Mopologist William Schryver Continues His Descent Into Madness

[Symmachus]

Of the issues you identified, the one that jumped out at me as most concerning was this one: "Of course the most egregious example is the attempt to cut off water to the (again, very pro-Russian) population of Crimea." Then the story turned out to be the Ukraine dammed a man-made canal that fed the Crimean peninsula's agricultural lands as infrastructure. At which point it gets pretty murky as well. Is that anti-ethnic Russians? Or leverage against an occupying force? It's hard to see the directed malice at a population.

Thanks for your reply, Honorentheos. Civilians living in Crimea are not an occupying force; they just live there. And it's not just that some farmers can't irrigate their fields. There is water-rationing, sanitation problems, the downstream effect of agricultural depletion on the local food supply, which stresses the food supply of the surrounding regions, and so on (see here, from before the invasion). It has made life pretty miserable. If it is not malice directed at the population, then it is using the civilian population to get at the Russian government. Maybe that's justified on a moral level, maybe not, but my point was that tabulating wrongdoings/atrocities just becomes a semantic task to justify preconceptions or justify something else. I'm asking: what is that something else? Anyway, Ukrainian cruelty doesn't mean we have to like Russia or approve of their invasion. As Physics Guy reminds us, the hopelessly corrupt people running Ukraine don't need to be angels! We are not supporting them for their angelic qualities, but rather because we are really just opposing Russians, who are even less angelic. Devilish even. It all makes sense if you just stick to the atrocity porn.

The issue you have is with the post WWII order that is decidedly breaking down as western influence wanes. Is that good, bad, mir egal? It seems it takes more energy to maintain than humanity could sustain for long at any rate, even at our troubled levels of hypocritical belief in sovereign national borders and ideals. It's a post-modern world now,.I suppose. Or just another turn of the wheel. You mentioned Thucydides earlier and I have to imagine the ideas aren't so post-modern as they are the thoughts of systems below the level of nation-state and globalization. Nothing is more timeless as that.

Why is it breaking down? Why is it waning? Who is deciding on this? I don't think it's a natural process like the seasons. There are policies and choices. Events can be out of control, but there are better and worse responses to those events. People who have responded terribly to previous events and advocated destructive policies and made poor choices are once again in the lead. I just don't see why we should continue to take them seriously. But of course that is because Putler and evil FSB have kompromat on me.

But I certainly agree with you about Thucydides.

That 2014 attack in Donetsk was a terrorist crime, but it was hardly shelling a city. It was a single mortar bomb; according to Symmachus’s Amnesty link, the pro-Russian de facto authorities in Donetsk determined it to have come from an improvised launcher.

A modern mortar is just a tube with only one open end....A 60mm bomb could wreck a streetcar, all right; but it’s only the size of a grenade. Bigger mortar tubes may need two people to carry, and their bombs can make bigger blasts, but they are usually considered human-portable weapons.

No doubt this distinction was very comforting to the victims' families and—more to my point—people who, because of common ties and all that, are conditioned to feel sympathetic to them. However, like a mortar from an Azov improvised launcher into a bus terminal, I believe you've missed the mark in what I'm talking about. There have been countless events that have been referred to as a "shelling" from 2014 onward in civilian areas (see here, for another example of more of what seems to fit your definition, or here). Shellings/terrorists attacks/whatever you want to call it have been continuous features in these areas of Ukraine since 2014. Maybe you think it is justified and maybe it is, but I am not trying to justify the invasion and have said so explicitly, so I find your conclusion quite wide of the mark:

The difference in scale between an improvised mortar and the Russian invasion is still so vast, though, that it is hard to justify mentioning them in the same breath.

How did you read me as trying to justify it? It seems I have to restate once again the topic I was discussing:

The point is not to keep "atrocity score," and determine who is better and more worthy of support based on tabulating atrocities after those atrocities have been proven and prosecuted in all details. Rather—as I said—the point is to show how atrocities are instrumentalized for propaganda purposes.

My point continues to be that both sides can play this game and whip up their populations. It is not a sound basis for policy. Instead, there needs to be a strategy in dealing with Russia that is informed by a principled realism and understanding, not moralistic theorizing from the left or the vapid speech-ifying from the right, and importantly that that strategy needs to be articulated and agreed upon by the a significant part of public. Are we doing this for liberal democracy or to contain Russia? If so, why do are we doing the "spreading democracy" thing again, and why exactly does Russia need to be contained? Justifications for our aims in Ukraine are all over the map, even harder to find on that map than Ukraine was for most of its passionate supporters in the US until a few months ago.

