God can write straight with crooked lines.

[Philo Sofee]

This is where Monet really earns his keep. The closer you look, the more detail gets in the way. But just step back farther and the picture slides into focus. The injuries don’t disappear, nay, there are just refocused, like one of those 3D posters where you have to cross your eyes to see the dinosaur.

I appreciate your humor quite a bit, Limnor. I will say that a God-at-a-distance is so far the closest I can get to a version of God I could possibly accept. But in this case, God isn't micromanaging, which Plantinga is happy with (free will), and God isn't personal. It's what I call the Amazon Rainforest God. The Amazon (I think) is about the size of the entire US. Imagine just how heinous the ecology of a densely packed forest teeming with diverse life in every square inch but goes on for millions of square miles. It's ludicrous to imagine God determining the life of every bug, or even observing all of it and finding meaning in the step of every ant. The amount of pain experienced by living things there must be off the scale. Can it be seen as beautiful? Or better to destroy it? The creative, horrifying ways creatures kill each other there is very disturbing for me. Yet, I'm open to it as a thing of beauty that should exist, but as its own neighborhood. We study it a little, but don't get too involved. What happens there stays there.

We don’t need to know the ultimate outcomes to know how to act. Rather, Jesus grounds moral action in simple terms: Love your neighbor,

It's a good suggestion, and I actually did consider it as an objection: we have a few simple rules and God takes it from there. Well, we've got to consider the criteria for good and evil. What makes something good? Utilitarianism tells us that we can add up happiness and suffering; if you take that seriously, then I don't think you can really say we're off the hook just because the calculations are hard. We simplify somewhat with rule utilitarianism -- I stop at the light every time -- but my kid is bleeding and there's no cars on the road? If my kid is starving and theft is the only way, I might steal and hope to make it right one day. Mormonism teaches that Adam's transgression of taking the forbidden fruit wasn't a "sin" because it fulfilled the higher law of multiplying and replenishing the earth. Adam had to learn crooked-line hopscotch. Well, all of this relies on teleological ethics -- consequences are what mater. If consequences matter, it's hard to absolve our duty to think beyond the rules when the rules are inadequate for maximizing goodness.

But if morality is based on either duty, or obedience to God, and we say consequences aren't the criteria, then you have the famous Kantian situation where "would you lie to the German soldiers to protect the lives of a Jewish family hiding in your basement?" And the answer is "No". Virtue ethics would also skirt outcome calculations. If we constrain God's Bible edicts to virtue, duty, or obedience, then they don't need to optimize aggregate outcomes, but that's because aggregate outcome optimization has nothing to do with morality. So in that case: "We have a few simple rules to live by" full stop. There is nothing for God to do beyond that to make things "better" or "worse".

O.K., so forgive me if you are not a Tolkien fan. I have been heavily into Tolkien now for quite a while and find he has answers where even the Bible falls short (No, I won't bring in the Book of Mormon, since it merely fobs off the Bible in so much, the Bible suffices, and Tolkien appears to me to be the more helpful way.) Please allow me to develop this in hopes it might help see this in yet another light.
I like especially your refusal to let complexity off the moral hook. Agreed. Now then, for something at a different angle than what you have here. Where I still struggle is here. Once God is fully non-personal and outcomes are morally irrelevant, it’s hard to see what finally gives our “simple rules” authority rather than just practicality. I think Tolkien, at least, has some bearing here. He seems to hold that while we’re not responsible for outcomes, outcomes still matter. And that includes even within a providence we don’t control. That tension feels essential rather than disposable. Tolkien's habit of sharing his insights are not to preach them, but to show them in his Legendarium. So realistically, the singular most powerful example we have is Frodo at Mount Doom destroying the One Ring. But Frodo blows it. He literally FAILS! He does not
choose the right action, and he doesn't complete the task.

So, Frodo is not what brought about the desired outcome. Yet, from a morality agency point of view here, Frodo cannot be considered the cause of the destruction of the ring. And Tolkien explicitly says this in Letter 246. Frodo did all he was asked to do. Yet his final act was beyond his moral capacity. Therefore, Frodo is not responsible for the Ring's destruction. He does not get the credit. Yet, and this is THE KEY, the outcome still matters immensely!
After all, the Ring is destroyed, and from this Sauron fails, which, of course, changes the world, and prevents the Shadow from over-ruling all beings in Arda now. Interesting isn't it that Tolkien insists on both truths at once?

