Bond]

Off-Topic Comedy Warning

Here's how I think all philosophical discussions should be decided

[_Yoda]

Yes. You've caught my position pretty well. (Except for the last sentence, where I think there is room for argument -- an argument in which I won't engage here, but regarding which Alvin Plantinga, William Alston, and a few other contemporary philosophers of religion are relevant.)

Incidentally, when you move this thread to the CK, can you do something about making it not spread out beyond the confines of my computer screen?

Moderator Note

I think the margin problem has been resolved. There were a couple of url references that Tal had placed in an earlier post that was causing the issue. The url references are still there. I simply re-labeled them with text.

Tal, please PM me if there is a problem reading the references. When I tested the links, they worked.

Liz

[_Tal Bachman]

Self-Congratulating Light Amidst Evil Gentile Darkness

Please keep the comments coming - you'll make a prophet out of me:

No doubt we will even be treated soon on this very thread to the spectacle of Mormon apologists claiming that "it was never official church doctrine that we can know Mormonism to be true"

Also, I'll see what progress I can make on "the problem of induction". I need some time, though.

Tarski

You and I agree that Mormonism is saturated with inconsistencies - in fact, even a lot of members acknowledge this disconcerting fact. However, while a spectrum of faith is contemplated in Mormonism, there is also a canonized statement about being able to know "the truth" of "all things" (that is, that people in reality vary in faith is not incompatible with "Moroni's promise" to the "pure in heart", etc.). The passage in Moroni 10 forms the basis of every single missionary pitch around the globe, every Mormon testimony meeting whether at youth camp, the MTC, monthly ward meeting, or at the family reunion. And LDS prophets and apostles, speaking ex officio at General Conference, reaffirm it at nearly every opportunity. Here it is:

And when ye shall receive these things, I would exhort you that ye would ask God, the Eternal Father, in the name of Christ, if these things are not true; and if ye shall ask with a sincere heart, with real intent, having faith in Christ, he will manifest the truth of it unto you, by the power of the Holy Ghost.

And by the power of the Holy Ghost ye may know the truth of all things.

I am very aware of how or why someone might doubt this statement; I am not aware of how someone can doubt, in light of innumerable Mormon conference talks, lessons, hymns, reaffirming this, that this is the primary epistemic claim in Mormonism, or doubt its meaning.

For all these reasons, I believe that the most rational position is that any epistemic claim which calls into question, or denies, that one "may know the truth of all things", has put itself at odds with a foundational Mormon tenet. In fact, I can hardly even believe we might disagree about that.

And Tarski, if at some level you didn't agree with me about the incongruity of strong doubt about the possibility of "knowing the truth of all things, and strong belief in the possibility of "knowing the truth of all things", I don't know why you would agree that skeptical arguments are a very poor defense strategy for "one true" religionists (?). You seem almost conflicted on this, as though you shouldn't like to see skepticism as fundamentally incompatible with Mormonism...but honestly, I think that if it could ever be said that skepticism is reconcilable with a canonical tenet that "we may know the truth of all things", then we would have rendered either, or both, positions essentially meaningless; for how can skepticism and credulism as concepts ever be made even close to synonymous, without destroying one or both as concepts?

Anyway, I'll see if I can press on with the Hume and Popper thing.


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