In Afghanistan, our listless emotionalism started as inflicting a just punishment—and it was surely just—but without any clear strategy, it ended up costing $2 trillion and about 2,500 American lives in attempt to turn it into a virtual colony over 20 years, and then we just quit one day, and left behind a couple billion dollars' worth of US military equipment, as well as our dignity and credibility, all for the same people to come into power and probably to do the same thing. Sure, it felt good to bomb Torah Borah for a few months in the fall of 2001, and there were those schools with girls drinking tea or something. Ultimately for our 3,000 Americans killed on 9/11 and 2,500 soldiers killed in Afghanistan, we got around 200,000 Afghans in something that started as a retaliation effort. But was that all worth it? I am only asking that question of Afghanistan, just sticking with the "good war" and "war of necessity" as the Democratic party termed in 2008—Republicans see all wars Americans fight as "good" and necessary—not getting into the "dumb war," as Obama called Iraq). The public had very little say in this because no politician wanted to discuss it, and no media in the US wanted to ask them about it. Probably bad for ratings. One significant change between the period 2001 to 2003 and now is that politicians have not attempted to bring the public in. They don't even bother coming up with excuses. Here we are with Bill Kristol and co. again, and think it is important to ask "why are we listening to these people again? what are we getting out of it?" I believe in some parts of Europe this is becoming an issue. Perhaps it will here.

The only answers I am getting to these questions are accusations that I'm duped by Russian propaganda, selective rage at Russia's violation of sovereignty, emotionally satisfying reminders of horrible atrocities, and of course the seemingly omnipotent and omnipresent Russian dezinformatsia that is the stuff of stupid conspiracy theories about Russian nefariousness and people like Alexandr Dugin. These fast-food approaches to the issue are not just hard for me to digest but apparently damage the ability of intelligent people to understand what I am saying.

That is probably because there are no coherent answers to such questions on offer in the sources that people here use to form there opinions. I have no complaint about that. My complaint remains with people who command actual authority in one form or another in the US, whether in government or media or think-tank world. I have found only a few of them actually wondering about this confusion (here's one from the other day). It is one thing for opinion writers to disagree; it is another to have a government disagreeing with itself—even a president who says one thing at night only to forget having said it the next morning. I don't know why I can't find comfort from this in atrocity-porn, as you all seem to. Few of the people making decisions appears to have any idea what they are doing or are not communicating what they are doing to the public; they are only offering us that atrocity-porn and democracy sweet talk. And many of the same people involved in the run up and prosecution of our failed foreign policy adventures the past few decades are here yet again, either advising policy makers, making policy, or just plain cheer-leading and steering media narratives. It is as if we are only able to deal with events at the level of tactics, without any strategy or long-term policy guiding us, stumbling from one move to the next, and then congratulating the people implementing whatever policy they are following as "masterful," simply for not yet having fallen flat on their face.

For some reason or other, we decided to put a deep footprint in Ukraine a few decades ago and start pre-screening their leaders. Doctor Cam is right that some Ukrainians asked for it, but we were not obliged to indulge them, and probably should not have. No one has ever really explained what benefit we were getting out of it and especially how any such benefit outweighed the risk. The only explanation I ever heard was the vague but imperialist promotion of democracy. Fine, that's in the past. But it is a significant causal factor in a war involving a nuclear power, not some sh!thole landlocked country that no one cares about anyway, so it should be even more important here in than in Afghanistan to understand the objectives that our billions and other kinds of support are meant to achieve. I really find disturbing that line of the some in this administration and their supporters in the media is that we can turn this into another Afghanistan for Russia, just as we did for the Russians in the past (see here, here, or here, among many other places). Such irony, fresh from our own debacle in Afghanistan, would be rich if it weren't so savage in its implications for ordinary people in Ukraine and in Russia.

And of course if the Russians really are as evil and barbarous as the ever impartial western media would have us believe and at the same time, they are just as powerful and dangerous as they are portrayed to be, then why do we believe no harm can come of it to us when we are moving some of our allies, and perhaps ourselves, closer to the status of belligerent, if not combatant. We can weather Putin's price hike, perhaps. But as we narrow the range of options for such an evil regime, why do we think that, being so evil, they won't make recourse to the most evil option available? It doesn't make sense. But don't worry! "Fingers crossed!" has been a great strategy in dealing with Russia so far, so I'm sure it'll keep working.



