Tal's epistemology (and DCP's)

[_Tal Bachman]

Tarski

I'm now on the backyard phase of my landscaping extravaganza, with a rented excavator, so I'm probably not going to have time for a day or two to get back into this thread. I will as soon as I can, though. If you can summarize what is most important to you I can try to blast out fairly quick answers perhaps tonight or early tomorrow morning.

If you are curious about my supposition that animals make inductive inferences, I can go into more detail about that; it would help me, though, if you would summarize why you should doubt that the brains of, say, apes or wolves, are capable of inductive reasoning, when you (I believe) freely concede that the brains of fellow mammals human beings are capable of this same type of reasoning. That would help me know where to begin.

Talk to you soon

Tal

[_tojohndillonesq]

Gad sez:
Apologetics is also a philosophical discipline, but as it obliges dishonesty from zealous defenders who absolutely don't know what they're talking about to hold positions that formally have nothing to do with logic or fundamentally have anything to do with reality, it deserves separate mention in your list.

I'll try my hand at a little formal logical analysis of the above paragraph... not my specialty, but something I do try to practice.

I believe the entire paragraph is "ad hominem circumstantial," also known as "an appeal to motive." It implies that the apologists are wrong because they have suspect motives.

Specific sentences from the paragraph contain other logical fallacies:

"it obliges dishonesty" - I believe that the word "obliges" makes this statement an example of "Post hoc ergo propter hoc." The fallacy is in the implication that because aplogists are dishonest, it is the act of apologetics that makes them so. In addition, the unproven assumption of dishonesty could be classified as false cause.

"defenders who absolutely don't know what they're talking about" - An example of secundum quid; a small sample has been taken to prove the universal case.

"(positions that) fundamentally have (no)thing to do with reality" - another example of secundum quid

"(apologetics) deserves separate mention in your list" - this is ignoratio elenchi... the conclusion does not follow from the argument (even if we were to accept the argument). I believe it would be proper to make an inference objection.

[_Tal Bachman]

I'm on break from the landscaping, thank God; I'm dying of boredom.

Tojohndillon - I'm sorry if you've already answered this - I might have missed it since I haven't been able to follow closely the last few days - but would you say that apologists for any particular ideology (or Mormonism in particular, if you prefer) tend, or tend not, to demonstrate fealty to the principle of full disclosure?

A similar question is: Is the endeavour of apologizing for some ideology equivalent to the endeavour of truth-seeking, no matter what the cost?

[_Tarski]

Tarski

I'm now on the backyard phase of my landscaping extravaganza, with a rented excavator, so I'm probably not going to have time for a day or two to get back into this thread. I will as soon as I can, though. If you can summarize what is most important to you I can try to blast out fairly quick answers perhaps tonight or early tomorrow morning.

If you are curious about my supposition that animals make inductive inferences, I can go into more detail about that; it would help me, though, if you would summarize why you should doubt that the brains of, say, apes or wolves, are capable of inductive reasoning, when you (I believe) freely concede that the brains of fellow mammals human beings are capable of this same type of reasoning. That would help me know where to begin.

Talk to you soon

Tal

Language and logical thought are discrete combinatorical systems. I am suggesting that animals achieve their behavior by more analog direct methods (like my little speed adjusting car). My intutition is that something like language is necessary for an important part of what humans do when we reason.


I don't know what animal brains are doing but I am not sure I am willing to characterize just anything as inductive reasoning based soley on external behavior. I want to know what steps the brain took in modifing behavior based on repeated instances.


I am interested in fleshing out what inductive reasoning amounts to in isolation of deductive reasoning and various forms of intuition.
I know what it is when presented in an oral or written argument where the purpose is to convince another intelligent being but what could it amount to in a languageless system? Is operant conditioning a demonstration of logical induction?

How about when I pull my arm away from sudden heat (a stove)? Here the signal dooesn't even make it to the brain. I know that there is no repetition here but there is a similar issue. Couldn't one become confused about why the hand moved away? What if I claim that my arm itself reasoned that there was harm there and so it reasoned to pull away since more might come?

Do you have a proof or argument to the effect that anything that behaves as if it were using induction must actually be using induction?
Will you define the problem away?

Of possible relevance:
http://www.vuw.ac.nz/phil/staff/stereln ... reason.pdf
http://www.amazon.com/Kinds-Minds-Towar ... 0465073514

[_KimberlyAnn]

My intuition is that something like language is necessary for an important part of what humans do when we reason.

Tarski, it's my intuition that I'm conscious! I read the article you linked me to, well about three-fourths of it (that's all I needed to know that I don't buy it), and I still maintain that to deny human beings are conscious is absurd. I can't see how humans can reason, which you assert we do, without consciousness. Are we all simply biological machines who's subjective, sensory experiences are hallucinatory? Do you maintain that there are no qualia at all? Are all our subjective experiences invalid? I posit they are not.

