It is possible however, that a specific time that one was feeling a bit emotional or good about the church may be transformed in the narrative into the "testimony event" even though at the time the person never thought of it that way.
Yes. Also, i was way dog tired last night so i wasn't clear on a lot of things. Dennett's project to "Quine Qualia" goes for the most real 'seeming' experiences, seeing colors, taste etc. His inspiration was Rorty's suggestion that a personal experience is meaningless to talk about once we accept the interpretation of outside observers over and above first-person reports - hence "heterophenomenology". Most people would agree that we can question first person reports, until it comes to the elusive qualia, and then we throw up a brick wall.
Let me take a related claim to the LDS testimony, the "sensus divinitatus". The belief that people have an inborn knowledge of deity. Now, the difference between the two is that the so called "God-sense" to my knowledge doesn't require a "what-it's-like" experience. It's epistemically basic like memory, but it's not clearly related to qualia. Philosophers have no problem laughing that one out of court - suggesting a priori knowledge of the great pumpkin and insist there's a publically available explanation. Now shift slightly to the LDS testimony, and you get knowledge+phenomenal experience. If we can question someones incorrigable knowledge of God's existence or the existence of the Great Pumpkin, why couldn't we question the supposed "good feelings" which add a phenomenal dimension to this knowledge proposition? It seems to me skeptics have no problem being eliminativists toward the "sensus divinitatus" and demand public evidence such as neurological structures in the brain that could capacitate the god-knowledge in the same way we can point to receptors for vision and structures for memory. But for some reason, they are more inclined to take at face value a burning in the bosom, or some other experiential happening, and then write it off as hallucination. Certainly, there are brain experiments that show specific activities for "spiritual experiences", but these kinds of feelings aren't exclusive to belief and they don't explain the LDS testimony which is more nuanced. Like I said, I'll keep the 2% open for the guy who really does go into a tent with contraband and come out with visions of eternity.
But just like incorrigable "knowledge" of God on grounds of the divine sense can be questioned, and I think, with enough scrutiny and examination of the person's life, shown to be confused and the "belief" not directed toward anything exclusively like a Supreme Being, the phenomenal "testimony" can in most cases be demonstrated as confused and lacking any true "what-it's-like" experience. Just as we may believe there is knowledge of some things but draw battle lines against propositions like the divine sense, I think we can believe there might be qualia but draw battle lines and not just take experiential reports at face value. In other words, I haven't decide whether there is a what-it's-like experience for "red" but I have decided, like the God sense, there is not something that it's like to have a testiphony. There are those rare birds with delusions and hallucinations.
It doesn't take a lot of interrogation to cast doubt on the testimony. It's a burning in the bosom, whether you had one or not, but if not and you can't own up, then it's a culmination of life experiences. Or it could be general good feelings, no feelings at all that were made up into something, or possibly a flat out lie to fit in with the group. It could be a complex narrative that includes a little bit of this or that or a single experience that at the time seemed incorrigable, but doubted later. New member testimonies put the bishopric in panic mode cuz you never know what kind of off-the-wall revelations are going to come over the pulpit. Then again, some life-longs will get up for the ritualistic 20 minute travelog, the audience feels embarrassed, but to the person standing up there a real, incorrigable testimony is being offered in sincerity. So there's already heterophenomenology going on within TBMs themselves. In fact, some critics it seems to me, elevate the testimony far more than members do and are willing to give it hallucinatory status. A testimony - every TBM experiences one, but there is no one can really say what-it's like - ah salt. Dennett's reasoning is similar for less controverial experience, like the taste of salt, it just takes weightier experimental evidence to make the points.
As far as Dennett is concerned I think his arguments are powerful. He might not be right in the long run but we has certainly given a challenge that must be taken seriously. (I had to read that CE book like three times before my assurity in the reality of qualia begain to be broken down).
I don't think Chalmer's has saved qualia but perhaps someone will. Perhaps it will never be fully resolved.
Dennett I'll admit has influnced me more than any other in that genre. He and Chalmers are two of the most famous, but also controversial, and there are a number of in between positions that I think are sensible. Chalmers rejects physicalism and Dennett rejects qualia. But there are good theories too which reduce qualia. And there is just as much mind-bending in the fight over First Order Theories and Higher Order Theories as you encounter in Dennett's book.