Secretary of State Anthony Blinken posing for his official portrait

I can’t argue with such a trustworthy news source as The Guardian, as in the two-month-old article you linked, the paper questions the validity of their own headline (Ukraine’s military plans to limit free movement to make conscription easier), in the body of the article: “It remains unclear if movement permits for men will be introduced…” and "President Volodymyr Zelenskiy criticised the announcement in his nightly TV address to the nation on Tuesday, saying that the general staff should not make decisions without him. Two parliamentarians immediately filed draft legislation that would scrap the army’s initiative, which they described as 'outdated'."

Thank you your reply, Morley. The policy is still in effect, last I heard, even if it is not something western news outlets want to dwell on with any frequency. Any news on whether it's been revoked? And it is not about conscription; it is simply barring people from leaving. Their ordinary conscription is still in effect; they just aren't letting men leave the country with their families. It is interesting that the military was calling the shots, not the government.

What’s interesting to me, is how few Ukrainians, among those who flee the country, choose to go to benevolent Mother Russia.

Of course. Most prefer Western Europe, which is why many Ukrainians wanted EU integration anyway: its much easier to immigrate to France as an EU citizen. It was always about a chance to get out of their miserable country, not some deep seeded identification with European project. That doesn't mean they are waiting to merge with Russia, and I didn't say so.

What does it suggest is going on?

It suggests they don't want their population emigrating to western Europe under refugee status, because they won't come back. It is not a country full of Ukrainian nationalists ready to die to the last drop to defend their homeland. They aren't all Azov LARPers.

Forgive me, but this is one of those meaningless clichés that could be ventured about any theory and its advocate.

No, not any theory, only those that have no real evidence, such as theories about Vladimir Putin's master plan. Theories with evidence can be tackled and fruitfully examined. Theories without cannot.

No, we don't, but it might be fair to speculate. On second thought, it might be not just be fair to speculate but also important to do so.

My point here is that our failed speculations are treated as confirmation, and that is risky. "Russia was supposed to win in two days" was a speculation whose failure has been taken as fuel for an ever accelerating war machine: "Ukraine can win this!" is a belief that justifies more and more support, which is more and more escalation.

Or perhaps it was, "Well, maybe that is so, but the minute they crossed the border and started killing people, shelling homes, and demanding we let them govern us, we must fight them."

I suppose it depends on who "we" is supposed to be. That Ukrainian response is natural and just; that does not mean that the "we" I am included in should support them at any cost or that we should do so because their plight is emotionally moving and retribution for their plight satisfying.

A moment ago, you were demonstrating proofs to Russia’s incompetence, now you call the notion of their fragility a cliché.

I fail to see the connection. I highlighted Russian incompetence in executing plans. We too are being led by incompetent people, but that does not mean the power structures atop which they sit are fragile. Just thinking comparatively, Russia was in a far more fragile state in the 1920s, the 1930s, and the 1940s, as well of course the 1990s. And yet it has not collapsed. It was never been known for superior competence during any of its strongest periods.

Unless I'm misreading him, Stephen Kotkin is also great on the idea that American intelligence did a bang up job in its assessment of Russia, that not taking the opportunity to expand both NATO and democratic ideals would have been a mistake, and that this conflict is an unmatched opportunity for the West to get things right.

I agree generally with Kotkin, and take what he says very seriously, but one of us has misread him or over-read him. I think all of this comes from interviews, not in print (correct if I am wrong), but I don't believe he has ever said we should have expanded NATO by bringing Ukraine into it. If so, I would like to see the context for that. And I don't know that he has endorsed the means by which we have promoted democratic ideals in Ukraine. I have heard him say that NATO expansion should not be seen as a primary cause, not because NATO was a desirable good in itself but because of how traditional security concerns are at play and are the bigger issue, which is what I have emphasized in my discussions here. Those surely should factor into NATO expansion, and in fact they do—hence Finland is in but Ukraine is out and will remain out. We have not been attempting expansion of NATO in Ukraine outright, but we have still been using that country or letting ourselves be used by it. I didn't believe in the aggressive democracy spreading in the early 2000s when the weak countries we went after had no friends and we had few rivals, so I don't believe in it now when a much more serious opponent is involved. Not without a really good reason, which so far has not been offered. It failed when we applied greater force to weaker countries—why would it work in applying weaker force to greater countries? None of this makes any sense to me, and I think intuitively it doesn't make any sense to anyone else, which is why they retreat into the atrocity stuff. Vengeance is easy to understand—but we should remember that is easy to understand for the other side too.