As I mentioned on the other thread, the very fact that we are able to consider whether or not we are conscious and engage in this discussion is evidence that we are indeed conscious.

Do you have a proof or argument to the effect that anything that behaves as if it were using induction must actually be using induction?

On what do you base your "'intuition' that something like language is necessary for an important part of what humans do when we reason", if not induction?

Do you believe in mathematical induction?

KA

[_Tarski]

My intuition is that something like language is necessary for an important part of what humans do when we reason.

Tarski, it's my intuition that I'm conscious! I read the article you linked me to, well about three-fourths of it (that's all I needed to know that I don't buy it), and I still maintain that to deny human beings are conscious is absurd. I can't see how humans can reason, which you assert we do, without consciousness. Are we all simply biological machines who's subjective, sensory experiences are hallucinatory? Do you maintain that there are no qualia at all? Are all our subjective experiences invalid? I posit they are not.

As I mentioned on the other thread, the very fact that we are able to consider whether or not we are conscious and engage in this discussion is evidence that we are indeed conscious.

Do you have a proof or argument to the effect that anything that behaves as if it were using induction must actually be using induction?

On what do you base your "'intuition' that something like language is necessary for an important part of what humans do when we reason", if not induction?

Do you believe in mathematical induction?

KA

Yes. And math is done with language.

[_tojohndillonesq]

I'm on break from the landscaping, thank God; I'm dying of boredom.

Tojohndillon - I'm sorry if you've already answered this - I might have missed it since I haven't been able to follow closely the last few days - but would you say that apologists for any particular ideology (or Mormonism in particular, if you prefer) tend, or tend not, to demonstrate fealty to the principle of full disclosure?

A similar question is: Is the endeavour of apologizing for some ideology equivalent to the endeavour of truth-seeking, no matter what the cost?

My experience (my library) says that most - but not all - Christian apologists do not practice full disclosure, and that they are generally not rigourous enough in their thinking to realize that that they failed in this area, or that is is a required aspect of valid argumentation. They want to be honest - think they are honest - and don't have the proper education to understand where they have failed.

This is not to say they are dumb. In fact, I would say most (or even all) of them are very bright. It is simply that their education did not include enough math or science or even philosophy to give them the tools they need.

This does not lead to any valid conclusion on apologetics in general, or even on Christian apologetics. That would be the "ad secundam" fallacy - arguing from the specific to the general. It does lead to the valid conclusion that if you are interested in Christian apolgetics you need to be really selective about who you read. CS Lewis is perhaps the most famous, and I believe he is really good. Admits what cannot be known, and practices full disclosure. Phillip Yancey equally so. Josh McDowell and Lee Stroebel are examples of poor logic in apologetics. Unfortunately, they are extremely populur, particularly with the fundamentalist crowd. (A nice irony as McDowel does not subscribe to the young earth theory so beloved of fundamentalists; his readers are not capable of the kind of close reading required to realize this.)

By definition NO Mormon apologist practices full disclosure. His own doctrine prohibits him from revealing all he knows or believes. How can you defend that which you will not reveal? Those who do talk about the "secrets" are no longer Mormon. Catch-22.

Regarding truth seeking... I think that applies, but only to the limited set of topics that are salient to the religion under discussion. Apologetics, I think, is aimed at explaining how what you believe can be logically explained and that your claims are not at odds with the "truth" or "reality." (Within a very limited but valid definition of those words.) So not aimed at truth seeking in general, but demonstrating the viability of a specific thought system. Different writers have different views on this, and no doubt different goals.

Everyone who posts here is an apologist. Our goals are wide ranging. I am here to test my thinking and powers of expression in the open waters of criticism. It is entertaining, and makes me a better apologist (and teacher; I have over forty 15-16 year olds every Sunday).

To me, the "truth" is that none of us are qualified to speak authoritatively on these subjects. Many posts rightly refer to authorities such as Popper, Kuhn, Descartes, etc., who ARE (more or less) qualified. We can present valid arguments; we are unlikely to be able to hold our own with the leading scholars in this area.

To adopt a pompous attitude about our knowledge, or to believe that we have somehow "proven" something in this forum is nonsense. Just because I don't know enough to refute an argument does not mean that the argument cannot be refuted. Conversely, my inability to present a valid argument does not make the argument invalid; just my presentation of it.

(Is there even ONE Mormon apologist who has broadly accepted educational credentials and publishes in professional journals? I think not. I do not believe BYU has accredited undergraduate programs in History, Archeology, Philosophy... or any other subject that crosses into their religious teachings. You can get the degree, but no non-mormon grad school will recognize it.)

This is getting pretty far away from your epistemology thread... though one might argue that ALL subjects properly fit here. Congrats on the ongoing success of that initial post!