But now we get to the sticky idea if outcomes don't matter then it appears that Frodo's failure would be morally final. End of story. The destruction of the Ring wouldn't have any meaning in the story. It is this which Tolkien refuses however. His presentation of the world is such that moral responsibility is bounded. There are times, and with several other characters in the stories, not just in Lord of the Rings, where outcome actually does exceed human control. But that doesn't take out meaning. Providence is still meaningful and that's exactly the tension you named. We are not responsible for outcomes, but outcomes still matter within a providence that we don't control. There is no micro-managing going on. There is no scheming for best outcomes no matter what.

Tolkien does not ask characters to compute outcomes or somehow maximize the total good with everything they do. There is no spread sheets giving them an option of choosing the least harmful way to go or action to perform in every instant. What Tolkien is asking them is to be faithful. They are also to refuse certain actions no matter what reward or payoff they may bring. Theirs is to simply act rightly even if and when the actual outcome is unknown or bad. Farimir comes to my mind on this score, because, like a few others, he was actually given the option of having the One Ring. He was desperate to help Gondor and the One Ring promised that right now, immediately. But he refused. I mean, even Frodo could not possibly see if he was going to make it at all, even with Sam accompanying him all the way. He could expect to succeed. King Theoden even rode out knowing... literally outnumbered 10's to 1 per person, he knew they couldn't win, yet he rides out anyway to defend Helm's Deep.

My point is that these choices we read about in this most magnificent story if we look at them with utilitarian eyes, are literally stupid. There is nothing rational about them. Yet in Tolkien's universe, they are the only sane ones to make. So, I mean that the idea that morality is about calculating which action produces the best overall outcome? That's not the only option. Tolkien appears to me to show another way, an actual better way in the long run, even if entirely unknown by those choosing that way. What Tolkien's characters are responsible for is faithfulness, not for optimizing results. But that faithfulness and those outcomes that occur are still woven into a meaningful providence. We see faithfulness carried out to its limit, which is then taken up into something larger. Tolkien states it through Gandalf, the best one to do so. “Behind that there was something else at work, beyond any design of the Ring-maker.
I can put it no plainer than by saying that Bilbo was meant to find the Ring, and not by its maker.” This isn't saying that Bilbo intended the outcome either. He obviously didn't control the result. None of them could have done that. And for all their goodness, that is still no guarantee they will succeed in the quest either! Tolkien's key word is "meant." Tolkien shows providence operates without canceling freedom, and without reducing events to moral bookkeeping, and many characters in this incredible tale elaborate on this through their actions.

[Philo Sofee]

God allows evil for the greater good is essentially the crooked lines metaphor. Mountain meadows was justified by some intricate least sum algorithm but this was a long time ago.The victims, on the other hand are either rewarded later or partially to blame. That seems to be a def con one.

Def con two? How about the Mark Hofmann bombings? God's collective mouthpiece on Earth are led on a couples ruse where the leaders dance a tango with Mark leading to extremely jagged lines and a ragged line of misery.


Def con Three? The Lafferty case. An example where prophetic 5d chess leads to individual claims of prophetic retribution. Victims in the wake are collateral damage for one JAG of the line.

Def Con Four. Natural disasters taking out thousands and millions of lives creating a fractal jagged line with no explanations.

Def Con Five. The Holocaust. The greater good is allowed because of this which paves the way for seismic jagged lines viewed with a smile.

I am going to take my time responding to these profound insights of yours Rivendale. I am deeply moved by much these days because of my reading Tolkien, not in spite of it, and I want to make sure I have some things right as I go along. Thank you for articulating this in such a profound and necessarily disturbing manner.

[Limnor]

Once God is fully non-personal and outcomes are morally irrelevant, it’s hard to see what finally gives our “simple rules” authority rather than just practicality. I think Tolkien, at least, has some bearing here. He seems to hold that while we’re not responsible for outcomes, outcomes still matter.

This comment was particularly helpful, and I appreciated the way you used Tolkien to illustrate your point. I’m still thinking through the implications, but the way you introduced the concept was genuinely edifying as it is pushing me to think more carefully about why “simple rules” feel authoritative in daily life rather than merely useful.