FINIS

[honorentheos]

Hi Symmachus -

Thanks for your reply, Honorentheos. Civilians living in Crimea are not an occupying force; they just live there. And it's not just that some farmers can't irrigate their fields. There is water-rationing, sanitation problems, the downstream effect of agricultural depletion on the local food supply, which stresses the food supply of the surrounding regions, and so on (see here, from before the invasion). It has made life pretty miserable. If it is not malice directed at the population, then it is using the civilian population to get at the Russian government. Maybe that's justified on a moral level, maybe not, but my point was that tabulating wrongdoings/atrocities just becomes a semantic task to justify preconceptions or justify something else. I'm asking: what is that something else? Anyway, Ukrainian cruelty doesn't mean we have to like Russia or approve of their invasion. As Physics Guy reminds us, the hopelessly corrupt people running Ukraine don't need to be angels! We are not supporting them for their angelic qualities, but rather because we are really just opposing Russians, who are even less angelic. Devilish even. It all makes sense if you just stick to the atrocity porn.

Perhaps the question remains unanswered if the Ukraine shutting down a canal that supplies agricultural lands after Russia occupied Crimea is really an example of malice towards ethnic Russians? And if so, what ethnic malice is behind Russia shutting down pipeline infrastructure that affects people's lives? The original request was to understand what supported the claim Ukraine was, "Perceived atrocities committed against ethnic Russians by the Ukrainian government are the core of Russian propaganda, after all, even though many of the elements of that propaganda campaign happen also to be true." Perhaps I misread the extent of the comment, and all that was implied is there is some actual event that feeds the perception that the Ukrainians are committing atrocities against ethnic Russians? Difficult to say that a claim of that degree of ambiguity could be disproven, but also so universally applicable to how propoganda generally works the point it makes is blunted even as it is made. Occupying forces are considered responsible for the well-being of the civilians in the occupied lands, and shutting off the supply of resources otherwise being provided for free to another polity isn't a war crime. A propogandist of sufficient wiles might argue doing so is a tacit legitimizing of Russian control of the region. Propoganda is like that.

The issue you have is with the post WWII order that is decidedly breaking down as western influence wanes. Is that good, bad, mir egal? It seems it takes more energy to maintain than humanity could sustain for long at any rate, even at our troubled levels of hypocritical belief in sovereign national borders and ideals. It's a post-modern world now,.I suppose. Or just another turn of the wheel. You mentioned Thucydides earlier and I have to imagine the ideas aren't so post-modern as they are the thoughts of systems below the level of nation-state and globalization. Nothing is more timeless as that.

Why is it breaking down? Why is it waning? Who is deciding on this? I don't think it's a natural process like the seasons. There are policies and choices. Events can be out of control, but there are better and worse responses to those events. People who have responded terribly to previous events and advocated destructive policies and made poor choices are once again in the lead. I just don't see why we should continue to take them seriously. But of course that is because Putler and evil FSB have kompromat on me.

It does leave open the question why the US having acted in bad faith at times, many times perhaps, legitimizes the rise of authoritarianism and erosion of Western Liberal Democracy which Putin has outright decried as decadent? Whatever is behind the decline, if it collapses into a more 19th century-esque nationalist competition model as appears to be Putin's model, what's the upside?

[Doctor CamNC4Me]

Man. If only there were some way to know what Putin’s ‘master plan’ were. I suppose we could look at his speeches and writings regarding Ukraine, the West, geopolitics, what have you. OR, since Putin’s statements are apparently opaque, behind a mysterious information iron wall with no way to access them, Symmachus could source some other reputable person who's been in direct contact with Putin who definitely isn’t the chancellor of Germany, isn’t Putin’s own propaganda machine, and isn’t any number of close and trusted friends like, I dunno, a former Russian president.



- Doc

[Moksha]

Is Ukraine wrong for not wanting to be part of Russia?

[Morley]

Thanks, Symmachus. Again, allow me a gentle rebuttal.

