Tal's epistemology (and DCP's)

[_Tal Bachman]

Another quick review before I go on:

In my last post, I summarized in syllogism form Hume's arguments against induction, and where they led him: to the conclusion that there is no rational or justifiable basis for any belief about the world. (This was a result of the epistemologically lethal mixture of empiricism with inductive skepticism).

But, I point out, if there were no rational basis for any belief about the world, then the belief that blood does not run through the veins of mammals would be just as "rational" (whatever that would mean) as the belief that it does; and indeed, just as "rational" as the belief that there is no such thing as blood at all, nor mammals themselves, and just as "rational" that a giant dragon lives under the neighbour's bed, or that one's neighbour actually IS a dragon. And indeed, the belief that poor Joseph Smith, devoted and pious Christian minister, only with great sadness achieved erection for his dozens of extramarital escapades after being forced to by a sword-waving, homicidal angel, or that Jesus was the first Mormon, or that "The Breathing Permit of Hor" is actually a secret Israelite cryptogram that only Joseph Smith could understand, would be just as "rational" as the belief that bees fly, flowers bloom, and birds sing.

Hence, Hume's despairing lament at the conclusion of all his philosophizing, which I quoted in the last post:

"I am ready to reject all belief and reasoning, and can look upon no opinion even as more probable or likely than another"

I think I have now shown that, for whatever else its merits, Hume's reasoning fails to provide an adequate account of how knowledge about the world is aquired. I now turn to Popper. I will attempt to show that Popper:

1.) Can give no adequate account of the fact that more is known now than it was, say, in 1507 (proposition [K]), and even in effect denies it;

and that

2.) His arguments derive from the patently defective account of Hume's, detailed above.

Supposing it is of interest to anyone, I might also try to show how such a patently implausible view has been made plausible to so many people, who would reject it outright if presented to them as I have presented it here.

So, first question: Does Popper deny the possibility of knowledge about the world? You decide. Let me first try to set the stage a bit, then let Popper himself describe his acceptance of Hume's patently defective argument, and then we will see just where this leads Popper.

I think it is fair to say that much of twentieth-century philosophy of science, and certainly the essentially incredulist strains within it, were prompted by the early twentieth-century discovery that Newtonian physics – theretofore considered the example par excellence of science's ability to achieve certain knowledge about how the world worked - did not in fact comprise the “one true explanation” of physics it had been believed to comprise. A firm confidence held by all scientists and philosophers of science, and one amply justified by innumerable experiments at that, was revealed to be misguided, and in need of wholesale rebuilding, by the vindication of Einstein's theories. (It was, after all, hard to argue with the success of his May 1919 eclipse predictions, not to mention the atomic bomb a quarter century later). And just as would follow in the case of a great building collapsing, which had previously been thought to be structurally invulnerable, and in which great hopes had been reposited, so now great care was taken by thinkers to discover just what had been fundamentally unsound in that previous conception of science, and just as much care taken to ensure that what would replace it be free of its predecessor's vulnerabilities. Perhaps those attached to the concept of science would never have to suffer such a devastating blow again.

It was in this mood-deflated situation that Hume's arguments against induction – really, against science as then conceived – could not help but be revisited after a century of relative disregard. What relevance, after all, could a man doubtful of science (half the time, anyway) have to a world being transformed monthly by the discoveries of the Industrial Revolution? It could only be after confidence had been so dashed in science, that ideas as normally suspect as Hume's on science could be taken seriously. Hume's criticisms of induction, for example, notwithstanding their irrationalist implications, would come to form the foundation on which Vienna-born Karl Popper would construct his entire philosophy of science.

Popper's solution to the blows delivered to philosophy of science by Einsteinian physics was simple: he announced that “we never know what we are talking about”.
(Yes, this is a direct quote [from page 26 of Popper's autobiography, "Unended Quest", published by Routledge. And if you think that's too paltry a quote to establish Popper's ultimate incredulism, just stick around and get ready for a whole lot more.])

How, it might be asked, could an extremely influential philosopher of science summarize his philosophy of science in such a way?