[Gadianton]

I also wanted to see if I’m tracking your other points above. I think you are saying the issue isn’t whether God “can” work through crooked lines, but what it costs if that idea is used to explain every outcome. Outside the LDS faith, people pray, decide, and sometimes misjudge things, but generally outcomes aren’t treated as proof that God intended that path.

Yes, I realize I went into wall of text mode, but relativism is the cost, and I'm sure there are volumes of writing from theologians explaining how their version escapes relativism and I've only seen the tip of the iceberg, but this is what I'm going with. For all practical purposes, I think we can use Holland's talk as an example. The burden for the believer, I would say, is to explain the options for Holland avoiding relativism in his "wrong road" talk.

They say there are no atheists in foxholes, and I think any Christian whose child is lost in the woods is going to pray with the intent of material consequences to come into play that may have not come into play if the prayer didn't happen. However, there are people who believe in predestination and still pray.

I think people in general who pray face a couple of psychological realities. I don't think people who pray are stupid about it unless grandstanding for political purposes, virtue signaling or whatever. In a normal private circumstance, people aren't stupid enough to ask for Ferraris outright because they know it's not going to happen, and they don't want to be wrong and to admit prayer doesn't work. If they thought there was a real chance of it happening, they would absolutely ask. People also play psychological games with God. They know they aren't supposed to be selfish, and so must ask in convoluted ways that emphasize his will and not to sound greedy. God might not give me a Ferrari but perhaps he'll give me a loaf of bread if I promise to share it with others.

[Gadianton]

He seems to hold that while we’re not responsible for outcomes, outcomes still matter. And that includes even within a providence we don’t control. That tension feels essential rather than disposable.

There is a ton of interesting stuff in your post and I realize I've gone in too many directions. I'm at a disadvantage because I could never finish Lord of the Rings, my fault. I don't know what happens. Well, the Bible absolutely says that outcomes matter but at the same time our scope of worry is duty to God. "do what is right let the consequence follow." Remember that? Do you think Tolkein's point was the same as the Mormon parable of the bicycle? The idea was a little girl saves her pennies for a bike, it's not enough, but dad takes the pennies and then buys the bike; showing how faith and grace collaborate.

Once God is fully non-personal and outcomes are morally irrelevant

When you say God is non-personal, was this a continuation of your Tolkein thinking? Was God non-personal in Lord of the Rings? Or was this in response to my Amazon theory, which was another tangent?

Whether God is personal or not is separate from whether morality is based on material consequences. Atheists tend to be consequentialists, but it doesn't need to be that way. The late Clark Goble was a consequentialist and believed in a personal God. Mormonism is more consequentialist than anything else it seems to me.

Tolkien does not ask characters to compute outcomes or somehow maximize the total good with everything they do.

This is a good distinction, consequentialism means the consequences matter, but utilitarianism is a specific version of consequentialism, one that bases choice on pure calculation. So you are absolutely right, consequences may matter but a moral law may not be utilitarian. (although I think it's hard to avoid)

Theirs is to simply act rightly even if and when the actual outcome is unknown or bad.

In duty ethics and even DCT, it's uncertain to the degree consequences matter. The statement you just made could be made by a person who believes in DCT, duty ethics, or who is a consequentialist. I can stop at a stoplight and be right out of Kantian duty, God told me to, or rule utilitarianism. In each case, the simple act of stopping is the same, it's independent of the actual outcome, but the reasoning behind the sanctity of the rule is very different.

Going back quickly to my comment that the "straight vs. crooked" lines discussion doesn't necessarily need to be a discussion about morality. Think of Holland's talk. Being stuck at the crossroads and asking God for help isn't about morality. But it has a lot to do with straight vs. crooked lines. I wish I'd thought of it yesterday morning and I could have saved myself a thousand words. I think that's a good example to think about because it avoids extra problems added to a scenario due to moral interpretation. Straight vs. crooked lines already makes any scenario complicated enough, add that to moral uncertainty and it exasperates the problem.

[Limnor]

However, there are people who believe in predestination and still pray.