Thank you your reply, Morley. The policy is still in effect, last I heard, even if it is not something western news outlets want to dwell on with any frequency. Any news on whether it's been revoked? And it is not about conscription; it is simply barring people from leaving. Their ordinary conscription is still in effect; they just aren't letting men leave the country with their families. It is interesting that the military was calling the shots, not the government.

Okay, I'm glad you abandoned the why-can't-they-behave-like-we-would-if-Mexico-invaded thought experiment.

I’m not sure that you’re really reading either the article you linked or what I’m saying. The article claimed the military was planning the ban, not that they had enacted it. Zolenskyy and some members of parliament were against it, and we don’t know that the military was able to call the shots. Nowhere in the article was it claimed that the ban had actually gone into effect. I’m curious to know where you heard that the policy had either been enacted or was still in effect.

Forgive me, but this is one of those meaningless clichés that could be ventured about any theory and its advocate.

No, not any theory, only those that have no real evidence, such as theories about Vladimir Putin's master plan. Theories with evidence can be tackled and fruitfully examined. Theories without cannot.

You claimed to have dismissed everything you’ve heard about what Putin thinks as saying more about the theorist than the theory. I would wager that there’s evidence behind some of those heard theories--whether historical, behavioral, or from gathered intelligence. To shrug off everything you've heard, with the wave of a cliché, seems a bit dismissive.

My point here is that our failed speculations are treated as confirmation, and that is risky. "Russia was supposed to win in two days" was a speculation whose failure has been taken as fuel for an ever accelerating war machine: "Ukraine can win this!" is a belief that justifies more and more support, which is more and more escalation.

I get your point. However, the dominant speculation was actually that Putin thought Russia would win this war in two to four days. I’m not sure said speculation was a failure--or that we know an 'accelerated war machine' is necessarily bad.

Or perhaps it was, "Well, maybe that is so, but the minute they crossed the border and started killing people, shelling homes, and demanding we let them govern us, we must fight them."

I suppose it depends on who "we" is supposed to be. That Ukrainian response is natural and just; that does not mean that the "we" I am included in should support them at any cost or that we should do so because their plight is emotionally moving and retribution for their plight satisfying.

I was answering this: "Just about every response to my earlier post is a variation of that: 'well, maybe that is so, but the minute they crossed the border they earned the death penalty and we must fight them.' "

As I understand it, the 'we' was the word you used to encompass the supposed positions of your critics. I rephrased your assertion to make it more accurate.

I fail to see the connection. I highlighted Russian incompetence in executing plans. We too are being led by incompetent people, but that does not mean the power structures atop which they sit are fragile. Just thinking comparatively, Russia was in a far more fragile state in the 1920s, the 1930s, and the 1940s, as well of course the 1990s. And yet it has not collapsed. It was never been known for superior competence during any of its strongest periods.

Again, point taken. I don't think Russia will ever collapse (though as Kotkin says, if it does collapse, it'll soon come back)

Unless I'm misreading him, Stephen Kotkin is also great on the idea that American intelligence did a bang up job in its assessment of Russia, that not taking the opportunity to expand both NATO and democratic ideals would have been a mistake, and that this conflict is an unmatched opportunity for the West to get things right.

I agree generally with Kotkin, and take what he says very seriously, but one of us has misread him or over-read him. I think all of this comes from interviews, not in print (correct if I am wrong), but I don't believe he has ever said we should have expanded NATO by bringing Ukraine into it. If so, I would like to see the context for that. And I don't know that he has endorsed the means by which we have promoted democratic ideals in Ukraine.

All the pieces are in print media.

I’m not aware that Kotkin has specifically mentioned bringing Ukraine into NATO, or for that matter, that he thinks it should be excluded from membership. My comment was meant to convey Kotkin's general support for a robust and expanding NATO.

I have heard him say that NATO expansion should not be seen as a primary cause, not because NATO was a desirable good in itself but because of how traditional security concerns are at play and are the bigger issue, which is what I have emphasized in my discussions here.

I believe he says outright that NATO was not in any way the cause of the invasion. I can provide a link if you wish.




Below, find some quotations and links to Stephen Kotkin you requested.


NATO expansion.

