This discussion suddenly took a turn for the fascinating.
Since I agree with subgenius on some points--actually subgenius I have to say, you have made some really sophisticated arguments here--and with Themis on others, I thought I might chime in and offer another perspective.
First of all, much of this discussion has turned on what exactly is meant by "sign." I think there has been a lot of slippage between "sign" in the sense of "contentful/meaningful communication [from God or some other entity]" and "sign" in the sense of "[physical or psychological] evidence that a given proposition is true." Certainly a contentful communication (sense 1) can theoretically serve as a kind of evidence (sense 2), but they're not
a priori identical.
Second, there has been a lot of debate as to what "counts" as an instrument of reliable knowledge, i.e. what is a valid
means by which we can arrive at true conclusions. Jo and subgenius want to say that physical or material phenomena are not valid means for evaluating spiritual truth-claims. Themis claims that certain types of physical evidence can disprove certain types of spiritual truth-claims, but does not specify or qualify the terms of this relationship.
More broadly, Themis seems committed a view of what he terms the "body-machine." Subgenius (rightly, in my estimation) demonstrates the internal inconsistency of this view: if one's perceptual faculties--generally speaking, the "means of reliable knowledge"--are flawed, and the only thing that exists is a machine-like body, then necessarily
subgenius wrote:To investigate one's self with the same inconsistent and unreliable physiological mechanisms (ie. brain) that produced the delusion in the first place is absurd and illogical.the conclusion is as flawed as the original experience. Replacing one delusion with another is not a resolution. You have no means by which you can escape the flawed instruments of your perceptions.....according to your own theory.
In my view, however, both jo/subgenius and Themis make the same mistake: they commit to a rigid mind/body or spirit/body distinction. Themis commits to this exact same rigid distinction; the only difference is that he basically denies the existence of the mind/spirit. So he is left in a position where he cannot effectively rebut the position of subgenius and jo, which proceeds from the exact same rigid distinction.
Thus I would say to you, Themis, that you should 're-evaluate' your strictly mechanistic philosophy of mind. There is no evidence for mechanistic determinism in general (regarding particle physics) or specifically applied to mental functions. And if you see the mind-body system as an integral whole, rather than in terms of a dualism, then you can more effectively argue that physical evidence is capable of refuting spiritual claims. Not
all physical evidence, and not
all spiritual claims, but if you commit to this kind of a rigid distinction then you are basically playing right into your polemical opponents' hands.
Great discussion. I would like to address subgenius' "apples to oranges" in greater detail, but I think it deserves its own thread.