Popper ultimately denied the possibility of knowledge (don't worry, quotes are forthcoming) throughout his long and decorated career because he accepted Hume's arguments about induction, as detailed above. That argument, remember, culminated in the conclusion that there is “no reason” to believe any proposition about the unobserved, which includes all scientific theories (i.e., science is irrational). Popper explained his reliance on Hume in this way:

"I approached the problem of induction through Hume. Hume, I felt, was perfectly right in pointing out that induction cannot be logically justified. He held that there can be no valid logical arguments allowing us to establish that 'those instances, of which we have had no experience, resemble those, of which we have had experience'..."
"(A)n attempt to justify the practice of induction by an appeal to experience must lead to an infinite regress. As a result, we can say that theories can never be inferred from observation statements, or rationally justified by them...I found Hume's refutation of inductive inference clear and conclusive. (See "Conjectures and Refutations", Routledge edition, pp. 55-56. Can someone pay me money for writing these, dammit?).

In his essay “The Problem of Induction”, Popper even more bluntly writes: “I agree with Hume's opinion that induction is invalid and in no sense justified”.

Science had traditionally been thought of as the process of gaining knowledge about the world. That process was thought to consist of the advancing and testing of hypotheses and theories to explain observed natural phenomena; the more that a particular claim withstood critical tests, was supported by direct or indirect evidence, and made successful predictions, the more probably true it would be considered. However, this standard view of science was not available to Popper, nor to anyone else accepting Hume's arguments and taking them to their logical extreme, for this description of science relies entirely on induction (horrified gasp!). On the point of theory construction, therefore, Popper puts it like this:

“Traditional empiricist epistemology and the traditional historiography of science are both deeply influenced by the Baconian myth that all science starts from observation and then slowly and cautiously proceeds to theories. That the facts are very different can be learned by studying the pre-Socratics”. (C&R, p. 185).

And again:

“The belief that science proceeds from observation to theory is still so widely and so firmly held that my denial of it is often met with incredulity”. (C&R, 61).

And on the possibility of gauging the probability of a theory being true, he writes

"In my view the importance, if any, of giving the best possible definition lies in the fact that such a definition shows clearly the inadequacy of all probability theories as theories of induction....Science has nothing to do with the quest for certainty or probability or reliability. We are not interested in establishing scientific theories as secure, or certain, or probable...".

And perhaps the most outrageous of this whole set: "we can never give positive reasons which justify the belief that a theory is true. (Let your next plane trip demonstrate to you how plausible you really find that statement). (C&R, 331).

That is, according to Popper, and in full accordance with Hume's conclusion, calculating truth probability (not certainty - probability) based on past performance is irrational, and has nothing to do with science. As he makes clear, there is no account of truth probability, or for lack of a better phrase, gradations of justified belief, in Popper's philosophy of science. If you can't quite believe these are his positions, read the quotes again, or better yet, go buy "Conjectures and Refutations" [probably his most popular book] and read it yourself!).

But for Popper, not even these extreme positions were enough to guarantee the safety of his philosophy of science against the contaminating influence of induction. As though to attempt to seal its purity off once and for all, Popper actually came to claim that inductive reasoning, as a psychological process, did not really even exist. That is, he "solved" the problem of induction, according to him, by claiming there was no such thing as inductive reasoning at all. Can you believe it? If not, read on:

“Induction, i.e., inference based on many observations, is a myth. It is neither a psychological fact, nor a fact of ordinary life, nor one of scientific procedure”. (see C&J, 70).

In another place, he writes

"I disagree with Hume's opinion (the opinion incidentally of almost all philosophers) that induction is a fact and in any case needed. I hold that neither animals nor men use any procedure like induction, or any argument based on the repetition of instances. The belief that we use induction is simply a mistake. It is a kind of optical illusion." (See "The Problem of Induction", at http://www.cavehill.uwi.edu/bnccde/PH29A/popper.html). (By the way, I'd like to have seen Popper as an anthropologist, trying to explain Kalahari tracking and hunting techniques - hell, even as himself trying to explain common dog training methods - while still claiming that neither humans nor animals induce anything).