There are internal processes in Putin's Russia, which started in Yeltsin's Russia, which predate both of them by a long, long time where the recourse to autocracy, the recourse to repression, the recourse to militarism, the suspicion of foreigners, these are not reactions to something that the West does or doesn't do, these are internal processes that had a dynamic of their own, and that NATO expansion became a pretext or an excuse post-facto. For many years we've now been having this I would say self-flagellation. Let's imagine that we don't expand the security perimeter and the realm of freedom. Where would those countries be right now? Where would Czechoslovakia, Poland, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, where would they be right now? They would potentially be in the same place as Ukraine. So the causality is the opposite here. Moreover, another thing that the analysts, once again, we respect them and this is an important debate, and there are some arguments on the other side, we did make many mistakes as we do in policy.

https://www.hoover.org/research/5-more- ... n%20policy.


I would even go further. I would say that nato expansion has put us in a better place to deal with this historical pattern in Russia that we’re seeing again today. Where would we be now if Poland or the Baltic states were not in nato? They would be in the same limbo, in the same world that Ukraine is in.

https://www.newyorker.com/news/q-and-a/ ... %20is%20in.



Russia as weak. (Umm, okay, maybe not fragile.) Foreign Policy article, "Russia’s Perpetual Geopolitics," which Stephen Kotkin wrote in May/June 2016 issue. Great article I’d love to reread, but I no longer have a subscription. However, I know this quotation is from there:


These high-water marks aside, however, Russia has almost always been a relatively weak great power.

https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles ... eopolitics



Kotkin refers to Ukrainians as a people and a nation. He insinuates that he thinks Putin thought he was going to take Kyiv in two or four days.

The West is a series of institutions and values. The West is not a geographical place. Russia is European, but not Western. Japan is Western, but not European. “Western” means rule of law, democracy, private property, open markets, respect for the individual, diversity, pluralism of opinion, and all the other freedoms that we enjoy, which we sometimes take for granted. We sometimes forget where they came from. But that’s what the West is. And that West, which we expanded in the nineties, in my view properly, through the expansion of the European Union and nato, is revived now, and it has stood up to Vladimir Putin in a way that neither he nor Xi Jinping expected.

If you assumed that the West was just going to fold, because it was in decline and ran from Afghanistan; if you assumed that the Ukrainian people were not for real, were not a nation; if you assumed that Zelensky was just a TV actor, a comedian, a Russian-speaking Jew from Eastern Ukraine—if you assumed all of that, then maybe you thought you could take Kyiv in two days or four days. But those assumptions were wrong.

https://www.newyorker.com/news/q-and-a/ ... re%20wrong.



Praise for American Intelligence.

Yes, all the capitals in Europe were surprised. All the capitals in Asia were surprised. The chattering classes were surprised. The establishment in Russia, which was out of the loop, they were also surprised. And of course, many people in the American establishment were surprised, but not the intelligence agencies. And what we did through the intelligence agencies was we shared real time intelligence with our European allies, showing them Russia's capabilities and possible intentions and predicting that they would invade. And it turned out that our intelligence agencies, along with the British nailed this and their sharing of information first with our allies and then publicly rallied the support of the West in a really big way. And so kudos to the intelligence agencies who've taken a beating lately in the past couple of decades, over the rock and many other issues. They nailed this one, they had Putin's number and that's a really big story, not just for Russia, but also for China. How did the U.S. and the UK intelligence agency seem to know so much?

https://www.hoover.org/research/5-more- ... %20much%3F



A muscular West in the Ukraine conflict as an opportunity for expansion.

And so this is a big moment for us, a huge opportunity to recalibrate and take this galvanized West and expand it as a voluntary sphere of influence, which can stand up to those significant threats to our way of life and our values.

https://www.hoover.org/research/5-more- ... r%20values.


Kotkin opines on what Putin was thinking.

Putin believed, it seems, that Ukraine is not a real country, and that the Ukrainian people are not a real people, that they are one people with the Russians. He believed that the Ukrainian government was a pushover. He believed what he was told or wanted to believe about his own military, that it had been modernized to the point where it could organize not a military invasion but a lightning coup, to take Kyiv in a few days and either install a puppet government or force the current government and President to sign some paperwork.

https://www.newyorker.com/news/q-and-a/ ... 0paperwork.


...


To tie this back into Mormonism, I need to make this disclaimer about the above discussion:

"And now, if there are faults they are the mistakes of Morley; wherefore, condemn not the things of Symmachus, that ye may be found spotless at the judgment-seat of Doctor Shades."


...

Thank you for your perspective, Consul. It's always fun for me to look at things from another, well-argued viewpoint.

Be well.



Edited eight billion times for formatting, grammar, and clarity.