I'M STARTING A NEW BOOK DISCUSSION THREAD. A place to find and give book recommendations.

Southwest

[NorthboundZax]

Language and logical thought are discrete combinatorical systems. I am suggesting that animals achieve their behavior by more analog direct methods (like my little speed adjusting car). My intutition is that something like language is necessary for an important part of what humans do when we reason.

I don't know what animal brains are doing but I am not sure I am willing to characterize just anything as inductive reasoning based soley on external behavior. I want to know what steps the brain took in modifing behavior based on repeated instances.

I am interested in fleshing out what inductive reasoning amounts to in isolation of deductive reasoning and various forms of intuition.
I know what it is when presented in an oral or written argument where the purpose is to convince another intelligent being but what could it amount to in a languageless system? Is operant conditioning a demonstration of logical induction?

How about when I pull my arm away from sudden heat (a stove)? Here the signal dooesn't even make it to the brain. I know that there is no repetition here but there is a similar issue. Couldn't one become confused about why the hand moved away? What if I claim that my arm itself reasoned that there was harm there and so it reasoned to pull away since more might come?

Do you have a proof or argument to the effect that anything that behaves as if it were using induction must actually be using induction?
Will you define the problem away?

1.) Yes, my guess also is that language, or I should say, some grasp of a set of symbolic representations of the world, including things like possibilities, is required for higher-order thought. (by the way, the Peter Carruthers book "Language, Thought, and Consciousness" is a good read on this);

2. You write that you are not "willing to characterize just anything as inductive reasoning based solely on external behavior", and that you "want to know what steps the brain took in modifing behavior based on repeated instances". Some pages ago, I mentioned this:

We have no way of directly accessing the intentional states of any other human being on this planet. (Call a particular intentional state, or set of states, {I}).
From this, it follows that that all we have access to is what others communicate about their intentional states. (Call what others so communicate [C]).

Perhaps a similar constraint applies here, for we have no way of directly accessing the precise mechanics of cognition of any thinking organism, human or animal. In fact, we cannot even directly access the precise mechanics of our OWN cognition. In other words, external behaviour, which may include self-reporting, is all we have. And since I cannot conceive of any defensible basis on which external behaviour should be excluded from the analysis of animal thought, but included in the analysis of human thought - not least because, of course, we ourselves are animals - to rule out external behaviour as an indicator of what the mechanics of cognition (animal or human) might be, would only immediately preclude any progress on this. It would leave us in total darkness. (Even Wittgenstein said once that "if I see someone writhing in pain with evident cause I do not think; all the same, his feelings are hidden from me"...).


(It might be asked, what of the fMRI? But even that only tells us where; it says nothing of how).

You ask: "Do you have a proof or argument to the effect that anything that behaves as if it were using induction must actually be using induction?". If this is the standard, then you should be fully on board with the logical possibility of David Chalmers's zombies, who have the same components as a human being, but who lack "real" consciousness and therefore, the ability to experience "qualia"...I guess I cannot offer "proof" that you, Tarski, feel pain, see colours, dream, deduce, induce, abduce, despair, hope, or anything else, if "proof" must entail something beyond inference based on your external behaviour/self-reporting, and/or extrapolations from my own experiences of these things, to other human beings.

I suppose you will have little if any doubt that you are not the only human being, out of all six billion of us on the planet, that experiences the things I just mentioned; and the reason why, I suggest, is that your inferences to that effect are supported by an overwhelmingly amount of evidence: the external behaviour of all other human beings, from which you make inferences. It is too much to believe that everyone else on the planet is an automaton, a zombie, devoid of any feeling, and is just a fantastic actor...it is too much to believe that Wittgenstein's man, bloodied and screaming after being flattened by a bus, is only acting. Likewise, it is too much to believe that animals don't really feel pain; of course they do, though we know this through the same means we know that fellow human beings feel pain: inference from their external behaviour - writhing, squealing, wincing, etc.

Likewise, I suggest that we are just as justified in inferring more than pain - say, inductive reasoning - in an animal, when that animal behaves in just the way, mutatis mutandis, that humans behave when we infer more than pain in them (like, inductive reasoning). When we observe an Australian aborigine on the hunt make predictions about a prey animal's whereabouts, at a certain time of day, the prey's behaviour once cornered, and in short, act just the way he would if he were inductively reasoning, we infer that he is inductively reasoning; why then should we not make the same inference when we observe a tiger or grizzly bear acting in much the same way? After all, all we have, in both cases, is external behaviour.

3.) I may be betraying some major ignorance here, but I am not aware that one pulls limbs away from dangerous heat without (brain-)processed sensory input.

[_Tal Bachman]

Everyone who posts here is an apologist.

---What would you say Tarski, for example, is an "apologist" for on this thread?