Since it must strain credulity that any philosopher – or any person, for that matter – could deny that human beings and animals alike routinely calculate probabilities based on past experience, I include a final quote from Popper:

“(A theory) is never inferred, in any sense, from the empirical evidence. There is neither a psychological nor a logical induction”. (C&R, 72).

Popper then announces, “this solves...Hume's problem of induction”. (Is that kind of like "solving" the problem of Lehi's invisible blood descendants by ignoring the Book of Mormon's own scriptures, Joseph Smith's and his successor's own pronouncements on Native American ancestry, while denying the flood story?)

Next time, I'll try to let Popper himself explain in more detail just where his denial of any such psychological process as inductive reasoning leads him with respect to the possibility of knowledge about the world.

Nighty night,

T.

[Guest]

I think it is Church doctrine that we can know the Church to be true. I don't think knowledge requires absolute certainty. If you do, I'm very sorry, but that position is something of a joke. I believe in truth. I believe we can have meaningful knowledge of the truth. In the ordinary sense of the word, I am certain about many things. This does not mean I am not a fallibilist with respect to knowledge. You are mistakenly trying to tease out of simple expressions philosophical positions they do not entail.

[_A Light in the Darkness]

I think I have now shown that, for whatever else its merits, Hume's reasoning fails to provide an adequate account of how knowledge about the world is aquired.

Hume himself acknowledges this though. So does every scholar of epistemology worth listening to. Epistemology, thus far, as failed to account for how knowledge about the world is acquired. It has not succeeded in its ultimate goal. So your criticism isn't just of Hume. It's of virtually everyone who has given the subject a modicum of thought and everyone worth taking seriously

[_Tarski]

Self-Congratulating Light Amidst Evil Gentile Darkness

And Tarski, if at some level you didn't agree with me about the incongruity of strong doubt about the possibility of "knowing the truth of all things, and strong belief in the possibility of "knowing the truth of all things", I don't know why you would agree that skeptical arguments are a very poor defense strategy for "one true" religionists (?).

Stated this way I think I can more or less agree.

You seem almost conflicted on this,

I am. I feel like you are trying to make every instance of the use of the word "know" have its strongest philosophical sense (whatever that is). If I agree to this then I feel some equivocation will be foisted on me later.
But isn't there a spectrum? What happens when a scientist says that we now know that all carbon atoms were form by fusion inside stars? Then we have philosophers of science that assure us that science doesn't claim absolute certainly about anything. It's all tentative to varying degrees.

In mathematics, words have definite strict meanings for our words and concepts and so it is easy to prove or pisprove this or that. But ordinary language doesn't seem to submit to that kind of treatment. In particular, attempts to make a perfect explication of what should constitute a proper use of the word knowledge is one of the places of continual contention in philosophy is in not?
I don't think you can prove a whole religion false based on how they use a particular word.

I will agree to this: Mormon missionaries and leaders routinely say that we can know this or that by the Holy Ghost. It is also in the canon but so is the suff about not having a perfect knowledge and the stuff about needing to walk by faith.
But I think they are unaware of or don't care about, the ambiguities and philosophical problems associated with the word know

I think Mormons who become aware of such issues might make the following translations without being heretical:

[By the of the Holy Ghost you may know the truth of all thing]=[by the power of the holy ghost you may gradually find out the truth of all things]

example. "Open the box if you want to know whats in there" = "Open the box if you want to find out what is in there".

[sure and certain]]=[extremely high degree of confidence] (as in "I am sure and certain that my father will not murder me")

Now if you agree that there is a spectrum of positions on human epitemological capacity that has radical sketicism on one end then I think we can say that Momonism, as it is understood by most of its owm members, needs to take a position pretty far away from that end of the spectrum.

I think this issue needs to wait until you finish your stuff about Hume etc. That way we might agree on a few terms and I can see where you are coming from personally.