[PseudoPaul]

"Why can't Ukraine just lay over and let Russia genocide them? Ukraine wanting not to be genicided is the real genocide, acktually."

[Chap]

"Why can't Ukraine just lay over and let Russia genocide them? Ukraine wanting not to be genicided is the real genocide, acktually."

Yes, it really is very irresponsible of them to do their best to repel the Russian army, which invaded their country with the aim of replacing their elected leader, while declaring that their country did not really exist.

And it is sheer bad taste for them to have exposed just how ill-trained, ill-led, ill-fed and ill-equipped large parts of the Russian infantry forces are. Could they not have exercised a little tact?

And they give up the last shred of decency when they begin to interfere with the only part of the Russian land forces that worked well - the long-range artillery that Russia has used for the sacred purpose of conducting bombardments that flatten entire cities and kill civilians while (as is only proper) not exposing the gunners to any personal risk whatsoever. And now those barbaric HIMARS are actually destroying that artillery and killing or injuring those operating it. So unfair!

[Kishkumen]

Yes, it really is very irresponsible of them to do their best to repel the Russian army, which invaded their country with the aim of replacing their elected leader, while declaring that their country did not really exist.

And it is sheer bad taste for them to have exposed just how ill-trained, ill-led, ill-fed and ill-equipped large parts of the Russian infantry forces are. Could they not have exercised a little tact?

And they give up the last shred of decency when they begin to interfere with the only part of the Russian land forces that worked well - the long-range artillery that Russia has used for the sacred purpose of conducting bombardments that flatten entire cities and kill civilians while (as is only proper) not exposing the gunners to any personal risk whatsoever. And now those barbaric HIMARS are actually destroying that artillery and killing or injuring those operating it. So unfair!

I wonder: if the US were not in any way involved in this situation, even indirectly, what would we think of Russia attempting to overthrow Ukraine's leadership because of their refusal to kowtow to Russian authority? What would we make of Russia's invasion of Ukraine and its slaughter of innocent civilians?

Let me just forget I am American for a moment and take ideology off of the table. If Russia were doing this regardless of the US, how would we react? I hope we would be as outraged as we are now.

I mean, I get that we have done awful things, but, then I didn't approve of those actions either. I would hope that my disapproval of Russia's actions is predicated on principles I hold fast to and not on tribal loyalties.

No matter which country is under consideration, I want them to determine their own destiny without the interference of foreign governments and business concerns, with the only exception to that rule relating to the severe violation of human rights. The same goes for us in our relationships with other nations. Our meddling in the affairs of other nations has infuriated me, not that shaking my fist and huffing and puffing does any good.

Of course, that is actually an ideological position. Alexander Dugin has made the argument that, as a Eurasian civilization, Russia should be at liberty to do as it pleases in its own neighborhood (outside its recognized borders). That is his ideological position, and it is true that many Westerners, including me (who cares), do not agree with it. I don't accept arguments about hypocrisy in the West justifying Russia doing whatever it wants to its neighbors. Yes, we are hypocrites, but, looking at how this invasion has gone down, I would say that, as awful as our civilizational sins may be, I don't see many of us, at this stage of history, wantonly leveling and slaughtering in the way Russia is.

The practical considerations about where Ukraine comes from and its relationship with Russia in the past, as well as its importance to Russian security, only go so far, in my view. At what point is Ukraine allowed to determine its own future? If someone else's imperial machinations created the border and mashed different peoples together, does that mean that Ukraine must accept Russia moving in and taking over?

Maybe I am being dense here, but what is Ukraine to do, and what right do others have to help them do what they seem to want to do?

[Chap]

I think Kishkumen sums up a reasonable position quite elegantly.

Ukraine is currently being invaded by a large neighbouring country run by a man who is effectively a dictator, and who wants it, in effect, to disappear.

If Ukraine asks other people for help in resisting, what kind of response would it be to say. "We'd like to help, but in the past some of our governments have done a lot of bad or ill-advised stuff that makes us feel really upset when we think about it. Sorry, but you'll just have to manage by yourselves."?

[Everybody Wang Chung]

"In Russia, soldiers don't fight for Russia, Russia fights for soldiers." -- Yakov Smirnoff


In what is surely fake news (according to William Schryver), Russia is now deploying helicopters to round up deserters:
https://www.msn.com/en-us/news/world/ru ... r-AA11EEnf