I think people in general who pray face a couple of psychological realities. I don't think people who pray are stupid about it unless grandstanding for political purposes, virtue signaling or whatever. In a normal private circumstance, people aren't stupid enough to ask for Ferraris outright because they know it's not going to happen, and they don't want to be wrong and to admit prayer doesn't work. If they thought there was a real chance of it happening, they would absolutely ask. People also play psychological games with God. They know they aren't supposed to be selfish, and so must ask in convoluted ways that emphasize his will and not to sound greedy. God might not give me a Ferrari but perhaps he'll give me a loaf of bread if I promise to share it with others.

I’ve thought about prayer within a predestination model and have a similar reaction as you describe, and I think it applies to the Book of Mormon prayer test as well.

If outcomes are fixed or always interpreted as God’s will after the fact, it’s hard to see what prayer is actually doing. I think the Lord’s Prayer as a model works, at least for me, as a means in which to achieve peace or acceptance within a given situation—this was particularly relevant during OIF. There might be more to it than that, but I’m uncertain there is much more—probably security and peace for my family and friends, as you mention. I may have a unique view in that what I’ve found myself doing is asking for God to live through me—because I have this simple concept that if God “is” love, then I’d want that effect.

In the Book of Mormon case, I was explicitly told a “no” answer isn’t even possible, only two result count—confirmation or “there’s something wrong with you, or you didn’t ask with sincerity,” or whatever, which is essentially self-sealing and nothing can falsify it. I don’t think it’s about sincerity, though, really the problem is what would ever count as God actually saying “no.”

[Limnor]

Going back quickly to my comment that the "straight vs. crooked" lines discussion doesn't necessarily need to be a discussion about morality. Think of Holland's talk. Being stuck at the crossroads and asking God for help isn't about morality. But it has a lot to do with straight vs. crooked lines. I wish I'd thought of it yesterday morning and I could have saved myself a thousand words. I think that's a good example to think about because it avoids extra problems added to a scenario due to moral interpretation. Straight vs. crooked lines already makes any scenario complicated enough, add that to moral uncertainty and it exasperates the problem.

The trouble is that once a path is later labeled “the one God intended,” it can have moral implications—especially if the model is extended and applied to situations in which people use outcomes to justify decisions or reinterpret mistakes as divinely endorsed. Even if the question begins as non-moral (“Which way should I go?”), the straight vs crooked can back into moral authority after the fact.

[Morley]

There have been some pretty brilliant replies to the to the opening post, but I'm still struggling to see what MG is trying to say. He proudly asserts "God can write straight with crooked lines." With the right apologetic narrative, anyone--large or small; dumb or smart; old or young; animal, mineral, or vegetable--can write straight with crooked lines. It's not that much of a feat and, as such, is a pretty low bar for an omnipresent, omniscient God.

As I said earlier, MG's God is not Monet, he's Lewis Carroll's Red Queen--arbitrary and capricious. He actions are good only because he tells us they're good. Like the Red Queen, God’s ways are beyond our understanding--and what seems to be apparent injustice is reframed as holy mystery. The sentencing of "Off with her head!" comes before the verdict--which makes the verdict into a post hoc explanation for the pronounced sentence.

As the Red Queen, God's ways are not our ways, in that he's not constrained by the logic and reason that he himself provided us. His justice is not our justice, in that he's not bound by the same rules that he himself told us to live by. God's hoppy taw is not our hoppy taw. We are not to question God's crooked lines--through his prophets, he'll tell us whether they're straight or not.

[Limnor]

There have been some pretty brilliant replies to the to the opening post, but I'm still struggling to see what MG is trying to say. He proudly asserts "God can write straight with crooked lines."

Introducing an unverifiable personal situation to explain non-responsiveness changed the rules of engagement and those ROE had to be explained.

[Gadianton]

That's true, and it could also be considered moral in utilitarianism if we must maximize aggregate utility. Restricted to Holland and his son, is getting home five minutes quicker with increased anxiety better or worse than getting home five minutes faster with less anxiety. What if the anxiety taught a lesson about taking better notes next time?

In your case, the one God intended is only a moral concern under DCT but sure, it would be a moral concern if God has a preference. If God respects agency he might not have one.

But for practical purposes it's not a moral question as there is no codified moral law that covers it under any belief system I'm aware of, and it poses no meaningful moral dilemma as in the case of the switch operator. Do you save your kid, or save the train?