[_Tarski]

Another quick review before I go on:

"I disagree with Hume's opinion (the opinion incidentally of almost all philosophers) that induction is a fact and in any case needed. I hold that neither animals nor men use any procedure like induction, or any argument based on the repetition of instances. The belief that we use induction is simply a mistake. It is a kind of optical illusion." (See "The Problem of Induction", at http://www.cavehill.uwi.edu/bnccde/PH29A/popper.html). (By the way, I'd like to have seen Popper as an anthropologist, trying to explain Kalahari tracking and hunting techniques - hell, even as himself trying to explain common dog training methods - while still claiming that neither humans nor animals induce anything).

Thanks for writing so clearly. I only have one comment (but don't miss my post just above).
Which is (K)?

k1. We (science) do not know more than we did in the past.
k2. We cannot be absolutely sure that we know more than we did in the past.
k3. We cannot prove that we know more than we did in the past.

or something else?

[_Ren]

Let a light number be defined as a positive integer which has less than 100 prime factors
One make check that 1 is a light number, 2 is a light number , 3 is a light number, 4 is a light number,
......,10 is a light number.
Conclusion: All integers are light numbers. (NOT!)

That's a great example Tarski. Thanks. That makes the principle clear to me.
But just to clarify the example, I take it the statement 'let a light number be defined as a positive integer which has less than 100 prime numbers' is meant to be the 'reality', rather than the 'model', or the 'theory' being used by the observer?
If so, I'm interested in what example of a 'model' you would think best compliments the example? Because surely the 'examiner' in question doesn't think that all integers are 'light numbers' - do they? If so, why don't they just call them 'integers' and go and do something more interesting?
Or perhaps, is there assumed to be some 'unspecified' way that the observer is distinguishing 'light' numbers from 'normal' integers, but is yet able to directly correlate them?

k1. We (science) do not know more than we did in the past.
k2. We cannot be absolutely sure that we know more than we did in the past.
k3. We cannot prove that we know more than we did in the past.

Assuming I'm still managing to clutch onto the robe of all this, this is exactly what I'd like clarified too.

I must thank both Tal and AlitD for introducing me to a heck of a lot of Popperian thought that I wasn't aware of. But just to clarify, is there any clear indication that Popper also meant pure logical constructs (like 2 + 2 = 4) when he was saying things like "We never know what we are talking about"?
If it was meant to be in relation to the philosophies of science only, then - well - it can still be catagorised as 'extreme' I'm sure, but... (from the link provided earlier)

Lastly, the proposition 'all knowledge is conjectural' is simply not true. The writer's observation that 'the sun is shining' is not conjectural, it is a fact known to him and countless other observers. At 11am on 5 May 2003 in western England the sun is shining. The observation is no more conjectural than 'George Bush is President of the USA (at time of writing),' or 'Einstein's grandparents are dead,' or 'the French for 'yes' is 'oui,'' or '2 plus 2 = 4.' These statements are true. They are demonstrable to any sane person; either ostensibly, or through the presentation of evidence beyond reasonable doubt, via simple common sense, or by means of logic. They constitute knowledge, not conjecture.

I'm sure most of this is relavent critism, but I don't see how the '2 + 2 = 4' bit is. And I'm not sure on the language example either. Unless - of course - there is yet more that I am missing? (which seems quite likely at this point).
Did Popper really mean this in the sense that would mean that we can't know that 2 + 2 = 4?!

I mean, I understand the guy is simply attacking the statement 'All knowledge is conjectural' - but surely we accept that Popper was addressing scientific philosophy - no? Seems a tad pedantic to not accept this context. Although perhaps 'proper' philosophers should be more careful about what they say...!

EDIT: Hmm - thinking about it, I guess the point the critic is making is not that Popper meant this, but that if Popper thought that the 'fact' The Sun is shining should be any less 'knowledge' than 2 + 2 = 4 then....
....hmmm - what a dilemma! Should I agree with the crazy guy?
I certainly feel like I want to...