About BYU and its undergrad degrees in history, philosophy, etc., yes they are recognized by other universities. BYU is an accredited university.

I also have a soft spot for C.S. Lewis, although I do think his argument, I think in "Mere Christianity", that the nonsensical nature of the Christian myth is evidence that it's true, is about as lame as anything we might find in on the MADness board. It's amazing how creative bright people get when they wish to defend ideas incompatible with everything else we know about the world, and even logic itself.

[_Tarski]

1.) Yes, my guess also is that language, or I should say, some grasp of a set of symbolic representations of the world, including things like possibilities, is required for higher-order thought. (by the way, the Peter Carruthers book "Language, Thought, and Consciousness" is a good read on this);

2. You write that you are not "willing to characterize just anything as inductive reasoning based solely on external behavior", and that you "want to know what steps the brain took in modifing behavior based on repeated instances". Some pages ago, I mentioned this:

We have no way of directly accessing the intentional states of any other human being on this planet. (Call a particular intentional state, or set of states, {I}).
From this, it follows that that all we have access to is what others communicate about their intentional states. (Call what others so communicate [C]).

Perhaps a similar constraint applies here, for we have no way of directly accessing the precise mechanics of cognition of any thinking organism, human or animal. In fact, we cannot even directly access the precise mechanics of our OWN cognition. In other words, external behaviour, which may include self-reporting, is all we have. And since I cannot conceive of any defensible basis on which external behaviour should be excluded from the analysis of animal thought, but included in the analysis of human thought - not least because, of course, we ourselves are animals - to rule out external behaviour as an indicator of what the mechanics of cognition (animal or human) might be, would only immediately preclude any progress on this. It would leave us in total darkness. (Even Wittgenstein said once that "if I see someone writhing in pain with evident cause I do not think; all the same, his feelings are hidden from me"...).


(It might be asked, what of the fMRI? But even that only tells us where; it says nothing of how).

You ask: "Do you have a proof or argument to the effect that anything that behaves as if it were using induction must actually be using induction?". If this is the standard, then you should be fully on board with the logical possibility of David Chalmers's zombies, who have the same components as a human being, but who lack "real" consciousness and therefore, the ability to experience "qualia"...I guess I cannot offer "proof" that you, Tarski, feel pain, see colours, dream, deduce, induce, abduce, despair, hope, or anything else, if "proof" must entail something beyond inference based on your external behaviour/self-reporting, and/or extrapolations from my own experiences of these things, to other human beings.

No I don’t see this as the same thing. We aren’t talking about qualia or something that can’t be explained in functional terms.

You see a difference between my deciding to slow down after running around the room and crashing into things a bit to often and on the other hand my little car slowing down for the same “reason” right?

We don’t have to have direct access, enough testing could in principle lead us to draw conclusions about whether an organism is doing something simple and analogue or whether it is doing something combinatorial like instantiating logical symbolic steps or using a mental language. It wouldn’t be easy but we are talking “in principle”.
Do you think that spiders use a language? Most cognitive scientists think not I believe.

I suppose you will have little if any doubt that you are not the only human being, out of all six billion of us on the planet, that experiences the things I just mentioned; and the reason why, I suggest, is that your inferences to that effect are supported by an overwhelmingly amount of evidence: the external behavior of all other human beings, from which you make inferences. It is too much to believe that everyone else on the planet is an automaton, a zombie.

Well, frankly I don’t experience myself using induction except when I explain my reasons to others or after the fact to myself. But that is beside the fact. I could conceivably use inductive reasoning even without consciousness. I don’t think the zombie thing is relevant. I would even be willing to concede that a computing machine can use logical induction and there the issue of a subjective inner life is not at issue. I also think that an automaton could use logic—at least if by automaton you mean something like a programmable machine.
On the other hand, it seems at least possible that what appears to superficially (and maybe only probabilistically) have the same behavioral effect as logical induction might just be a simpler behavior modifying trick –even in a conscious being and even in an unconscious machine. by the way, I am with Dennett on the consciousness thing—it isn’t a nonmaterial epiphenomenon—but again beside the point. I am thinking in terms of programs and neural operations.

Likewise, I suggest that we are just as justified in inferring more than pain - say, inductive reasoning - in an animal, when that animal behaves in just the way, mutatis mutandis, that humans behave when we infer more than pain in them (like, inductive reasoning).

See above comment. Pain as quale is irrelevant to my concern. The whole thing could be phrased for machines that unconsciously either reason inductively to achieve behavior modification or some other, say connectionist or purely analogue nondiscursive method.
Think of the little car again.

Again, the issue is whether neural/computational rules and steps are being followed that we would recognize as logical steps involving symbols whose content refers to what is supposedly being reasoned about. I doubt a spider is doing such a thing. One can probe a black box machine to reverse engineer it in principle at least. Subjectivity and first person perspectives are not at issue.