[_A Light in the Darkness]

Popper believed in the progress of knowledge. It's just that he thought knowledge progressed by getting rid of false notions, sort of like someone creating a sculpture by removing the rock that isn't part of it. (Gad's evolution analogy is perhaps better here). His account of progress in scientific knowledge is refinement through falsification rather than induction. I don't think he was successful, but it would be incorrect to say he denied progress in his arguments. If you argue that his arguments aren't a fully successful account of knowledge and he therefore did not account for how knowledge progresses, then well yes, but that's true of everybody. Nobody has accounted for how knowledge progresses, but not too many of us think knowledge doesn't progress.

[_Tarski]

Let a light number be defined as a positive integer which has less than 100 prime factors
One make check that 1 is a light number, 2 is a light number , 3 is a light number, 4 is a light number,
......,10 is a light number.
Conclusion: All integers are light numbers. (NOT!)

That's a great example Tarski. Thanks. That makes the principle clear to me....

I'm not so sure it is a good example for our purposes here.
I hope you realize that I am not holding this up as an example af faulty scientific induction but rather as faulty formal logic.
There is, by the way, a principle of induction in mathematics that goes like this:

Suppose there is an infinite list of propositions
P1, P2, P3, ....
If P1 is true
and
if Pn implies P(n+1) for all n
then
Pn is true for all n.

Again, this isn't the kind of induction at issue.

The problem of induction is concerned with empirical observation and is to say exactly how it is that repeated observations of something emipirical can ever warrant more confidence or provide knowledge. Or maybe, how do we overcome Hume and Poppers objections to induction? Better yet read the links I gave you. It's better explained.

[Guest]

“Traditional empiricist epistemology and the traditional historiography of science are both deeply influenced by the Baconian myth that all science starts from observation and then slowly and cautiously proceeds to theories. That the facts are very different can be learned by studying the pre-Socratics”. (C&R, p. 185).

What, exactly, is wrong with this comment? And why is it highlighted? This is a myth common among the empiricists of the time. It is naïve Baconianism. There is this mistaken notion out there that one makes a series of raw observations that exist as "facts" and one goes and derives theories from them. A more modern, sophisticated approach understands that such observations do not exist in a vaccuum, but are already interpreted in the context of theories about the world. The idea that observations can be made independent of theory is the myth in question. One gets the impression you either don't agree with this or don't understand the purpose of the quote. This does not entail any of the broader positions you are trying to nail down, such as radical skepticism.

[Guest]

Popper believed in the progress of knowledge. It's just that he thought knowledge progressed by getting rid of false notions, sort of like someone creating a sculpture by removing the rock that isn't part of it. (Gad's evolution analogy is perhaps better here). His account of progress in scientific knowledge is refinement through falsification rather than induction. I don't think he was successful, but it would be incorrect to say he denied progress in his arguments. If you argue that his arguments aren't a fully successful account of knowledge and he therefore did not account for how knowledge progresses, then well yes, but that's true of everybody. Nobody has accounted for how knowledge progresses, but not too many of us think knowledge doesn't progress.

Yeap - I understand what you mean, I think.
I guess my real misunderstanding of Popper was that I thought - that he thought - that we could gain confidence in theories over time - rather than relying on falsification only. I just thought he put more emphasis on falsification...
But yes - I think just looking at some of Poppers comments in the most extreme way possible is kind of missing the point. Although I'm not very confident about that at all - especially after this thread.

I can see how you can take a view that denies absolute knowledge regarding emperical fact (not pure logical fact like 2+2=4) and then turn that into a statement like 'We know no more now than we did 500 years ago'. I can see the way the argument can be constructed. And in fact - depending on how you view the word 'knowledge', it may well be technically correct! But I think to view the word 'knowledge' in the manner that would construct the 'extreme' view is the problem. It smacks - to me - of the need to be 'logically' sure, just for the sake of it.

Rather than putting it as something like - 'We have no good reason NOT to think that we know more now than we did 500 years ago...'.
To lose heart in rationality over inevitable doubt seems itself irrational. To me anyway...

EDIT: This is what most of you have been saying of course - that science carries on, even while the 'problem of induction' goes - for most - technically unsolved...